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Abstract
This dissertation studies two structural frameworks in empirical studies of In-
dustrial Organization: two-sided matching models and simultaneous auction/contest
models. Both models involve two disjoint sides of players: matching occurs between
firms and workers, schools and students, and so forth; in an auction or contest, there
always exists an auctioneer or contest designer on one side and bidders or contes-
tants on the opposite. First, empirical studies of two-sided matching markets reveal
that sorting patterns between potential employers and employees may be driven by
unobserved heterogeneity on both sides and preferences over multidimensional wage
contracts. Therefore, in Chapter 2, I study a generalized matching model with Non-
Transferrable Utility (NTU), i.e. a two-stage model where employers firstly set wage
contracts for their jobs, workers then match with the jobs in a decentralized way. I
propose a strategy that exploits the variation in agent- and match-specific charac-
teristics from finite-sized repeated markets to identify and estimate the preference
primitives in the presence of two-sided unobserved heterogeneity, assuming employ-
ers share a vertical preference over workers. I further suggest a likelihood-based
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estimation strategy that tackles the dimensionality issue emerging from the existence
of global players of the repeated game, and show its performance via Monte Carlo
simulation analyses.
In Chapter 3, I apply the model and identification method developed in Chap-
ter 2 to study recently fast-growing online labor markets that match skilled labor
to short-term jobs using a contest-based mechanism. Despite the anecdotal evidence
showing both firms and workers benefiting from largely decreased meeting friction
and increased flexibility on the platform, it is economically substantial to quantita-
tively reveal the preference structure of both parties, which may include unobserved
factors to researchers. I, therefore, adopt the two-stage model where firms set wage
contracts for their jobs before programmers choose coding projects simultaneously. I
then use the identification strategy that exploits the variation in agent- and match-
specific characteristics from finite-sized repeated markets to estimate workers’ latent
skill levels and jobs’ latent complexity levels. Using individual-level data from a
leading online tournament-based labor market, TopCoder.com, which matches work-
ers worldwide with short-term software developing tasks, I find a multidimensional
preference beyond cash motives when workers consider which jobs to take. Using the
results from the estimation, I further study the elements regarding market design that
could leverage off the matching mechanisms to improve the total surplus generated
from such markets.
While this “crowdsourcing” market can be modeled as a matching process between
iii
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firms with temporary jobs and workers, I would also like to capture the strategic
interaction of workers after they match with an individual job. Within the same job,
workers exert effort to win pre-determined cash prizes according to the rank order
of their delivered work. This can be naturally modeled in a (multi-prize) contest
environment. A central concern is to recover the underlying preferences of workers,
which again requires the full knowledge of the unobserved heterogeneity, or types, of
both workers and jobs. Chapter 4 develops a new method to identify and estimate
primitives in simultaneous contests with multiple prizes. I establish a two-stage game
where bidders/contestants first choose one among multiple auctions/contests, then
in the second stage, they compete within each auction/contest by submitting their
bids simultaneously, contributing their efforts to win over the pre-determined prize
based on the rank order. I show that by observing their first-stage choice probability
combined with the second-stage bidding strategy, I can nonparametrically identify
the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity on both sides of the market. I then
present an estimation strategy and show the performance of Monte Carlo experiments.
Primary Reader: Professor Yingyao Hu
Secondary Reader: Professor Elena Krasnokutskaya
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Two-sided markets have been widely observed in real life and reached growing
attention by researchers in recent decades. Examples can be found from online mar-
kets matching skilled labor force with temporary jobs to the public school admission
process. Economically, it is of great importance to understand how preferences from
both sides of the market drive the observable market outcomes, such as the sorting
between workers and jobs, and ultimately how the welfare could be leveraged up by
policy intervention alternating the market power of players. This dissertation ex-
plores two different perspectives to identify the underlying preference primitives for
both sides, allowing for the existences of multi-layer unobserved heterogeneity.
First, in Chapter 2, I establish a generalized one-to-many matching model with
Non-Transferrable Utility (NTU) to study such markets. Specifically, there are two
sets of players, denoted as firms and workers for simplicity. They meet in the market
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to match with each other to form an employment relationship. Capacities from both
sides are constrained so that a worker can complete at most one job in the market,
and firms can hire no more than their pre-determined slot quota for the job. Initially,
firms set the wage scheme for the potentially paired workers simultaneously, based
upon their own preference over workers’ skills and rivalry from other firms; after-
ward, workers match with jobs by signing up a slot for a job, commonly observing
the posted wages and other job features. Compared with standard NTU matching
models in the literature, I add a wage-setting stage before the matching process, to
relax the exogeneity assumption of monetary transfers under NTU framework and
better understand how financial motives shifts the sorting patterns. After setting
up this model, I define a rational expectation equilibrium notion, in which workers
acquire pairwise stable matching in the second stage, and firms maximize their ex-
pected payoff in the first stage, holding correct beliefs about second-stage matching.
Additionally, by assuming firms carrying a vertical preference over workers’ skills, I
manage to establish critical characterizations of the equilibrium that directly links
to my identification strategy. In particular, I argue that from repeatedly observing
(1) a one-dimensional index that proxies workers’ skill level, and (2) a match-specific
outcome for each matched worker-job pair for at least two periods, I have enough
variation in observables and am able to nonparametrically identify the joint distribu-
tion of job-wise and worker-wise unobserved heterogeneity in each market, using the
eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition method developed in measurement error mod-
2
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els. Next, I recover the joint choice probability for all workers in each market, which
leads to the identification of workers’ utility parameters. In this step, I follow the well-
studied single-agent discrete choice framework to model workers’ indirect utility from
choosing any job or the outside option. Lastly, from jointly observing at least three
firms in each market, I recover their profit structure along with the distribution of a
market-level demand shifter, as the joint observation of multiple firms links to firms’
primitives in a way similar to measurement error models as well. 1 Following the
identification argument, I also provide a practically viable likelihood-based estimator
that performs well in Monte Carlo simulation analyses. The estimator maximizes a
modified likelihood that utilizes partial information from all markets observed and
can be useful especially when the number of firms and/or workers in each market
grows large.
Using data from an emerging online labor market that matches computer pro-
grammers to software development tasks on a weekly basis, I apply my generalized
matching framework and identification strategy in Chapter 3 to unveil the market
players’ preferences. I have individual-level data about the website TopCoder.com,
the world’s online leader in accommodating programmers from worldwide to complete
Information Technology (IT)-related short-term jobs remotely. It adopts the concept
of “crowdsourcing”, where multiple programmers usually engage in one job at the
same time, and payment is delivered according to the rank order of their final prod-
1An example of the market-level demand shifter is the efficiency to for firms to recruit workers
via this platform compare with alternative platforms.
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ucts submitted to the firm. From data, I find a preliminary yet interesting pattern
from regression – highly paid jobs on average get deliveries of poorer quality on this
platform. As this is apparently unappealing for the long-run sustainability of the
website, it is substantial to explore the underlying preference pattern of both parties
using a structural model. By applying the two-stage model, I developed in Chapter
3 to estimate the parameters, I find that skilled workers, while indeed prefer to get
more money out of a job, generically try to avoid more complicated jobs which pay
more in equilibrium. Based on the estimates, I conduct two sets of counterfactual
experiment, and find out that compared with stimulating skilled workers’ passion to-
wards demanding jobs through indirect channels, one more efficient way to boost the
market is to allow firms to “discriminate” workers by using a wage menu contingent
on the quality of submissions. These novel findings are not all intuitive compared
with reduced-form regressions and have their credits in the empirical studies of online
markets, as well as empirical matching market analyses.
The aforementioned “crowdsourcing” feature of the market I study in Chapter 3
relates to another important strand of structural IO studies, the all-pay auctions if the
winner takes all and contests if prize schedule is based upon rank orders. Specifically,
I shift my focus from the matching process between jobs and workers to the strategic
behavior after workers choosing the job in Chapter 4. Workers are in fact engaged in
a multi-prize contest, where they exert efforts to deliver their products to the firm,
and their payment, or prize, depend on the rank order of the final products’ quality.
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Therefore, I simplify the wage-setting stage of firms to be exogenous and set up
another two-stage model for workers afterward. 2 Workers hold a private valuation
toward all jobs in the market. This can be alternatively thought of as their capacity
of completing a job. They initially choose one job to take part in, then decide how
much effort they exert to maximize their expected payoff. I show in this chapter
that from jointly observing workers’ first-stage choice probability and second-stage
bidding behavior, I can nonparametrically recover the distribution of bother job-wise
and worker-wise unobserved heterogeneity (or types). The intuition is that, following
the seminal paper by Guerre, Perrigne and Voung (2009), I can establish a mapping
from observed bids, or quality of delivered products, to the unobserved valuation of
each worker. 3 On the job side, the variation in the probability of choosing a job given
different numbers of competing workers in the same market provides identification
power under regulatory conditions. I suggest a two-step estimator corresponding to
my identification argument and present the Monte Carlo simulation performance.
The estimator performs better when the job-wise unobserved heterogeneity is drawn
from a discrete space rather than continuous.
2Firms’ wage-setting behavior is exogenous, but I allow the wages or prizes to be related with their
job characteristics in an arbitrary way. Thus, this model still captures some features of two-sided
markets.
3Essentially, the valuation affects workers’ profit of taking part in a job.
5
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When a market explicitly consists of two disjoint sets (sides) of agents, and agents
on both sides have preference over forming a relationship with agents on the other side,
it is often referred to as two-sided matching markets. Empirical studies of matching
markets have recently garnered considerable attention. Ever since the seminal work
by Gale and Shapley (1962) and Shapley and Shubik (1972), researchers separately
study two frameworks of matching games: Non-Transferrable Utility (NTU) frame-
6
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UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY
work if all the characteristics on both sides including potential monetary transfers are
exogenously determined; and Transferrable Utility (TU) framework if monetary trans-
fers are additively separable to one’s utility and endogenously determined along with
the matching allocation.1 The choice between the two structures usually hinges on
researchers’ understanding of the institutional structure of the market. For instance,
when analyzing school admission problems, it is inappropriate to adopt the TU frame-
work, as tuition fees are usually pre-determined by the government or schools with
little room for negotiation, if not completely nonnegotiable. This is the main reason
why the NTU framework is adopted in college admission problems. Nevertheless,
when doing so, one should be cautious when claiming tuition fees, similar to other
school characteristics, are exogenous. In fact, if one believes that tuition fees are set
strategically either by the government or by schools, then the underlying preferences
over students will affect the observed distribution of tuition fees, leading to inconsis-
tent estimation of model primitives if ignoring so. It is, therefore, important to study
the determination process of monetary transfers even when they are not negotiable
between two sides.
Another challenge in the empirical analysis of two-sided matching games is that the
preferences resulting in the observed outcomes may depend on individual’s features
that are unobservable to the researcher. In the example of school admission problems,
important factors influencing the observed matching outcomes include students’ latent
1A recent paper by Galichon et.al. analyzes the Imperfect Transferable Utility (ITU) framework
that is based on the TU structure but allows for non-additive transfers to agents’ utility functions.
7
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skills and schools’ reputation, both of which are unlikely to be entirely captured by
observables. Ignoring the existence of such unobserved heterogeneity will also impede
the accuracy of model estimates to suggest any policy improvements further.
In this paper, I analyze a generalized Non-Transferrable Utility (NTU) matching
game in which the monetary transfers are firstly determined by one side of the market
(e.g. the employers), then the matching process occurs in a decentralized fashion in
the second stage, taking the monetary transfers as given. I use information repeatedly
observed for agent- and match-specific characteristics to nonparametrically identify
both sides’ unobserved heterogeneity, assuming employers share a vertical preference
over employees. Preference primitives are further identified from solving this two-
stage model, linking the observed distribution of market outcomes to employers’ latent
pricing strategies and employees’ latent choices over multiple jobs. Afterward, I
propose a likelihood-based estimation strategy that tackles the dimensionality issue
emerging when the number of markets and/or players increases, and establish the
consistency result of such an estimator.
Contribution of this paper:
First, from a theoretical perspective, the two-stage model in this paper combines
the matching process with a wage-setting process beforehand, which generalizes the
nontransferable utility (NTU) framework in two-sided matching games that assumes
the complete exogeneity of monetary transfers in matching games. An explicit or
implicit wage-setting stage is widely observed in markets without individually nego-
8
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tiable contracts but has been underexplored in the applied matching-theory literature.
By incorporating this stage, I can explain in depth how monetary transfers are set
strategically based upon jobs’ features, and how it further determines the matching
allocation of workers towards jobs. When some job and/or worker features are not
observed by the researcher, characterizing the wage-setting process will further facil-
itate the identification of these unobserved types which will be discussed in details
later.
Second, my model allows market players’ preferences over the opposite side to be
driven by both observed and unobserved features. Workers are furthermore allowed
to have heterogeneous preferences over the types of jobs they favor. Heterogeneity
in types and preferences is mostly detected in the empirical literature of online mar-
ketplaces but has rarely been modeled explicitly in literature, as identification issues
are a central concern. In this paper, I obtain point identification through a multistep
method in which the unobserved type distribution of both sides are initially nonpara-
metrically identified from jointly observing worker- and match-specific characteristics
for multiple periods, using a modified version of eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposi-
tion techniques based on measurement error models. Then workers’ heterogeneous
preference primitives are recovered from the market-level choice probability using the
widely-studied discrete choice model. Lastly, firms’ profit primitives are identified
through the symmetric monotone strategy of their equilibrium wages against their
job types under incomplete information. This identification strategy is novel in the
9
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structural literature estimating matching games with unobservables, and could be
applied to various empirical settings with finite-sized markets. 2
When estimating the generalized matching game using maximum likelihood, a
general concern is the dimensionality issue when the number of players and/or mar-
kets increases. In the model, one important feature is that some players from one
side of the market (i.e. workers) are repeatedly observed over time, which makes
them “global players” of the repeated game. When this set of players increase, or
the number of market increases, it requires a high-dimensional integration over global
players’ types to construct the likelihood function, which can be very computation-
ally impractical using real data. In this paper, I suggest a likelihood-based estimator
that maximizes a reconstructed likelihood function to reduce the dimensionality sig-
nificantly, and it performs well in Monte Carlo simulation. This estimator could be
adopted in other similar models (e.g. single agent discrete choice models) with a high
dimension of unobserved heterogeneity and/or a significant number of players within
a market.
Related literature:
From a methodological point of view, this paper contributes to the recently grow-
ing empirical literature analyzing preferences in two-sided matching markets when
2Alternatively, researchers assume an infinite number of players in one market (market being
thick) and develop identification strategies accordingly. The thickness of the market is usually as-
sumed in the current empirical literature, but this is not ensured: In online labor markets, transac-
tions usually take the form of spot tasks, which can be sensitive both temporally and geographically.
Examples of temporally sensitive tasks are the coding jobs at Topcoder.com. An example of a
geographically sensitive work is a babysitting job on TaskRabbit.com.
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unobserved heterogeneity. Modeling the role of monetary transfers in these markets
is crucial for econometric specification and counterfactual experiments. When it is
believed that monetary transfers are determined simultaneously with the equilibrium
match, it falls into the TU framework, in which the researchers are only able to
identify the one-dimensional match-specific output/surplus from data on observed
matches. One strand of the literature manages to transform the matching problem
into a general equilibrium problem by assuming agents have preferences over finite
types of their counterparts and that the market is thick on both sides (Choo and
Siow, 2006; Chiappori et al., 2006; Graham, 2013; Galichon and Salanie, 2012; Sinha,
2014).
Meanwhile, the rank-order property developed in Fox (2010) is a major economet-
ric tool when preferences are over individuals, and requires that across a population
of observationally equivalent identical markets, the matching allocation that yields a
higher (deterministic part of the) surplus will be more frequently observed. While
this assumption is intuitive economically, it is challenging to write an exact data-
generating process under which it holds. Moreover, this property no longer holds
when unobserved heterogeneity is introduced into the model. Fox and Yang (2012)
show that without the rank-order property, in markets with match-specific unobserved
heterogeneity, the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity could be identified follow-
ing the special regressor method in the multinomial choice literature when researchers
are able to observe markets where no agents are matched. In this paper, I adopt a
11
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similar intuition by assuming preferences are over individuals rather than types, and
translate the matching problem to a well-studied discrete-choice problem by assum-
ing firms admit a vertical preference over workers, but I do not depend on observing
completely unmatched markets to achieve identification. Instead, by exploiting the
distribution of endogenous wage contracts, along with repeatedly observing agents on
one side across markets, I can uniquely recover the joint distribution of unobserved
types of both sides using the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition. A more funda-
mental difference from Fox and Yang(2012) is that I adopt the NTU framework in
my second stage model, wherein monetary transfers are treated as given and cannot
be negotiated between the two parties.
Although there has been a stream of papers that estimate the preferences over
various characteristics (see for example Logan et al., 2008; Boyd et al., 2013), two
recent papers have shown that utility primitives are typically not identified from
merely observing the joint distribution of characteristics of one-to-one matched pairs:
Menzel (2015) shows that under the parametric assumption on idiosyncratic match-
specific tastes, only the sum of individual surplus from a match is identified in a
single large market. Agarwal and Diamond (2014) show that double-vertical prefer-
ence in a large single market could be identified when econometricians can observe the
joint distribution of (at least) two-to-one matching characteristics. To achieve iden-
tification of distributions of unobserved heterogeneity (or partially identifying some
function of unobserved heterogeneity), both papers assume the unobserved compo-
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nents are independent of observables, inducing no systematic correlations in prefer-
ences among market players; furthermore, they rely crucially on market size going to
infinity. This paper complements their work by showing that, by observing a one-
dimensional match-specific outcome and worker-specific outcome, one could obtain
point identification even with limited market size and one-to-one matching, as long as
preferences on one side are vertical. This assumption – or, more generally, the aligned-
preference assumption – ensures uniqueness of the equilibrium and is widely used in
the literature. For instance, Agarwal (2014) makes the same one-sided vertical pref-
erence assumption when studying the national medical-resident placement market,
a labor market with almost nonnegotiable wage contracts. Sorensen (2007) adopts
a fixed sharing rule between matched pairs, which also leads to aligned preference,
and identifies utility primitives from exclusion restrictions across different markets
with match-specific idiosyncratic components. In this paper, I explicitly model the
contract setting stage before the matching process, which is not captured in any of
the papers listed above.
An alternative strand of empirical studies dodges the discussion of point identifi-
cation of utility primitives. Instead, it estimates a set of parameters consistent with
the pairwise-stability notion (Baccara et al., 2012; Uetake and Watanabe, 2014).
In this paper, I make a stronger assumption on the preference structure to obtain
a unique equilibrium outcome, as point identification facilitates the computation of
counterfactuals while the identified set may not be sharp.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 establishes the structural
model and characterize the equilibrium for the Generalized Non-Transferable Utility
matching game. Next, in Section 3, I present the main identification and estimation
results that nonparametrically recover the unobserved heterogeneity and paramet-
rically recovers the utility primitives. Also, I provide a likelihood-based estimation
procedure implementing my identification method. Following that, Section 4 presents
the Monte Carlo results that confirm the validity of my estimation strategy. Lastly,
I conclude this paper in Section 5.
2.2 A Structural Model for the General-
ized NTU Matching Games
I now establish the structural model for the generalized matching game. Each
market consists of two sides of players, denoted as firms and workers seeking for a
job. They gather to match and form an employment relationship. In the market,
each firm carries one job needed to be fulfilled but can attract multiple applications,
and each potential employee can be matched with at most one job in a market;
across different markets, however, there is no restriction on the number of jobs a
worker can take. As the researcher, I observe three sets of information: on one side
of the market, I observe the monetary transfers proposed by each employer to their
potential employees; on the other side, I observe a one-dimensional “index” for each
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potential employee, and this index provides partial information about their ability
levels. Lastly, I observe the allocation of which person ends up with which employer.
Conditional on other observed information, the complexity level of each job carried by
an employer, along with the latent ability level of each employee and the market-wise
demand condition, is unobservable to me. I will focus on these layers of unobserved
heterogeneity and abstract away observable heterogeneity of both sides of the market.
It could be viewed as the model is built for each subpopulation that shares the same
observable characteristics.
2.2.1 The Timeline
The market game consists of two stages in each market t. At Stage 1, a finite
number Jt of employers randomly sign up to be present in the market. They have
common prior about the distribution of peer jobs’ complexity and potential employ-
ees’ utility profiles, but cannot observe other employers’ types nor the actual identity
of participating employees. Besides, they all observe the market-wise demand con-
dition, ωt, that commonly affects their profits.
3 By the end of this stage, employers
simultaneously determine the monetary transfers they will grant to their potential
employees. They are allowed to recruit multiple people but are faced with a budget
constraint that is commonly known to all peer employers.
At Stage 2, a finite number It of workers are randomly drawn to enter the market.
3An example that determines ωt is the cost efficiency of recruiting people via alternative platforms.
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Perfectly observing the characteristics and utility profiles of every job and every peer
job-hunter, they simultaneously choose the job they would like to work on. Due to
capacity constraint, they are allowed to sign up for at most one job in a market; on
the other side, each firm can hire up to Qjt workers to work on the same project. After
signing-up, employees simultaneously work on the project and deliver their completed
job by the due date. Firms then hire a third-party reviewer board to rank order all
submissions based on their quality. The market game finishes when workers get cash
payment according to their rank order. In this model, I assume away strategic entry
and exit decisions on the firm side. This is a significant simplification that enables us
to focus on the strategic pricing behavior of firms and discrete choices of workers in
the market, which I believe are essential to recover for policy implications.
Next, I define the preference structure of players from both sides. There is an
abuse of notation in the subsequent discussion: It (resp.Jt) denotes both the number
of employees (resp. employers) in market t, and the set of employees (resp. employers)
in market t.
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2.2.2 Preferences of Firms
Firm j’s ex post payoff from recruiting a set of workers µt(j) to complete their
posted job in market t is modeled as:









where R is the revenue function that depends on three elements: (i) the job-wise
complexity Z∗j ; (ii) the sum of Zij, which denotes the quality of worker i’s submission
to firm j, 4 and (iii) the demand-side shifter, such as the cost efficiency of recruiting
via outside options, that affects the overall willingness to pay of all firms in the
market, and is denoted by ωt.





j , bj), (2.2)
where g2-function is increasing in worker i’s ability, X
∗
i , and decreasing in the com-




j ) and is
realized only after the employees complete their job. 5 A possible factor included in
bj is the bias when the third-party reviewer board evaluates the submissions.
4Here I assume all submissions enter firms’ profit function uniformly; instead, I can assume
non-winning submissions add partial credits to the firm’s profit. The core idea is that, without
considering cost, firm strictly prefers having extra submissions.
5This is to exclude the case where firms know ex ante the value of bj when they decide the cash
prizes at Stage 1.
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where R0 is a known function. Lastly, the rule of how each employee gets paid
according to their rank-order is also observed by the researcher. Specifically,
Pij =

Pj, if i is the first place
φ1Pj, if i is the second place
φ2Pj, if i is the third place
· · ·
φQjtPj, if i is the Qjt place
where φk > φm,∀k < m, k,m = 1, 2, · · · , Qjt; φk, φm ∈ [0, 1) and is known to the
researcher.
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2.2.3 Preferences of Workers
Following the single-agent discrete choice literature, I assume the indirect utility
of employee i choosing firm j in market t is determined by the following equation:




j ) + νijt (2.4)
where β captures one’s vertical preference over cash prizes, and β ≥ 0. The function
ũit is a worker’s heterogeneous preference over the complexity of a job, and may
interact with their own skills. Lastly, νijt is the idiosyncratic taste shock that is
independent of other variables. I use j = 0 to denote the choice of staying outside
the market.
Formally, this Extensive Form game is defined as follows:
Definition 1 The two-stage market game is described by (It, Jt,Z,X,P, µt,Ω, Fω, π, u),
where
1. It is the set of workers, and Jt is the set of jobs posted by employers.
2. Z is the support of the complexity of jobs; X is the support of employees’ skill
levels.
3. P is the support of cash payments of all jobs.
4. µt is the matching allocation such that if employee i chooses job j, then µ(i) = j
and µ(j) = i. If employee i remains unmatched, then µ(i) = ∅; if no one chooses
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job j, then µ(j) = ∅.
5. Ω is the support of market unobservables that affects all firms’ profits.
6. π is the firms’ profit function and is defined in equation (3.1).
7. u is the workers’ indirect utility function and is defined in equation (2.4).
2.2.4 Equilibrium Notion and Characterization
After defining the game and players’ preferences, I now define a rational expecta-
tion equilibrium notion for this extensive-form game.
Definition 2 The rational-expectation equilibrium (δ∗t , µ
∗
t ) is such that: At Stage 2,
for any observed (P t,Z
∗
t ), the matching allocation µ
∗
t : I ∪ J → I ∪ J ∪ ∅ is pairwise
stable; At Stage 1, given the rational expectation about the stable matching function
and the knowledge of distribution of (X ∗t ,Z
∗
t ), firms play the mixed-strategy pricing
function δ∗t : Z→ Σ which is Bayesian Nash Equilibrium strategy.
The equilibrium concept defined in the second-stage market is the well-known
pairwise stability notion introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) and generalized in
Roth and Sotomayor (1989). An observed µ is said to be pairwise stable if it satisfies:
1. (Individual Rationality) ui,µ(i),t ≥ ui,∅,t,∀i ∈ It and |µt(j)| ≤ Qt, πpostj,µt(j),t ≥
πpostj,µt(j)\i,t, ∀j ∈ Jt, i ∈ µt(j).
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2. (Nonblocking Pairs) For any employee i and firm j such that j 6= µt(i), the fol-
lowing situations cannot happen simultaneously: ui,j,t > ui,µ(i),t; and π
post
j,µt(j)∪i,t >





,∃i′ ∈ µt(j) if |µt(j)| = Qt.
The first condition implies that the matching allocation I observe is at least as
desirable for all firms and workers as staying unmatched. The second condition means
that, for any worker i in the market, his/her current choice µt(i) is the most desirable
job in his/her choice set. This choice set consists of any firms that are willing to swap
their current matched employees with i, or to fulfill a vacant space with i.
At Stage 1, expecting employees will behave on the equilibrium path in the follow-
ing stage, and conditional on the prior knowledge of the joint distribution of workers’
abilities and peer firms’ job complexity, along with the distribution of workers’ id-
iosyncratic taste shock and the idiosyncratic shock to the submission quality, the
mixed-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is defined as a mapping δ∗t : Z → Σ,
where Σ := {δ|
∑m
l=1 δ
l = 1}, such that for each firm j, given other firms’ equilibrium




























∗, δ∗−j,t(·), ω)] · δlj,t,∀δ ∈ Σ. (2.5)
where πint denotes the interim payoff for firms j that chooses cash prize Pj and
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∗, δ∗−j,t(·), ω) =∑
µt
Pr(µt|Z ∗−j,t,X ∗t , Z∗j , pl, δt(Z ∗−j,t))πpost(Z∗j , ωt,X ∗t , µt, pl) (2.6)
In the subsequent paragraphs, I characterize the rational-expectation equilibrium
that leads us to the identification results in Section 3 in a backward fashion.
At Stage 2, the matching stage, it is well known from theory literature that a
pairwise stable outcome always exists when preferences are responsive (Roth and
Sotomayor, 1989). Uniqueness is ensured through the assumption that workers have
strict preferences over slots, and all slots agree upon the vertical and strict ranking
over workers (Clark, 2006; Niederle and Yariv, 2009). The formal result is presented
in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If firm j’s profit under matching allocation µt is defined as in equation
(3.1), then firms’ preference over set of employees is responsive to the preference over
individual employee. Furthermore, when preferences are strict on both sides, the stable
matching µ exists and is unique.
The proof of Lemma 1 uses the well-known Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance
Algorithm(DAA) to find the unique matching allocation. Nonetheless, as this game
proceeds without multiple rounds of making, holding and rejecting offers as suggested
in DAA, the question arises naturally: would the observed outcome still obtain pair-
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wise stability? The answer is yes. Consider the following non-cooperative game:
In the market firms simultaneously announce their jobs, each assigned with a cash
payment schedule and offers multiple (but finite) slots, each worker then simultane-
ously apply for a job , or simply exit the market; then, each firm accepts or rejects
received applications if there is any; lastly, if the application is accepted, the worker
and the job slot are matched, otherwise workers exit the market remaining single,
and the corresponding slots remain vacant. Matched workers then complete the job
as requested.
It is shown by Proposition 2 in Niederle and Yariv (2009) that under complete
information assumption, meaning that all players in the market are fully informed of
the utility profile, the stable match is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome surviving
iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Therefore, if we restrict our
attention to players’ rationalizable equilibrium strategies only, the non-cooperative
game’s rationalizable equilibrium are all pairwise stable.
After establishing the equivalence mapping from the non-cooperative game to the
matching framework, I would like to characterize pairwise stability in such a way that
relates to the single-agent discrete choice problem. By the proof of Lemma 1, we can
see that the skill level of a worker directly affects the cardinality of his choice set.
For instance, the most skilled worker, with the knowledge of being the best in the
market enjoys a very rich choice set containing the slots of all jobs in the market.
On the contrary, the choice set of the least-skilled one would be very limited, as in
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equilibrium, those slots favored by better workers would never be available to him.
In addition, only higher-ranked workers’ preferences will affect worker i’s choice set,
but not the lower-ranked ones. As a result, for each worker i, we can characterize his
choice set conditional on the stable matching µ in market t as:
Mi[µt] := {j1|j 6= µ(l), ∀X∗l > X∗i , π
post
j,i,t ≥ 0} ∪ {jk|∃lm,m = 1, 2, · · · , k − 1,









} ∪ ∅ (2.7)
where the first part of the RHS denotes the first-place of all jobs that are not chosen by
any of the better workers and are willing to hire worker i than letting the slot remain
vacant, and the second part denotes the highest slot of each job that is not fulfilled
by a better worker and the firms has to be willing to hire worker i than letting the
slot remain vacant. Through this characterization, I can rewrite the pairwise stability
condition into a series of single-agent optimal choices over heterogeneous choice sets:
Lemma 2 The match µt is pairwise stable if and only if ui,µ(i) ≥ maxm∈Mi[µt] ui,m,∀i ∈
It, where Mi[µt] is defined in equation (3.7).
6
The proof is in the appendix. Lemma 2 implies that as long as we know the actual
skills of all potential employees in market t, the pairwise stable outcome degenerates to
a discrete choice problem, in which workers make their discrete choices sequentially.
Firms’ preferences are embedded in the skill ranking of workers, which affects the
6Menzel (2015) characterizes the equilibrium using a similar argument here. His specification is
more general, though, as he includes all possible preference structure for both sides.
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sequence of workers’ moves. This lemma holds as long as one side of the market
admits a vertical preference over the other; therefore, a symmetric result could be
obtained if workers have vertical preference over jobs yet firms hold heterogeneous
preferences over workers.
Next, to characterize first-stage Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), recall that
according to Harsanyi (1967), the incomplete information game is equivalent to a
complete information game with k · J “shadow firms,” and these shadow firms be-
longing to the same job will be randomly selected by Nature to be present at Stage
1 after they set their equilibrium strategy. The existence of a mixed-strategy BNE is
therefore ensured by Nash’s theorem. Formally,
Lemma 3 If both the support of submission qualities Z and the support of cash prizes
P are finite, then the game defined above has at least one mixed-strategy Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium.
The proof is provided in the appendix. The next proposition summarizes the
existence result for the complete two-stage game:
Proposition 1 There exists a rational-expectation equilibrium (µ∗t , δ
∗
t ) for the game
defined in Definition (1).
I already proved the uniqueness of the second-stage subgame equilibrium; Nonethe-
less, the uniqueness of the whole game cannot be assured with further restrictions.
For simplicity, I assume:
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Assumption 1 (Equilibrium Selection Rule) The same symmetric equilibrium
mixed-strategy δ∗ is uniquely played in the data.
Although due to the complexity of firms’ interim payoff functional form at Stage
1 7, I cannot derive the closed-form solution for the mixed-strategy equilibrium cash
prize, there are some characterizations that suffice for identification in the subsequent
section. In particular, I show the following lemma holds:
Lemma 4 In markets where all firms fill up their vacancy, the probability of observing
a firm setting the cash prize pm = maxP monotonically increases with the market-
level unobservable ω and the cost coefficient c.
Proof can be found in the appendix. So far, I have established results regarding
the existence and characterization of the rational expectation equilibrium, and the
next section will move to the econometric discussion for recovering the primitives.
2.3 Identification
In this section, I discuss under which conditions I can use the observed data
patterns from many finite-sized markets to fully recover of the underlying utility and
profit parameters through firstly identifying the unobserved worker-wise and job-wise
heterogeneity. Before that, let me clarify the data generating process for this game
here:
7The complexity arises as the interim payoff integrates out distribution of all potential workers’
types preferences and taste shocks, therefore difficult to solve.
26
CHAPTER 2. IDENTIFICATION OF MATCHING GAMES WITH TWO-SIDED
UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY
2.3.1 Data-Generating Process and Notation
Suppose, as the econometrician, I can observe T markets with It workers and Jt




jt × Qjt = It. Once a firm is randomly drawn in market t, it leaves the
population and will not be selected in future markets. On the other hand, workers
enjoy a positive (and exogenous) probability of re-entering a new market in the game.
Every worker carries a latent ability level, X∗t that is discrete and evolves over
time according to some underlying exogenous law, Pr(X∗t |X∗t′) if the worker appears
in markets t′ and t consecutively. Each firm carries one job with a difficulty level
Z∗, also discrete. Additionally, each market t carries a one-dimensional unobserved
heterogeneity, ωt that affects all firms’ willingness to pay. All Qjt slots within a job
j share the same characteristics, W j, including the unobserved type Z
∗
j , but grant
different cash payment [Pj, φ1Pj, φ2Pj, · · · , φQjtPj], respectively.
To summarize, for each market t, I observe a It×1 vector of worker characteristics,
Xt; a Jt × 1 vector of firm/job characteristics, Wt (including the cash payments, Pt);
and a matching allocation µt such that if worker i choose slot q in firm j’s job, then
µ(i) = kqj and µ(k
q
j ) = i. The goal of identification consists of three items: (1) The
joint distribution of workers’ skill levels and jobs’ complexity levels, (X ∗t ,Z
∗
t ); (2)
workers’ utility primitives in ui,j,t; and (3) firms’ ex post profit primitives in π
post
j,i,t and
market-level unobserved heterogeneity, ωt.
In the following discussion, I suppress the market subscript t for ease of notation.
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Also, I use bold letters to denote market-wise vectors of characteristics, and regular
letters to indicate individual-level characteristics. The letter f is used to denote the
probability mass/density function of any distribution, with a little abuse of notation;
and M is used to indicate the matrix representation for any discrete distribution.
The identification strategy I have developed includes three steps: in the first step,
I derive the nonparametric identification result for the two-folded unobserved hetero-
geneity; following that, I identify the utility parameters on the worker side; lastly,
the firm side primitives are identified in a semi-parametric fashion. The subsequent
sections provide detailed discussion on each step.
2.3.2 Step 1: Identification of (X ∗,Z ∗)
In the first step, within each market, conditional on observing pairwise stable
matches µ, I identify the joint distribution of (X ∗t ,Z
∗
t ) from jointly observing worker-
specific, firm-specific and match-specific characteristics. The identification strategy is
based on the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition technique developed in Hu (2008).
The basic idea is that, to fully recover the distribution of a latent variable, I need
at least three sets of useful information, all of which are correlated with the latent
variable in any arbitrary ways, but are independent of each other conditional on the
latent variable. In particular, one of them can be as simple as a binary variable. In
this model, the complication lies in the fact that the latent factor of interest is a
vector consisting of two parts: worker skills and job complexity. One extra feature
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unique to the matching model is that the distribution of observables from both sides
is correlated with the market matching allocation. For instance, if the econometrician
observes a significant portion of workers having relatively good ratings for their skills,
but submit jobs of very poor quality, how could he infer the underlying distribution
of skills among the population labor force? One possibility is that: posted skill
ratings are very noisy, and it is in fact very rare for a worker to be highly skilled.
However, one other possibility is that ratings are informative, and the main reason
why we see poor quality submissions are due to the complexity of jobs matched
to the workers. Therefore, without conditioning on the matching allocation, the
econometrician can never truly identify the distribution of workers’ skills. We can
make a similar argument on the job-side unobserved heterogeneity. Next, I show in
details how one can construct the set of information sufficient for identification.
2.3.2.1 The Job Evaluation System: A Match-Specific Out-
come
First, like mentioned before, one important slice of information observed by the
econometrician is the quality of each completed job, or more broadly, the match-
specific outcome. In empirical studies, the match-specific outcome is often observable
and can take many forms. An example in labor markets is the job evaluation sys-
tem. In the matching between venture capitalists and companies for investment, this
outcome could be the IPO stock price. The evaluation result provides a cardinal
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measurement to (1) rank order workers’ performance within the same job, thereby
determining the monetary transfers; and it also reflects (2) the productivity of any
matched pair.
I already modeled the quality of submission in the previous section using equation
(2.2); here in order to capture the two features above, I model it more specifically
with regard to how the match-specific outcome are determined:
Assumption 2 Let Zti,j represent the match-specific outcome generated from a matched







1. g2-function is continuous and monotonically increasing with respect to its first
argument ( ∂g2/∂X
∗ > 0).





3. Conditional on observed matches µt,
(a) For any two firms j and l in market t, bjt ⊥ blt.
(b) For any worker i that is matched with j in market t, bjt ⊥ (X∗it, ait).
(c) For any firm j in market t, bjt ⊥ (Z∗jt, ωt).
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(d) For any two markets t and t′, bt ⊥ bt′.
Assumption 2 (i) implies that the more skilled a worker is, the better the match-
specific outcome would be, fixing other factors. This is a reasonable assumption in
real life. Assumption 2 (ii) -(iii) implies that idiosyncratic shocks to the match-specific
outcome are independent of other observable and unobservable characteristics. This
is a crucial assumption to ensure identifiability, and is more general than it seems to
be – I do not restrict the functional form of g2 except for Assumption 2 (i), so that
the idiosyncratic shock could interact with other factors in an arbitrary way.
Next, I exploit observed one extra slice of information on the worker side to
construct more moments related to the latent types from two sides.
2.3.2.2 The One-Dimensional Index for Workers
As mentioned in the modeling section, one set of observable information is a one-
dimensional index for each worker in each market, aiming to proxy their skill levels.
For instance, in school admission problems, this index can be students’ SAT or other
standardized test scores. The major difference between this index and the match-
specific outcome is that, the former is revealed before the matching process whereas
the latter is generated after the matching. I denote this index for worker i in market
t as Xit, and assume it is initially generated from a finite space for each worker, and
is updated in subsequent markets by the following equation:
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if he participates in both market t− 1 and t consecutively. If not, the index remains
unchanged until the next time he appears in a market. In the equation above, Xi,t−1
is the last-period index; Z∗µt(i),t is the complexity of the job he completes in the
market; X∗it is the latent skill level that evolves according to an exogenous rule:
Pr(X∗it|X∗i,t−1). Next, Xµt(µt(i)),t−1 are the peer workers’ previous skill indexes within
a job – including this factor allows one’s skill index to be contingent on the relative
performance to others in the same market. Lastly, ait is an idiosyncratic shock specific
to the individual worker in the market and is assumed to be independent of the other
factors. Formally, I assume:
Assumption 3 The function g1 is invertible with respect to its first argument. Fur-




> 0 when fixing other factors in g1
function. The idiosyncratic shock ait is realized after workers submit their jobs, and
satisfies: (i) ait ⊥ X∗i |µt; (ii) ait ⊥ ai,t′ for any two different markets t and t′; (iii)
ait ⊥ akt|µt for any two workers i and k in market t; and (iv) ait ⊥ ωt.
Compared with the worker side, it is sometimes difficult to observe any explicit
information to index the types (more precisely, the complexity levels) of jobs. Good
news is that I do not need as much information on the firm side as for the worker
side. In fact, a binary indicator that carries some variation in job types suffices for
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identification.
By revisiting Assumption (3), we can see that the pattern of a worker’s ability
index over time (i.e. markets) can tell us how complex the job he completes in the
current market might be. In particular, the binary indicator: 1(Xit < Xi,t−1) is
monotonically increasing with the complexity level of the job he completes. This,
therefore, serves as a binary indicator related with job complexity levels. 8
Specifically, let Yj denotes the binary indicator, equal to one if the (first-place)
worker’s index decreases in market t and zero otherwise. Then, I make one more
assumption here:
Assumption 4 Given Z∗, the distribution of Y is independent of both firms’ profit
shocks and shocks to the match-specific outcome. Furthermore, Yj is excluded from
workers’ utility functions.
This assumption restricts the potential correlation between the evolution of worker’s
skill index and the idiosyncratic shock in match-specific outcomes in its first part.
This is reasonable if we believe that ex post match-specific outcome do not affect the
evolution of one’s ability index directly, but only through the underlying types of
workers and jobs, along with other observables. Furthermore, I exclude the situation
where workers explicitly care whether their indexes will increase or not after they
play the game in market t on top of all other characteristics of the jobs. This is a




< 0. The inequality sign
depends on the researcher’s understanding of how workers’ ability indexes can be affected by the
type of jobs they complete.
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strong exogeneity assumption but is often assumed in the literature.
Given all the information we have explored, the next lemma formally establishes
the conditional independence result regarding observed characteristics. To be more
accurate, we return to the explicit market subscript t.
Lemma 5 Under Assumptions 3–4, from observing many markets repeatedly, the
following condition holds for the market-level observables.
(X t|Y t) ⊥ (P t, Z̃ t) ⊥ Z t|(Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt),
where Y t denotes the Jt × 1 vector of binary variables each indicating whether the
ability index of the best worker within a job decreases; X t represents the It× 1 vector
of workers’ contemporary ability index; P t represents the Jt×1 vector of cash payment
for all jobs; Z̃ t indicates the It×1 vector of all workers’ match-specific outcome up to
their most recent participation; Z t is the It× 1 vector of contemporary match-specific
outcomes for all workers; (Z ∗t ,X
∗
t ) is the It × Jt matrix of all jobs’ and workers’
types; and X̃ t is the It × 1 vector of all workers’ ability indexes up to their most
recent participation. Lastly, µt is the observed match in market t.
Intuitively, for any individual worker i, we have three conditionally independent
pieces of information related to their ability level: current index Xt, current and
previous match-specific outcomes (Zt, Z̃t)). On the job/firm side, we are unable to
observe information for the same job across different markets as each firm appears
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in only one market. Instead, we must rely on the information observed from the
matching outcomes in one market to invoke identification. So far within a market,
there are three slices of useful information related to job-wise heterogeneity: firms’
cash payment, the match-specific outcome, and whether the skill indices of the best
workers in each job decreases or not. To see this, first, let us focus on the match-
specific outcomes, as they not only reflect workers’ innate abilities, X∗, but also
the complexity of jobs, Z∗. We must be cautious here, though, as the observed
outcomes are driven by the matching allocation, through which jobs in the same
market are implicitly correlated. Another bit of useful information concerns the
cash payment decided by firms: They are the major movements firms make during
the extensive-form game and are equilibrium outcomes. Again, cash payment from
different firms is correlated through the market-level unobservable, ω, and further
correlated through the matching allocation, µ.9 Consequently, we cannot separately
identify its distribution without looking at other jobs in the same market. Instead, the
conditional independence could only be built upon observed (market-level) matching
allocations.
The major implication of Lemma 5 is that, suppose we could observe infinitely
many markets. Then, fixing the market size (I, J,Q) that is suppressed from the
following equations, the matching allocation, and workers’ previous performance,
(µ,X̃ ), we could decompose the joint distribution of (X,P , Z̃ ,Z |Y ) that is directly
9To see this, note that the probability of observing a certain match µ depends on the joint
distribution of (X∗,Z∗,P ). Thus, the distribution of P is variant with different values of µ.
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computable from data as




f(P , Z̃ |Z ∗,X ∗, X̃ , µ) · f(Z |Z ∗,X ∗, X̃ , µ) · f(X,Z ∗,X ∗|Y ,X̃ , µ) (2.9)
as well as,




f(P , Z̃ |Z ∗,X ∗, X̃ , µ) · f(Z |Z ∗,X ∗, X̃ , µ) · f(Z ∗,X ∗|Y ,X̃ , µ) (2.10)
Next, I formalize the distributional assumptions with respect to both observed
and latent variables in the market:
Assumption 5 1. Each job omplexity is drawn from the finite space {z1, z2, · · · , zm}.
2. Each worker’s, i, ability is drawn from the finite space {x1, x2, · · · , xl}.
3. The match-specific outcome, Zij, is drawn from a bounded atomless support
[0, 100].
4. The cash payment is drawn from the finite space {p1, p2, · · · , pM} with M ≥ m.
5. The ability index, Xit, is drawn from an arbitrarily large but discrete support
{x̃1, x̃2, · · · , x̃L}.
36
CHAPTER 2. IDENTIFICATION OF MATCHING GAMES WITH TWO-SIDED
UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY
As all latent types are discrete, we would like to write equations (3.25) and (3.26)
in matrix forms. The following assumption is crucial.
Assumption 6 For any observed (µ,X̃ = x, I, J,Q),
1. There exists a mapping φX : {x̃1, x̃2, · · · , x̃L} → {x1, x2, · · · , xl} such that for
any job j: ∀x,x′ ∈ {x̃1, x̃2, · · · , x̃L}|µ(j)|,x 6= x′, and for any observed X̃µ(j),
Pr(X dµ(j) = x|X ∗µ(j) = x,X̃µ(j)) > Pr(X dµ(j) = x|X ∗µ(j) = x′, X̃µ(j)),
where, for any worker i, Xdi = φX(Xi).
2. There exists a mapping φP : {p1, p2, · · · , pM} → {1, 2, · · · ,m}.
3. There exists a mapping φz1 : [0, 100]→ {1, 2, · · · , l ·m} for each match-specific
outcome, Zj,1, of the best workers within each job
4. There exists a mapping φz2 : [0, 100] → {1, 2, · · · , l} for each match-specific
outcome of the non-winning workers Zj,−1 and a vector of values y, such that
the following matrix is of full rank mJ · lI :
MP d,Z̃d,Zd|Y =y,X̃=x,µt,I,J,Q. (2.11)
where for each non-winning worker i, Zd = φz2(Zi) and Z̃
d = φz2(Z̃i); for
each winning worker i, Zd = φz1(Zi) and Z̃
d = φz1(Z̃i); and for each job j,
P d = φp(Pj).
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The intuition behind Assumptions 12 and 13 is that, when (X∗, Z∗) follows a
discrete distribution, we could partition (or discretize, if observables are continuous)
observable characteristics to have the same dimension as the cardinality of the support
for (X∗, Z∗), such that equations (3.25) and (3.26) could be written in a matrix form
and would provide the nice property of invertibility. Assumption 13(1) implies that
we could partition the ability indexes in a way that gives us a good indicator of the
true ability level.
Specifically, fixing a certain value of (Y = y, X̃ , µt, I, J,Q), I compute the proba-
bility of observing X d = x as well as various values of (P d, Z̃ d,Z d)
MXd=x,P d,Z̃d,Zd|Y =y,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q
= MZd|Z∗,X∗,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q ·DZ∗,X∗,Xd=x|Y =y,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q ·M
T
P d,Z̃d|Z∗,X∗,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q (2.12)
where on the LHS, the element on the i-th row and j-th column corresponds to the
probability:
Pr(X d = x, (P d, Z̃ d) = (p,z)j,Z
d = z i|Y = y, X̃ = x, µ, I, J,Q)
where (p,z)j(resp. z i) is the j-th(resp. i-th) distinct value for the vector (P
d, Z̃ d)(resp.
Z d). The first and third matrix on the RHS is similarly defined. The middle matrix D
on the RHS is diagonal whose elements are the probability of observing (Z ∗ = z,X ∗ =
x′,X d = x) for various values of (z,x′) conditional on (Y = y, X̃ = x, µ, I, J,Q). All
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matrices are of dimension (mJ · lI)× (mJ · lI). In addition,
MP d,Z̃d,Zd|Y =1−y,X̃=x,µt,I,J,Q = MZd|Z∗,X∗,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q ·DZ∗,X∗|Y =1−y,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q·
MT
P d,Z̃d,Z∗,X∗|X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q (2.13)
By inverting equation (2.13) and right-multiplying equation (2.12), we get
MXd=x,P d,Z̃d,Zd|Y =y,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q ·M
−1
P d,Z̃d,Zd|Y =1−y,X̃=x,µt,I,J,Q





Here, the matrices on the LHS are directly computable from data, and the RHS
embeds the distribution of unobservables that we are interested in. I then exploit the
independence condition of observable characteristics across jobs:
MZd|Z∗,X∗,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q = MZd1 |Z∗1 ,X∗µ(1) ⊗MZd2 |Z∗2 ,X∗µ(2) ⊗ · · · ⊗MZdJ |Z∗J ,X∗µ(J) (2.15)
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The RHS of equation (3.29) therefore can be written as















)⊗ · · ·















:= M1 ⊗M2 ⊗ · · · ⊗MJ (2.17)
On the RHS, each matrix Mj is a square matrix of dimension m · l|µ(j)|. From
the definition of the Kronecker product, we know that matrix MJ could be identified
up to a positive scale from the upper-right (m · l|µ(J)|)× (m · l|µ(J)|) submatrix of the
LHS. Thus, by changing the order of variables when we construct the LHS, we could
identify the Mj matrix for any job j up to a positive scale. The next step is to recover
the matrix MZdj |(Z∗j ,X∗µ(j)) from the identified matrices Mj.
Suppose we have identified Mj up to a positive scale, s > 0. Then, by definition
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of Mj in equation (2.17), we have











This equation reminds us to use the eigenvalue–eigenvector decomposition method
developed in Hu (2008) for nonparametric identification. Specifically, each column in
matrix MZdj |(Z∗j ,X∗µ(j)) corresponds to an eigenvector of the LHS matrix (after a nor-









] represents the corresponding eigenvalue of the LHS matrix. Fol-
lowing the argument in Hu (2008), in order to determine the ordering of all the
eigenvectors, we exploit the implications from Assumption 4 and 13 to derive the
following result:
Lemma 6 Under Assumption 4 and 13, for each job j, it holds that all the eigenval-
ues of the matrix s ·Mj are distinct.
This result is derived from the fact that, from Assumption 4, given different com-
plexity levels Z∗j , we could always rank the probability of observing such complexity
level given Yj = 1 relative to given Yj = 0. Furthermore, from part (1) of Assumption
13, the probability of correctly signaling one’s ability by discretized ability indexes
is higher than the probability of mismeasurement. Combining these two conditions
together, I can pin down the ordering of diagonal elements of the eigenvalue matrix,
which further leads to the identification of eigenvectors and eigenvalues in the ma-
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trix s ·Mj up to the normalization of each column in MZj,1,Z j,−1|(Z∗j ,X∗µ(j)). The next
proposition is a major result to identify the joint distribution of (Z ∗,X ∗) given the
market size and observed match, µ.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 3–13, the joint distribution of (P ,Z ∗,X ∗|µ, I, J,Q)
is nonparametrically identified from observing the joint distribution of (Y ,X,P , Z̃ ,Z , X̃ )
conditional on a certain (µ, I, J,Q).
The proof is in the appendix.
To fully construct the likelihood when estimating the model, the conditional distri-
butions of (Z j|Z∗j ,X ∗µ(j)) and (Xµ(j)|X ∗µ(j), X̃µ(j)) must also be known. The following
corollary establishes the identification result.
Corollary 1 For any worker i and job j, the conditional distributions of (Z j|Z∗j ,X ∗µ(j))
and (Xµ(j)|X ∗µ(j), X̃µ(j)) are nonparametrically identified. Moreover, the underlying
law of motion Pr(X∗it|X̃∗it) and initial condition Pr(Xi1|X∗i1) are nonparametrically
identified.
The proof is in the appendix.
2.3.3 Step 2: Identification of Workers’ Utility Prim-
itives
The market-level choice probability is equivalent to the probability of observing
the matching allocation µt, and is determined solely by workers’ preferences once we
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know their underlying skill levels. As their preferences are affected by (X ∗,Z ∗,P ),
the market-level choice probability can be written as Pr(µ|X ∗,Z ∗,P ).
In order to simplify the notation, the (I, J,Q) is suppressed from now on. One
should bear in mind, however, that all of our distributions are conditioning on a
certain market size. After identifying the conditional distribution of unobserved types
of worker–slot pairs, we could apply the Bayes Theorem:





where, f(P,Z∗,X∗|µ) is identified from the previous section and Pr(µ) is directly
observable from data.
Given the knowledge of Pr(µ|X ∗,Z ∗,P ), I am able to further decompose it into
individual-level choice probability:
Pr(µ|X ∗,Z∗,P ) = Pr(u1,µ(1) ≥ max
j∪∅
u1,j) · Pr(u2,µ(2) ≥ max
j 6=µ(1),∅
u2,j) · · · · Pr(uI,µ(I) ≥ max
j 6=µ(i),∀i<I,∅
uI,j)
if I order workers such that X∗1 > X
∗
2 > · · · > X∗I .
Recall that I parametrize their indirect utilities as:




i + ηit) · Z∗j + νij, (2.19)
where νij is the match-specific idiosyncratic taste shock, following an known i.i.d.
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distribution. The coefficient γ0 is the fixed-effect for a given ability level X
∗
i ; γ1
measures each worker’s preference over the interaction of her ability and the job’s
difficulty level. ηi is an unobserved taste determinant that follows a distribution
known up to a K-dimensional parameter σ. The unknown parameters are, therefore,
(β, γ0, γ1σ).
I first write down the conditional probability of the best worker, worker 1, chooses
µt(1) :
Pr(µ(1)|P ,X ∗,Z ∗)




1 + η1) · Z∗µ(1)ν1,µ(1) ≥




1 + η1) · Z∗j + ν1,j, ∀jk ∈Mi[µt])




1 + η1) · Z∗j , ∀jk),
and the functional form of H is known. Other workers’ choice probabilities could
also be written similarly, except that their choice sets are constrained by their ability
ranking in the market.
First, to identify β, I exploit the situation when all jobs in the market have zero
complexity and all workers have zero ability level. 10 Then, the choice probability for
10This could be done by normalization of (X∗, Z∗).
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the best worker becomes
Pr(µ(1)|Z∗,X∗,P)|Z∗j =0,X∗i =0∀i,j = H(βPjk).
The LHS of the equation is identified from the following equation. The RHS
has only one unknown parameter β. If the H-function is invertible on β, then it is
identified.11




Next, in order to identify γ0, I exploit the situation when all jobs in the market
have zero complexity level. Firstly we have:
∂Pr(µ(1)|Z∗,X∗,P)
∂Pj




















11Typical specifications, such as the multinomial logit model, ensure the invertibility of H.
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Lastly, to identify the distributional parameters of η1, we need to make the fol-
lowing assumption to identify σ.
Assumption 7 The function H(·) is K times continuously differentiable and there
always exists some cash payment such that H(k)(β(Pµ(1)−Pj)) 6= 0,∀k = 0, 1, · · · , K.
By Assumption 7, we can construct the moment functions of η from taking the





























H(1)(βPj + γ0X∗1 )
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H(k)(βPj + γ0X∗1 )
where the RHS can be perfectly computed now, and the LHS corresponds to the k-th
moment of η1. This suffices for the identification of σ. This method of identification
is a special case of Fox et al. (2012).
Consequently, all the utility primitives are identified in the model.
2.3.4 Step 3: Identification of Firms’ Profit Prim-
itives
From Step 1, we have identified the joint distribution of (P ,Z ∗,X ∗). We know
that, for each job j, the symmetric equilibrium cash payment depends on (Z∗j , ωt),
which implies
Pj ⊥ Pj′ ⊥ Pj′′ |Z∗j , Z∗j′ , Z∗j′′ , ω (2.20)
for any j, j′, j′′ in market t. Therefore, we could recover the distribution of market
unobserved heterogeneity, ωt, from jointly observing at least three jobs in the market.
Specifically, suppose we observe J ≥ 3 jobs per market, then conditional on J ≥ 3,
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we could construct the joint probability
f(P1, P2, P3|Z∗1 , Z∗2 , Z∗3) =
∑
ω
f(P1|Z∗1 , ω) · f(P2|Z∗2 , ω) · f(P3, ω|Z∗3) (2.21)
and
f(P1, P3|Z∗1 , Z∗2 , Z∗3) =
∑
ω
f(P1|Z∗1 , ω) · f(P3, ω|Z∗3). (2.22)
This naturally relates to a measurement-error model; following Hu (2008), we
make the following assumption to identify the conditional distribution, f(Pj|Z∗j , ω).
Assumption 8 1. ω is drawn from a finite support {w1, w2, · · · , wn} with n ≤ m.
2. There exists a mapping ρ : {p1, p2, · · · , pm} → {1, 2, · · · , n} such that the fol-
lowing matrix is of full rank n× n.
Mρ(P1),ρ(P3)|Z∗1 ,Z∗3 := [Pr(ρ(P1) = p, ρ(P3) = p
′|Z∗1 , Z∗3)]p,p′∈{1,2,··· ,n}
The next theorem tells us that we could identify the distribution of a single firm’s
cash payment, P , conditional on its job complexity, Z∗, and the market unobservable
ω. This condition distribution could be viewed as firms’ pricing strategies.
Proposition 3 Given Assumption 11, we can nonparametrically identify Pr(Pj|Z∗j , ω)
and the marginal distribution of ω.
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As discussed in the previous section, the equilibrium cash prize distribution max-





















−j(·), ω) is the firm’s interim payoff function defined previously.
In equilibrium, δ∗ is a function of (c, Z∗, ω, β, γ, σ, Pr(Z∗), P r(X∗)), where only the
profit coefficient c is not known. As we already made the assumption with regard to
the equilibrium selection rule, we only need to make sure the δ∗ function is invertible
for c. From Lemma 4, the equilibrium distribution of cash payment δ∗ is stochastically
increasing with respect to c. Thus, the profit coefficient, c, can be identified from
c = (δ∗)−1(Pr(P |Z∗, ω), Z∗, ω, β, γ, σ, Pr(Z∗), P r(X∗)).
So, we have nonparametrically identified the distribution of unobserved hetero-
geneity on both sides of the market, and more importantly, identified the preference
primitives for firms and workers. The next section will discuss the estimation proce-
dure in detail.
2.3.5 Likelihood-Based Estimation
Although the distributions of unobserved types (Z ∗,X ∗) are entirely nonparamet-
rically identified, empirically it is hard to estimate the distribution fully nonpara-
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metrically due to data constraints. Here, we assume a parametric structure on the
function of match-specific outcome, Z, and preserve the nonparametric structure for
other distributions related to (Z ∗,X ∗). First, we estimate a simple case, where work-
ers’ types, X ∗, could be entirely inferred from their ability indexes, and we estimate
the distribution of job-level unobserved heterogeneity, Z ∗, along with workers’ utility
primitives. Then we extend to the general case of latent workers’ types and estimate
its distribution along with other primitives in the basic model. The dimensional-
ity problem arises in the latter model, as workers participate in different markets.
To make the estimation practical, I make further assumptions on the workers’ par-
ticipation rule to reduce the dimensionality of the likelihood. Lastly, I discuss a
simulation-based approach to estimate firms’ utility primitives.
2.3.5.1 Benchmark Case: When X ∗ Are Perfectly Observed
In this benchmark model, I use workers’ ability indexes (Xi) as the perfect measure







= ξ1Xit + ξ2Z
∗
jt + bjt, (2.23)
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where ξ1 > 0 and ξ2 < 0 are unknown. b follows an atomless distribution known up
to a finite-dimensional parameter κ.
Also for simplicity, I assume cash payment follows the exogenous distribution,
δ := Pr(P |Z∗, ω). This is because of the complexity of simulating the equilibrium
pricing strategies. I will incorporate the equilibrium wage-setting stage in a more
general model in section 3.4.3.
The primitives I would like to estimate consist of three sets: (1) (β, γ,σ), which
are parameters in workers’ indirect utility function; (2) (ξ,κ), which are parameters
in the match-specific outcome function in equation (3.11); and (3) the distributions
Pr(Y |Z∗, X∗, µt), Pr(P |Z∗, ω), Pr(Z∗) and Pr(ω). Including all parameters and















Pr(P t|Z ∗t , ωt) · Pr(ωt) · Pr(Z ∗t )
)
(2.24)
where, if we rank workers in market t such that X∗1 ≥ X∗2 ≥ · · · ≥ X∗I ,12
Pr(µt|Z ∗t ,X ∗t ,P t) = H1 ·H2 · · · ·HI
12For simplicity, assume when two workers carry the same ability level, all firms strictly prefer the
one with a smaller subscript.
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and,
Hi :=Pr(µ(i) = j





m6=µ(i′) exp(β(Pm − Pjk) + (γX∗i + ηi)(Zm − Zj))
dFη(ηi)
In words, Hi is the probability of worker i choosing job µ(i) given the choices by other
better workers in the market. Lastly, the probability of observing the match-specific
outcomes are:
f(Z t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , µt) =
Jt∏
j=1
fZ j(z|Z∗j ,X ∗µt(j)) =
Jt∏
j=1
fbj(z −X∗µ(j),1 − ξZ∗j ), (2.25)
where (µ(j), 1) denotes the worker matched with job j and sits in the first place. All
other probabilities on the RHS of equation (3.19) are primitives of the model and are
discrete.
So far, all the components in the likelihood are fully specified, and the Monte
Carlo simulation result is presented in section 2.4.1.
The next lemma establishes the consistency result for the estimator.
Lemma 7 Assume (i) the product space for estimation primitives are compact; 13
(ii) Pr(µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t ) is continuous in all parameters and probability distributions;
(iii) the set of primitives such that Pr(µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t ) > 0 does not depend on the
13The space include the parametric spaces for (1) (β, γ,σ), which are parameters in workers’ utility
function; (2) (ξ,κ), which are parameters in the score function in equation (3.11), and lastly, the
probability space for the distributions Pr(Y |Z∗), Pr(P |Z∗, ω), Pr(Z∗) and Pr(ω).
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value of primitives; (iv) there exists a function K(µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t ) such that
logPr(µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t , θ)− logPr(µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t , θ0) ≤ K(µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t ) and
EK(µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t ) <∞; then the likelihood estimator that maximizes the function
in equation (3.19) converges in probability to the true values of the primitives.
Proof can be found in Appendix 2.7.9.
2.3.5.2 General Case: Both (X ∗,Z ∗) Are Latent
In the general case, where both (X ∗,Z ∗) are latent, we make one simplification
on the generating process for ability indexes. Specifically, we simplify equation (2.8)
to be:
Xit = g(X̃it, X
∗
it, ait). (2.26)
Thus, the distribution of Xit depends only on (X̃it, X
∗
it). Compared with the
benchmark case, where X∗ is completely observable, Pr(Xit|X̃it, X∗it) and Pr(X∗it|X̃∗it)
are the additional primitives I would like to estimate. The likelihood function there-
fore is






Pr(W 1|X ∗1) · Pr(W 2|X ∗2,W <2) · · ·Pr(W T |X ∗T ,W <T ) · Pr(X ∗1,X ∗2, · · · ,X ∗T )
(2.27)
where W t includes all variables observed in market t, i.e., (Y t,Z t,P t,X t, µt). From
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Assumption 2, we know that




Pr(Z t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , µt) · Pr(Y t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , µt) · Pr(X t|X ∗t , X̃ t)
· Pr(µt|Z ∗t ,X ∗t ,P t)) · Pr(P t,Z ∗t ). (2.28)
where X̃ t refers to the vector of the most recent rating scores of each worker in market
t. And in the first market,
Pr(W 1|X ∗1) =
∑
Z∗1
Pr(Z 1|Z ∗1,X ∗1, µ1) · Pr(X 1|X ∗1) · Pr(µ1|Z ∗1,X ∗1,P 1) · Pr(P 1,Z ∗1).
(2.29)
I have so far constructed the likelihood function for the general case. Ideally,
one would estimate the conditional distribution of Pr(X|X̃,X∗), the initial condition
Pr(X1|X∗1 ) and the law of motion Pr(X∗t |X̃∗) along with other unknown primitives
using a Likelihood-Based estimator. Practically, however, due to the high dimension-
ality of (X ∗1,X
∗
2, · · · ,X ∗T ), this is impossible to do without further modification.
To see why the dimensionality problem arises, suppose in the real data, we have
N workers and T markets in total. Given that workers are very likely to appear in
multiple markets, they can be viewed as “global players” of the repeated game. On
average, if we observe M > N/T workers per market on average, to compute the full
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likelihood, we need to evaluate the joint probability distribution Pr(X ∗1,X
∗
2, · · · ,X ∗T )
approximately 2M ·T times, even if each worker’s skill level takes only two possible
values. This is computationally unrealistic to implement as T grows large. Instead, I
make the following assumption to simplify the estimation procedure.
Assumption 9 Suppose the probability of worker i being present in market t is
eit =

e0, if worker i never participated before,
e1, if worker i participated in market t− 1,
0, if worker i appeared both in market t and t− 1.
where 0 < e2 < e1 < 1.
Intuitively, workers enter the market and stay for at most two consecutive weeks.
Afterwards, they leave the market forever. The entry, stay and exit decisions are
nonstrategic though. Furthermore, I assume the populations of both workers and
firms consist of countless many candidates. Thus, there always exist positive numbers
of workers and firms across all markets. Hence, in each market t, the set of workers,
It, could be divided into three categories, {It,−1, It,0, It,+1}, where It,−1 denotes the
ones that also appeared in market t− 1 and stayed in market t, It,0 denotes workers
that appeared only in market t and leave forever after t, and It,+1 denotes those who
first appear in market t and stay for one more period. The detailed illustration is in in
Figure (3.6). Now, I construct a new likelihood function that uses partial information
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from what we observe:14
L̃(θ) =Pr(W 1,W 3, · · · ,W T−1|[Z 2,X 2, µ2], [Z 4,X 4, µ4], · · · , [ZT ,XT , µT ])
=
Pr(W 1,W 3, · · · ,W T−1, [Z 2,X 2, µ2], [Z 4,X 4, µ4], · · · , [ZT ,XT , µT ])
Pr([Z 2,X 2, µ2], [Z 4,X 4, µ4], · · · , [ZT ,XT , µT ])
=
∑
[P 2,Y 2],...,[P T ,Y T ]
L(θ)∑
W 1,W 3,··· ,W T−1
∑
[P 2,Y 2],...,[P T ,Y T ]
L(θ)
. (2.30)
Essentially, I have integrated out some information with regard to even markets,
and mainly focus on the odd markets. This enables me to compute market-level
likelihood separately without encountering the dimensionality problem. To see this,
















2t−1|[Z 2t−2,X 2t−2, µ2t−2], [Z 2t,X 2t, µ2t]). (2.31)
I condition on the information of Z and X from even markets, as they are relevant
to workers’ underlying types X∗. The second equality follows from the fact that
in market 2t − 1 and 2t + 1, no workers is overlapping anymore; thus, the joint
14Without loss of generality, assume T is an even number. In addition, there is an abuse of
notation – some variables inW are continuously distributed, but I use the summation sign to denote
the summation of all possible values for discrete variables, and the integration over the support of
continuous variables.
56
CHAPTER 2. IDENTIFICATION OF MATCHING GAMES WITH TWO-SIDED
UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY
distributions of observables are independent of each other, conditional on neighbor
market observables. The third equality follows from the fact that workers stay for
at most two periods. Thus the only relevant information from even markets is about
the match-specific outcomes from right before and right after market t.
To simplify my notation, I denote variables (Z t,X t) as Rt. Then I divide all
variables into three parts according to whether the worker is from last period (denoted
as subscript {t,+1}), stays only at this period (denoted as subscript {t, 0}), or stays
for one more period (denoted as {t,−1}). Then, I have,
Pr(W t,X
∗


























2t−1|[Z 2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1, µ2t−2,+1], [Z 2t,−1,X 2t,−1, µ2t,−1]).
(2.33)
In other words, I have avoided the dimensionality problem by picking up only
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odd numbers of weeks from the data, and partial information from even numbers of























Pr(Z 2t−1|Z ∗2t−1,X ∗2t−1, µ2t−1) · Pr(Y 2t−1|X 2t−2,+1,Z ∗2t−1,X ∗2t−1, µ2t−1)·
Pr(µ2t−1|Z ∗2t−1,X ∗2t−1,P 2t−1) ·
∑
ω2t−1
Pr(P 2t−1|Z ∗2t−1, ω2t−1) · Pr(ω2t−1) · Pr(Z ∗2t−1)·
Pr(X 2t−1,X
∗
2t−1|[Z 2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1], [Z 2t,−1,X 2t,−1]). (2.34)
The RHS of equation (3.24) corresponds to the primitives we are interested in
estimating. The detailed derivation is provided in the appendix.
Assumption 9 may seem to be restrictive at first sight, but empirically it is accept-
able to focus on workers’ consecutive participation behavior only, and treat reentry
behavior separately for the same worker.
The next lemma establishes the consistency result for the estimator.





2t−1|[Z 2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1], [Z 2t,−1,X 2t,−1]) is continuous in all
15The space include the parametric spaces for (1) (β, γ,σ), which are parameters in workers’
utility function; (2) (ξ,κ), which are parameters in the score function in equation (3.11), and the
probability space for the distributions Pr(Y |Z∗), Pr(P |Z∗, ω), Pr(Z∗) and Pr(ω); lastly, it includes
the conditional distribution of Pr(X|X̃,X∗), the initial condition Pr(X1|X∗1 ) and the law of motion
Pr(X∗t |X̃∗)
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2t−1|[Z 2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1], [Z 2t,−1,X 2t,−1]) > 0 does not depend on
the value of primitives; (iv) there exists a function K(W 2t−1) such that
logPr(W 2t−1|[Z 2t−2,X 2t−2], [Z 2t,X 2t], θ)−logPr(W 2t−1|[Z 2t−2,X 2t−2], [Z 2t,X 2t], θ0) ≤
K(W 2t−1) and EK(W 2t−1) < ∞; then the likelihood estimator that maximizes the
function in equation (3.24) converges in probability to the true values of the primi-
tives.
The proof can be found in Appendix 2.7.10.
2.3.5.3 Including Wage-Setting Stage
As described earlier, the equilibrium decision of the optimal cash payment is set
by firms before the matching process. Specifically, it should be related with the
underlying complexity level of the firm’s job. For simplicity, I assume workers’ skill
levels are still observable. In the most general case, we can always use the modified
likelihood estimator from the previous section.
I conduct a two-step estimation: In the first step, I estimate δ̂ := Pr(Pjt|Z∗jt, ωt).
In the second step, I match the simulated cash payment distribution with the esti-
mated distribution from Step 1, and use the minimum-distance estimator to estimate
the firm’s profit parameter c.
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2.4 Monte Carlo Evidence
This section presents the Monte Carlo results for the three estimation methods
discussed above. I start from the benchmark case with only job-level unobserved
heterogeneity, and the cash payments are set by an exogenous rule; next I incorporate
worker-level unobserved heterogeneity, and lastly, I include the equilibrium wage-
setting process and present the result for the model with only job-level unobserved
heterogeneity.
2.4.1 Benchmark Case: When X ∗ Are Perfectly
Observed
I generate a random sample consisting of 1,000 markets. Within each market,
each job has a quota of recruiting up to 3 workers, and the number of workers within
a market is randomly drawn from {8, 9, · · · , 15}. For simplicity, assume each job
carries a complexity level that takes two possible values, {1, 10}. The cash payment
and match-specific outcomes are also drawn from the discrete space {1, 10}.16 The
idiosyncratic utility shock for workers, ν, follows a standard Type I extreme-value
distribution. The heterogeneity in taste over complexity, η, follows a mean-zero nor-
mal distribution with unknown variance σ2η. On the firm side, the unobserved shock
16This assumption could be generalized to draw the cash on the positive integer space, and match-
specific outcomes drawn from any bounded interval. This setting is simple, but it is sufficient for
illustration.
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b to match-specific outcomes follows a mean-zero normal distribution with unknown
variance σ2b . The parameter ξ1 is normalized to 1, as it could easily be estimated from
(Ztij − Ztlj)/(X∗it −X∗lt). Lastly, for simplicity, I assume whether a coder’s rating de-
creases or not only depends on the underlying complexity of the project he is enrolled
in. This can be easily extended to the case that the binary indicator is related to both
project complexity and the current rating score the coder has. The parameter spec-
ifications are given in Table 2.1. The first specification denotes the situation where
workers’ heterogeneous preferences are mainly driven by the random coefficient η,
and they are moderately incentivized by wages. In contrast, the second specification
denotes the situation where workers’ heterogeneous preferences are mainly driven by
the interaction between their skill levels and the job complexity, and they are highly
incentivized by cash.
For each estimate, I use 125 Bootstrap iterations. The performance is shown in
Table 2.2, with more detailed results provided in the appendix. The bias is quite
small for all estimates. The estimates for the unobserved part has larger standard
deviations than those for observable characteristics. For instance, the coefficient γ for
the interaction term X∗Z∗ is slightly more biased and has a larger standard deviation
than β, the coefficient for observable cash payment.
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2.4.2 General Case: Both (X ∗,Z ∗) Are Latent
Now I allow workers’ skill levels to be latent as well. Specifically, I assume that
a worker’s skill level on entering the market follows a Bernoulli distribution with
parameter pX ∈ (0, 1). In addition, we assume the observed ability indexes and
evolution of underlying abilities are determined by two rules:
Xτ−1 = X
∗
τ−1 + u1 (2.35)
and
Xτ = λ ·X∗τ + (1− λ) ·Xτ−1 + u2. (2.36)
Lastly,
Pr(X∗τ = xH |X∗τ−1) = [δx1, δx2]′, (2.37)




. The goal of estimation, therefore, is to find (σ1, σ2, λ, δx1, δx2, pX).
Furthermore, I allow the cash payment to be drawn from the support consisting of
three elements instead of two: {1, 4, 10}. The results are shown in Table 2.3. Com-
pared with the benchmark case, we see larger bias and standard deviation, but the
overall performance is still good.
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2.4.3 Endogenous Cash Prize
In this section, I follow the benchmark case in which workers’ skill levels are en-
tirely observable, but add the second step of estimating firms’ ex post profit primitive
c using a minimum-distance estimator. Due to the computational complexity of sim-
ulating the equilibrium prize, I assume within each market that there are two firms
and four workers who are randomly drawn from the population. Each firm offers two
slots, and will award the first slot P , whereas the second slot receives 0.5P . The cash
payment P is drawn from a finite space {pl, pm, ph} = {1, 4, 10}. Results are shown
in Table 2.4. The estimate for the firms’ profit parameter is less accurate than the
other estimates, probably due to the finite-sample bias of the simulated moment.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper develops a two-stage model for two-sided markets where wage contracts
are set before the matching process. In the analysis, I establish the formal identifi-
cation and estimation result when unobserved heterogeneity prevails on both sides.
This paper takes the first step to establish a structural model to estimate finite-sized
Non-Transferable Utility matching markets with two-sided unobserved heterogeneity.
I see at least two directions for future research. First, it would be substantial to
account for workers’ strategic behavior after matching with the jobs. I.e. there is a
“post-matching” stage of the game, in which the match-specific outcomes are gener-
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ated in a non-cooperative fashion. This requires developing a three-stage game where
the last stage is workers’ strategic behavior over exerting efforts. Second, researchers
are concerned about the learning-by-doing phenomenon in such markets; i.e. when
workers decide which job to take, they may hold a clear expectation that they may
polish their skills, benefiting future jobs. This dynamic concern is essential if one
wants to capture and perhaps improve the learning phenomenon in such markets but
may introduce nontrivial theoretical complications to my current model. To sum, the
model and econometric discussion in this paper provide a basis for better modeling
the real-world matching market.
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2.6 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Monte Carlo Simulation: Parameter Specification
Specification β γ ση σb ξ2 δp(1) δp(2) δp(3) δp(4) δy(1) δy(2) δZ∗ δω
S1 1.2 -1 1 0.8 -1.2 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.5
S2 2 -2 0.5 0.8 -1.2 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.5
Table 2.2: Performance of the Likelihood-Based Estimation - Benchmark Case
S1 S2
true value bias std.dev true value bias std.dev
β 1.2 -0.00769 0.038696 2 -0.00686 0.06865
γ -1 0.009296 0.049781 -2 0.010316 0.070334
ση 1 -0.011 0.065985 0.5 -0.00418 0.031742
σb 0.8 -0.00107 0.007794 0.8 -7.7E-05 0.00859
ξ2 -1.2 -0.00019 0.002259 -1.2 -7.2E-06 0.002563
δp(1) 0.1 0.001751 0.010896 0.1 0.001307 0.011692
δp(2) 0.8 0.000186 0.01319 0.8 -0.00033 0.014436
δp(3) 0.2 -0.00015 0.01741 0.2 -0.00084 0.018748
δp(4) 0.9 0.00111 0.012722 0.9 0.001039 0.013752
δy(1) 0.1 0.000492 0.005351 0.1 0.000372 0.005892
δy(2) 0.9 0.003515 0.007733 0.9 0.002628 0.008298
δZ∗ 0.3 -0.0003 0.007629 0.3 -0.00015 0.008518
δω 0.5 -0.00048 0.01744 0.5 -3.8E-05 0.018804
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Table 2.3: Performance of the Likelihood-Based Estimation - General Case
true value bias std.dev
β 2 -0.01244 0.127455
γ -2 0.029126 0.170246
ση 1 -0.03156 0.129736
σb 3 -0.01441 0.072752
ξ2 -3 -0.00241 0.025119
δy(1) 0.1 -0.00019 0.009647
δy(2) 0.9 0.00025 0.013505
δZ∗ 0.3 0.00177 0.013729
δω 0.5 -0.01621 0.079816
Pr(pL|Z∗ = zL, ω = ωL) 0.9 -0.00879 0.034099
Pr(pM |Z∗ = zL, ω = ωL) 0.05 0.00564 0.029639
Pr(pL|Z∗ = zH , ω = ωL) 0.7 -0.01372 0.059793
Pr(pM |Z∗ = zH , ω = ωL) 0.1 0.005325 0.03103
Pr(pL|Z∗ = zL, ω = ωH) 0.5 -0.0087 0.040982
Pr(pM |Z∗ = zL, ω = ωH) 0.4 0.008471 0.038291
Pr(pL|Z∗ = zH , ω = ωH) 0.1 -0.00534 0.048937
Pr(pM |Z∗ = zH , ω = ωH) 0.2 0.001762 0.035481
Pr(X∗τ−1 = xH |X∗τ−1 = xL) 0.1 4.84E-05 0.01417
Pr(X∗τ−1 = xH |X∗τ−1 = xH) 0.9 0.000787 0.013756
λ 0.5 0.001182 0.014416
σ1 2 0.007197 0.053475
σ2 1.5 -0.00104 0.032806
Pr(X∗ = xH) 0.4 -0.00057 0.015655
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Table 2.4: Performance of the Likelihood-Based Estimation - Endogenous Cash
Prize
true value bias std.dev
β 2 0.015883 0.249372
γ -2 -0.04571 0.324542
ση 1 0.023752 0.317615
σb 0.8 0.000221 0.016724
ξ2 -1.2 0.000118 0.004728
δy(1) 0.1 -0.00078 0.013076
δy(2) 0.9 0.001045 0.016621
δZ∗ 0.3 0.001649 0.014605
δω 0.5 -0.20408 0.021261
δp(1) 1 -1E-06 1.33E-06
δp(2) 1.16E-06 -5.7E-07 7.71E-07
δp(3) 0.1221 0.001095 0.021602
δp(4) 0.285709 -0.00055 0.027849
δp(5) 2.64E-07 1.45E-06 2.13E-06
δp(6) 1 -2.7E-06 3.36E-06
δp(7) 3.28E-08 2.77E-06 4.27E-06
δp(8) 2.71E-08 2.54E-06 3.44E-06
c 1 -0.08326 0.45173
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First, I prove that the firms’ preferences represented by the profit functions in
equation (3.1) are responsive, which is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Responsiveness) Firms’ preference over a set of workers is responsive
to the preference over individual workers if, for any set of workers C such that |C| <
Q, and i,m, (i) firm strictly prefers C ∪ i to C if and only if it strictly prefers i to ∅;
(ii) firms strictly prefers C ∪ i to C ∪m if and only if it strictly prefers i to m.
Let Cj denote the set of workers participating in job j. Without loss of generality,
assume the first worker has the highest skill level. First, I check part (i) of the
definition. The ex post profit of job j from hiring Cj is:









whereas the utility of hiring Cj plus one more worker i is:




















c · ωt · [Z∗j · (X∗i )], if |Cj| ≥ 2
c · ωt · [Z∗j · (X∗i )]− 0.5Pj, if |Cj| = 1
c · ωt · [Z∗j · (X∗i )]− Pj, if |Cj| = 0
Remember that we have assumed all jobs weakly benefit from having one more
worker, regardless of his/her type, which indicates that πpostj,i,t := c·ωt ·[Z∗j ·(X∗i )]−Pj ≥
0,∀. This further implies πpostj,Cj∪i,t − π
post
j,Cj ,t
≥ 0; with the strict inequality holds if and
only if πpostj,i,t > 0. Part (i) in the definition is checked.
To check part (ii), I calculate the job’s profit from having Cj ∪m, m /∈ Cj,m 6= i.














j,Cj∪m,t = c · ωt · [Z
∗
j · (X∗i −X∗m)]
which indicates ∀i,m, πpostj,Cj∪i,t− π
post




m. Part (ii) in the
definition of responsiveness therefore is checked.
According to Lemma 1 in Roth and Sotomayor (1992), provided preferences are
responsive (and strict), the many-to-one matching game share the same stable out-
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come with a corresponding one-to-one matching problem where each slot within a job
is treated as the new “agent” on the firm side. Specifically, I enumerate define the set
of slots of all jobs in the market as K := {k11, k21, · · · , k
Q
1 , · · · , k1J , k2J , · · · , k
Q
J } for the






c · ωt · (Z∗j ·X∗i )− Pi,kqj if slot is filled by worker i
0, otherwise
Within a job, all slots share the same ordinal preference over workers. Con-
sequently, we are describing a market with two sets of disjoint population, set of
workers I and set of slots K. Furthermore, this market entails a commonly-known
utility profile, U := {{u}, {πpost}}. Each worker i gains a utility uikt if he is matched
with slot k, whereas this slot gains πpost
kqj ,i,t
from matching with worker i.
This proof for the existence and uniqueness of the stable matching is based on
Lemma 1 in Roth and Sotomayor (1992) and Theorem 2 in Clark (2006), via the
following deferred acceptance algorithm.
In market t, we can rank workers according to their desirabilities from slots’
perspective, such that X∗1 > X
∗
2 > · · · > X∗|It|. First, we execute the slot-optimal
Deferred Acceptance Algorithm:
Round 1 : all slots propose to worker 1, the most preferred worker, and worker 1
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chooses his most preferred slot, denoted as S1 and hold this offer. Note that worker
1 knows any other offers in later rounds will be worse than S1, so he would only hold
the offer till the end and accept the offer eventually.
· · ·
Round k : slots rejected at Round k− 1 will propose to their best available choice,
worker k, who will, in turn, choose his most favored available firm, denoted as Sk,
and will not change her mind until the end of the game, as any later offers will be
worse than Sk.
The outcome is pairwise stable in the sense that all workers get their best choices
available to them and so are all slots. To see this, consider a worker i and a slot k
that are not matched with each other. If worker i prefers slot k to her current slot,
µ(i), then it must be that slot k is chosen before Round i, as otherwise, worker i
will certainly choose k instead of µ(i) in that round. The slot k is chosen by another
worker, µ(k), who is ranked higher than i. Consequently, even if worker i prefers slot
k to µ(i), slot k would not agree to form a coalition with worker i, as k’s current
match µ(k) is better than i.
Now consider the case when slot k prefers i to µ(k), then it must have proposed
an offer to worker i in Round i, earlier than Round µ(k), because i is ranked higher
than µ(k). The only reason why i is not matched with k is that i chose µ(i) over
k, representing that she strictly prefers µ(i) to k. Therefore, a coalition still cannot
be formed by (i, k). As I assume the utility of being matched is better than staying
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unmatched, the two conditions of pairwise stability are both satisfied.
To prove the matching is unique, we consider a sequence of sets of workers and
slots, {< In, Jn >}, n = 1, 2, · · · , N , such that < I1, J1 >:=< I, J > is the whole set
of workers and slots. If worker i and slot j is the most preferred choice of each other,
we define them as a fixed pair. In this setup, as both sides have strict preferences
over the counterpart, the unique fixed pair is worker 1 and her best choice, S1. We
define < I2, J2 >:=< I1, J1 > \ < 1, S1 >. In the subpopulation, < I2, J2 >, the
unique fixed pair is worker 2 and her best choice, S2, among all remaining slots. We
define for any n, < In+1, Jn+1 >:=< In, Jn > \ < n, Sn >. Then, the last element in
the sequence, < IN , JN > would consist of no workers and all unfavored slots. We,
therefore, know that the sequence {< In, Jn >} is uniquely defined from < I, J >.
Let µ be any stable matching of < I, J >, and let µn be a matching of the
subpopulation < In, Jn > such that µn(i) = µ(i) for all i ∈ In, and µn(j) = µ(j)
for all j ∈ Jn. By Lemma 2(ii) in Clark (2006), as we know µ is a stable matching
of < I, J >, then µn will be a stable matching of < In, Jn >. By construction, for
any worker i, she will form a fixed pair with Si in subpopulation < Ii, Ji >. Then
by Lemma 2(i) in Clark (2006), µi(i) = Si for the fixed pair < i, Si >. Combining
the results, we know that for any < i, Si > pair, µ(i) = Si, i.e., the matching µ is
unique. Furthermore, by Roth (1986), the set of unmatched slots remains the same
across different stable matchings. Therefore, the set < IN , JN > will also be the same
for different matchings. As a result, the stable matching µ is unique, and the proof
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completes.
2.7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
To prove Lemma 2, we check the two conditions specified in the definition of
pairwise stability. First, the Individual Rationality condition is satisfied on the worker
side as the set Mi[µt] always contains the empty set, i.e. staying outside the market.
Thus, the worker’s choice is always weakly better than staying unmatched. On the
firm side, if a worker generates negative incremental profit for the firm, its vacant
slots will be excluded from the worker’s choice set. Thus, whoever hired by the firm
must provide nonnegative incremental profit, satisfying the IR condition.
Second, if we consider a “blocking pair” such that a worker i switch to a job j
that still have a vacant slot, and both are better off – this will never happen as job
j is included in worker i’s choice set when he makes his decision. The fact that he
dismisses job j and chooses job µ(i) proves the nonexistence of such a blocking pair.
Similar nonexistence argument follows when job j has no vacancy but is willing to
replace a current worker with worker i.
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2.7.3 Proof of Lemma 3
First, we define the best response correspondence for firm j given other firms’
mixed strategy δ−j to be:





















−j, P−j, ω) · Pr(Z∗−j, P−j|δ−j)] · δ′l, ∀δ′ ∈ Σ}
And the best response correspondence for all firms is defined asB := B1×B2 · · ·×
BJ . Proof of the existence of a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is equivalent of showing
the existence of a fixed point in B . According to Kakutani’s theorem, we check the
following conditions:
1. The set Σ is compact and convex.
2. B is nonempty for all δ.
3. B is convex-valued.
4. B has a closed graph.
For the first condition, I show that for each Σj : {δ|
∑m
l=1 δ
l = 1} is a simplex of
dimension m − 1 thus closed and bounded, i.e., compact. It is also easy to show Σj
is convex. Thus, Σ : Σ1 × Σ2 · · ·ΣJ is also compact and convex.
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For the second condition, as each Σj is nonempty, and the expected profit for firm
j is linear in its mixed strategy δj, thus continuous in δj. Therefore, Bj is nonempty
as well.
For the third condition, I show that for any j, Bj is convex valued. This is true as
Bj is linear in δj. Thus, for any δ−j, pick any pair δ, δ
′ ∈ Bj(δ−j), then by definition,
they both maximize expected profit of firm j. Their linear combination also maximizes
expected payoff. From linearity, the linear combination of expected payoffs equals the
expected payoff of the linear combination of δ, δ′. Thus, the convexity condition is
checked.
For the last condition, I prove by negation. Suppose there exists a sequence




πint(δ−j) · δ̃l >
m∑
l=1
πint(δ−j) · δl + 3ε
By the continuity of the expected profit function, we have
m∑
l=1
πint(δn−j) · δ̃l >
m∑
l=1
πint(δ−j) · δ̃l − ε >
m∑
l=1
πint(δ−j) · δl + 2ε
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But also from the continuity of the expected profit function,
m∑
l=1
πint(δ−j) · δl >
m∑
l=1




πint(δn−j) · δ̃l >
m∑
l=1
piint(δn−j) · δ̂l,n + ε
which contradicts the fact that δ̂n ∈ B(δn). This completes the proof for Bj to have a
closed graph. The product of all Bj’s, B therefore has a closed graph, and combining
all conditions, it has a fixed point on Σ : Σ1 × Σ2 · · ·ΣJ .
2.7.4 Proof of Lemma 4
First, I prove that the probability of observing a maximum price increases with
the cost coefficient c in a market where all slots are fulfilled. Suppose this is not true,
then there exists two coefficient values cA and cB, such that cA > cB and other things
being all equal in the game, but Pr(P = pm|cA) ≤ Pr(P = pm|cB). Without loss of
generality, let Pr(P = pm−1|cA) ≥ Pr(P = pm−1|cB). Then consider firm j in the
game with cB deviate from his current (equilibrium) mixed-strategy δB to δ
′
B:
Instead of playing Pr(P = pm|cB) on the highest price pm, firm j decreases the
probability to Pr(P = pm|cA). Correspondingly, it increases the probability of playing
pm−1 from Pr(P = pm−1|cB) to Pr(P = pm−1|cB)+Pr(P = pm|cB)−Pr(P = pm|cA).
Conditional on ω, the difference between the expected payoff given δ′ and δ therefore
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j , cB , ω) · Pr(Pj = pm|δ′B)− π0j (pm, Z∗j , cB , ω) · Pr(Pj = pm|δB)+
π0j (pm−1, Z
∗
j , cB , ω) · Pr(Pj = pm−1|δ′B)− π0j (pm−1, Z∗j , cB , ω) · Pr(Pj = pm−1|δB)
= (π0j (pm, Z
∗
j , cB , ω)− π0j (pm−1, Z∗j , cB , ω)) · (Pr(P = pm|cA)− Pr(P = pm|cB))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≤ 0
and the last inequality follows from the fact that the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium




j , cB, ω)− π0j (pm−1, Z∗j , cB, ω)) ≥ 0
Next, I show the following inequality must hold for a bigger cA:
(π0j (pm, Z
∗
j , cA, ω)− π0j (pm−1, Z∗j , cA, ω)) ≥ 0
For this inequality to hold, a sufficient condition is that 1) the expected incremen-
tal revenue from play pm−1 to pm is increasing in c, and 2) the expected incremental
cost is decreasing in c. To see this, remember that when c = cA, the other firms’
equilibrium strategy is to put less weight on playing pm than when c = cB, i.e.
Pr(P = pm|cA) ≤ Pr(P = pm|cB). Thus, when c increases from cB to cA, the ex post
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revenue R increases, and given others are now playing a less aggressive strategy, the
ex ante expected revenue will also increase. This proves the first argument. To see
why the second argument also holds, I show the following equality holds:
E(P |pm, cB)− E(P |pm−1, cB) = E(P |pm, cA)− E(P |pm−1, cA)
where E(P |p, c) denotes firm j’s expected payment when it is playing p and the cost
coefficient is c, other things being fixed. As all slots are fulfilled in the market, the
expected payment from firm j is
∑Q
k=1 φkp regardless of c, this the equality above
holds.
This further indicates the following inequality:
[π0j (pm, Z
∗
j , cA, ω) · Pr(Pj = pm|δA)− π0j (pm, Z∗j , cA, ω) · Pr(Pj = pm|δ′A)+
π0j (pm−1, Z
∗
j , cA, ω) · Pr(Pj = pm−1|δA)− π0j (pm−1, Z∗j , cA, ω) · Pr(Pj = pm−1|δ′A)]
= (π0j (pm, Z
∗
j , cA, ω)− π0j (pm−1, Z∗j , cA, ω))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
· (Pr(P = pm|cA)− Pr(P = pm|cB))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≤ 0
where the mixed strategy δA is the equilibrium mixed-strategy of firm j in the game
with cA, and δ
′
A is a deviation such that instead of playing Pr(P = pm|cA), the firm
increases the probability to Pr(P = pm|cB); instead of playing Pr(P = pm−1|cA), the
firm decreases the probability to Pr(P = pm−1|cA)+Pr(P = pm|cA)−Pr(P = pm|cB).
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Therefore, in the game with cA, we have found a profitable deviation for firm j,
given others’ equilibrium mixed-strategy. This contradicts with the fact that δA is an
equilibrium strategy. The negation indicates the monotonicity of Pr(P = pm|c) in c
holds.
The proof for monotonicity in ω follows the same procedure, by fixing c.
2.7.5 Proof of Lemma 5
I show the following conditions hold:
1. Y t ⊥ (P t, Z̃ t)|(Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt)
2. Y t ⊥ Z t|(Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt)
3. X t ⊥ Z t ⊥ Z̃ t|(Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt)
4. X t ⊥ P t|(Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt)
5. Z t ⊥ P t|(Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt)
where condition (2) and (3) indicates the conditional independence between (Y t,X t)
andZ t; condition (1), (3) and (4) indicates conditional independence between (Y t,X t)
and (P t, Z̃ t); condition (3) and (5) indicates conditional independence betweenZ t and
(P t, Z̃ t).
First, I show condition (1) and (2) hold. As the distribution of Y t is only related
with Z ∗t , conditional on Z
∗
t , the variation in Y t is completely independent of other
covariates; the first two condition, therefore, is checked.
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Next, I show condition (3) holds:
f(X t,Z t, Z̃ t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt)
= f(X t|Z t, Z̃ t,Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt) · f(Z t|Z̃ t,Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt) · f(Z̃ t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt)
= f(X t|X ∗t , X̃ t, µt) · f(Z t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , µt) · f(Z̃ t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt)
The second equality holds because (i) for any individual worker i, conditional
on (X ∗, µt), the variation in Xit is completely driven by ai,µt , which is independent
of (Z t, Z̃ t); and (ii) conditional on (Z
∗,X ∗, µt), the variation in final score Z
t
ij is
completely driven by bjt, which is also independent of (X t, Z̃ t). Thus, condition (3)
is checked.
Similarly, we can check conditions (4) and (5) by showing the following:
f(X t,P t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt) = f(X t|P t,Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt) · f(P t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt)
= f(X t|X ∗t , X̃ t, µt) · f(P t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , µt)
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and
f(Z t,P t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt)
= f(Z t|P t,Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt) · f(P t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt)
= f(Z t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , µt) · f(P t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t , µt)
As all five conditions are checked, the full conditional independence condition hold
and the proof completes.
2.7.6 Proof of Proposition 2
First, I show equation (2.15) and (2.16) hold. That is, the following two equations
hold:
f(Z d|Z ∗,X ∗, X̃ = x, µ, I, J,Q) =
J∏
j=1
f(Zdj |Z∗j ,X ∗µ(j))
and,
f(Z∗,Xd = x|Y = y,X∗, X̃ = x, µ, I, J,Q) =
J∏
j=1
(f(Z∗j |Yj = y) · f(Xdµ(j) = x|X
∗
µ(j), X̃µ(j) = x̃))
The first equation holds because of part 3(a) in Assumption 4. The second equa-
tion holds because of Assumptions 3 and 5 – i.e., Y ’s are independent amongst differ-
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ent jobs in the same market; the rating scores are conditionally independent amongst
workers belonging to different jobs in the market. Thus, by observing the joint distri-
bution of (Y ,X,P , Z̃ ,Z , X̃ ) conditional on a certain (µ, I, J,Q), we could rewrite the
main equations in the form of equation (2.17), and ultimately, we have the equation
(2.18) for eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition as in Hu (2008).
In order to uniquely determine the ordering of eigenvalues/vectors of the matrix
on LHS, we imposed Assumption 7. To see how this works, let us first rewrite the
























where q’s are distinct values and takes up to m values in total, as Z∗ could take up
to m values. Similarly, as X ∗µ(j) takes up to l
|µ(j)| distinct values, the second diagonal
matrix is of dimension l|µ(j)|.
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The upper-left element ofDZ∗j |Yj=y·D
−1
Z∗j |Yj=1−y
is q1 := Pr(Z
∗
j = z1|Yj = 1)/Pr(Z∗j =
z1|Yj = 0). From part (1) in Assumption 5, we know that, Pr(Z∗j = z1|Yj =
1)/Pr(Z∗j = z1|Yj = 0) would be the largest element among all probabilities given






is c1 := Pr(X
d
µ(j) = x|X ∗µ(j) = {x1, x1, · · · , x1}, X̃ =
x̃µ(j)). If we choose x = {x1, x1, · · · , x1}, then according to part (2) in Assumption
7, the largest number should correspond to this upper-left element, c1.
Combining the two results together, we know that when we conduct eigenvalue-
eigenvector decomposition for the matrix s ·Mj where X dµ(j) = {x1, x1, · · · , x1}, then
the largest number in eigenvalue corresponds to q1 · c1.
Following the same logic, we could identify q1 · c2 through q1 · cl|µ(j)| by con-
ducting the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition for matrix s · Mj where X dµ(j) =
{x1, x1, · · · , x2} through X dµ(j) = {xl, xl, · · · , xl} simply by picking the largest num-
ber in eigenvalues.
Now that we have identified q1 · c1 through q1 · cl|µ(j)| and their corresponding
eigenvectors, we could put them aside and look at the rest of the matrix. For instance,
when we decompose s · Mj where X dµ(j) = {x1, x1, · · · , x1}, the largest number in
eigenvalues that does not belong to q1 · c1 through q1 · cl|µ(j)| should correspond to
q2 · c1, as q2 is the largest number except for q1 in terms of Pr(Yj = 1|Z∗j ). We
therefore could identify q2 · c1 through q2 · cl|µ(j)| . After putting aside these identified
elements, we are able to identify (in descending sequence) all qk · c1 through qk · cl|µ(j)|
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for all k = 3, 4, · · · ,m.
Given that we identify every single element of the eigenvalue diagonal matrix, the
eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition is unique up to a normalization of each column
in the eigenvector matrix. This indicates that, the matrix MZdj |Z∗j ,X∗µ(j) is nonparamet-
rically identified for each job j. Consequently, the matrix MZd|Z∗,X∗,X̃ ,µ,I,J,Q is also
identified from equation (2.15). Note that MZd|Z∗,X∗,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q is invertible as matrix
M(P d,Z̃d,Zd|X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q) is of full rank according to Assumption 6.
For any value P = p, the following equation holds:
Pr(Z d,P = p|µ, I, J,Q) =
∑
Z∗,X∗
Pr(Z d|Z ∗,X ∗, µ, I, J,Q) · Pr(P = p,Z ∗,X ∗|µ, I, J,Q)
(2.38)
Thus, if we write the above equation into vector and matrix form:
VZd,P=p|µ,I,J,Q = MZd|Z∗,X∗,µ,I,J,Q · VP=p,Z∗,X∗|µ,I,J,Q (2.39)
where each element of the LHS vector denotes a probability of a distinct value for
Z d and the dimension is (mJ · lI)× 1. On the RHS, the first matrix is of dimension
(mJ · lI)× (mJ · lI) and the second vector is of dimension (mJ · lI)× 1.
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Thus, we could identify the distribution of (P ,Z ∗,X ∗|µ, I, J,Q) from:
VP=p,Z∗,X∗|µ,I,J,Q = M
−1
Zd|Z∗,X∗,µ,I,J,Q · VZd,P=p|µ,I,J,Q (2.40)
This completes the proof.
2.7.7 Proof of Corollary 1
As shown in the proof of Theorem 2, the conditional distribution Pr(P d, Z̃ d,Z ∗,X ∗|X̃ , µ, I, J,Q)
is identified. For each value of Z = z , the following condition holds:
Pr(Z = z,P d|µ, I, J,Q) =
∑
Z∗,X∗
Pr(Z = z |Z ∗,X ∗, µ, I, J,Q) · Pr(P d,Z ∗,X ∗|µ, I, J,Q)
(2.41)
If we rewrite it into matrix form:
VZ=z,P d|µ,I,J,Q = MP d,Z∗,X∗|µ,I,J,Q · VZ=z |Z∗,X∗,µ,I,J,Q (2.42)
Again, all the V -vectors are of dimension (mJ · lI) × 1 and the M -matrix is of
dimension (mJ · lI) × (mJ · lI). Therefore, the probability Pr(Z |Z ∗,X ∗, µ) could be
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identified from:
VZ=z |Z∗,X∗,µ,I,J,Q = M
−1
P d|Z∗,X∗,µ,I,J,Q · VP d,Z=z |µ,I,J,Q (2.43)
Once Pr(Z |Z ∗,X ∗, µ, I, J,Q) is identified, the job-level conditional probability
Pr(Z j|Z∗j ,X ∗µ(j)) could also be identified from the market with only one job.
Next, we could identify Pr(Z,X ∗|µ, I, J,Q) by:





Pr(Z |Z ∗,X ∗, µ, I, J,Q) · Pr(P d,Z ∗,X ∗|X̃ , µ, I, J,Q)
(2.44)
Then, for any X = x, we have the following equation:
Pr(Z,X = x|X̃ , µ, I, J,Q) =
∑
X∗
Pr(X = x|X ∗, X̃ , µ, I, J,Q) · Pr(Z,X ∗|X̃ , µ, I, J,Q)
(2.45)
As Z is continuously distributed, we could discretize its so as to make the matrix
MZdd,X∗|X̃ ,µ,I,J,Q invertible and is of dimension l
I × lI . Therefore, the distribution of
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(X = x|X ∗, µ, I, J,Q) could be recovered from:
VX=x|X∗,X̃ ,µ,I,J,Q = M
−1
Zdd,X∗|X̃ ,µ,I,J,Q
· VZdd,X=x|X̃ ,µ,I,J,Q (2.46)
Again, for each job j, the probability of Pr(Xµ(j)|X ∗µ(j), X̃µ(j)) could be recovered
from observing markets with only one job.







Pr(Zi|X∗i ) · Pr(Z̃i|X̃∗i ) · Pr(X∗i , X̃∗i ) (2.47)





i ) and the joint distribution.Pr(Zi, X
∗
i )
could be recovered from Pr(Z,X ∗|X̃ , µ, I, J,Q). Note that due to the data generat-
ing process, Pr(Z̃i|X̃∗i ) follows the same distribution as Pr(Zi|X∗i ). Thus, the joint
distribution of (X∗i , X̃
∗
i ) could be recovered from:
VX∗i ,X̃∗i
= [MZddi |X∗i ⊗MZ̃ddi |X̃∗i ]
−1 · VZddi ,Z̃ddi (2.48)
The matrix in the middle is invertible because MZddi |X∗i is invertible. This is true
as MZddi |X∗i ·DX∗i = MZddi ,X∗i , and the matrix on the RHS is invertible from previous
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proof. Thus, the joint distribution of (X∗i , X̃
∗
i ) is identified.
Lastly, the initial condition refers to the situation where no worker in the job
carries a rating score before participation – i.e., everyone is a newbie. Thus, the
distribution of rating score degenerates to Pr(Xit|X∗it). For a given value of Xit, we






it) · Pr(Xit|X∗it) (2.49)
Therefore, if we discretize Zit such that the matrix MZddit ,X∗it is of full rank, the






· VZddit ,Xit (2.50)
2.7.8 Proof of Proposition 3
According to Theorem 2, conditional on (µ, I, J,Q), we are able to nonparametri-
cally identify MP ,Z∗,X∗|µ,I,J,Q. The following joint distribution can therefore be iden-
tified:
f(P ,Z ∗|µ, I, J,Q) =
∑
X∗
f(P ,Z ∗,X ∗|µ, I, J,Q)
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hence,





f(P |Z ∗, J) =
∑
µ,I,Q
f(P |Z ∗, µ, I, J,Q) · f(µ, I,Q|J)
Given f(P |Z ∗, J) and the conditional independence condition (3.30), we obtain
equation (2.21) and (2.22) conditional on J ≥ 3:
f(P1, P2, P3|Z∗1 , Z∗2 , Z∗3) =
∑
ω
f(P1|Z∗1 , ω) · f(P2|Z∗2 , ω) · f(P1, ω|Z∗3)
as well as,
f(P1, P3|Z∗1 , Z∗2 , Z∗3) =
∑
ω
f(P1|Z∗1 , ω) · f(P1, ω|Z∗3)
Next, we write down the following matrix equations:
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where,
Mρ(P1),P2=pm,ρ(P3)|Z∗1 ,Z∗3 := [ρ(P1) = p, P2 = pm, ρ(P3) = p
′|Z∗1 , Z∗3 ]p,p′∈{1,2,··· ,n};
Mρ(P1),ρ(P3)|Z∗1 ,Z∗3 := [Pr(ρ(P1) = p, ρ(P3) = p
′|Z∗1 , Z∗3)]p,p′∈{1,2,··· ,n};
Mρ(Pj)|Z∗j ,ω := [Pr(ρ(Pj) = p|ω = w,Z
∗
j )]p={1,2,··· ,n};w={w1,w2,··· ,wn}, j = 1, 3;
DP2=pm|Z∗2 ,ω := diag(Pr(P2 = pm|ω = w,Z
∗
2))w={w1,w2,··· ,wn}.
According to part (2) in Assumption 9, Mρ(P1),ρ(P3)|Z∗1 ,Z∗3 is of full rank. Therefore,
we take the inverse of the LHS matrix in equation (2.52) and right-multiply the LHS
matrix in equation (2.51), and get:
Mρ(P1),P2=pm,ρ(P3)|Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ,Z∗3 ·M
−1
ρ(P1),ρ(P3)|Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ,Z∗3




According to Corollary 1, the conditional probability Pr(P2 = pm|Z∗2 , ω) is mono-
tonically increasing with ω. After the eigenvalue–eigenvector decomposition as in Hu
(2008), we could rank all numbers in the eigenvalue matrix in an ascending order,
and uniquely determine the position of each diagonal element in DP2=pm|Z∗2 ,ω, thereby
identifying the distribution of Pr(P2 = pm|Z∗2 , ω) for each value of Z∗2 . Moreover,
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we are also able to identify the eigenvector matrix Mρ(P1)|Z∗1 ,ω, from which we could
identify Pr(P2 = p|Z∗2 , ω), p = {p1, p2, · · · , pm−1}. To see this,
DP2=p|Z∗2 ,ω = M
−1
ρ(P1)|Z∗1 ,ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
identified





·Mρ(P1)|Z∗1 ,ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
identified
,
p = {p1, p2, · · · , pm−1}
To summarize, we are able to identify the distribution of cash prize Pj given
different values of (Z∗j , ω).




Pr(ρ(Pj)|Z∗j , ω) · Pr(Z∗j |ω)
where, Pr(ρ(Pj)|Z∗j , ω) is directly identified from the decomposition; Pr(Z∗j |ω) =
Pr(Z∗j ) due to the independence assumption, and could be identified from Pr(Z
∗|J).
Then, I write down the following equation in matrix form:

Pr(ρ(P ) = 1)
Pr(ρ(P ) = 2)
...






Pr(ρ(P ) = 1|ω = w1) Pr(ρ(P ) = 1|ω = w2) · · · Pr(ρ(P ) = 1|ω = wn)





Pr(ρ(P ) = n|ω = w1) Pr(ρ(P ) = n|ω = w2) · · · Pr(ρ(P ) = n|ω = wn)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
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Pr(ρ(P ) = 1|ω = w1) Pr(ρ(P ) = 1|ω = w2) · · · Pr(ρ(P ) = 1|ω = wn)










Pr(ρ(P ) = 1)
Pr(ρ(P ) = 2)
...
Pr(ρ(P ) = n)

2.7.9 Proof for Lemma 7























log (Pr(µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t , θ)/Pr(µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t , θ0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Q(θ)/Q(θ0)
] (2.54)








µt,Z t,P t,Y t
[logQ(θ)/Q(θ0)]dF (µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t , θ0) ≤ 0
(2.55)
On the RHS, it is known as Kullback-Leibler Divergence, which could be proved
to be non-positive by applying Jensen’s Inequality. This indicates that for any θ the
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µt,Z t,P t,Y t
[logQ(θ)/Q(θ0)]dF (µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t , θ0)| = 0) = 1
(2.56)











µt,Z t,P t,Y t
[logQ(θ)/Q(θ0)]dF (µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t , θ0)| = 0) = 1
(2.57)
As the RHS of equation (2.56) equals zero iff Q(θ) = Q(θ0), given we have achieved
identification, it holds that Pr(µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t , θ) = Pr(µt,Z t,P t,Y t|X ∗t , θ0)) iff
θ = θ0 . Thus, θ0 is the maximizer of the objective function in equation (2.58) when
T →∞, which means it equals θ when T →∞. This completes the proof.
2.7.10 Proof for Lemma 8













Pr(W 2t−1|[Z 2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1, µ2t−2,+1], [Z 2t,−1,X 2t,−1, µ2t,−1], θ)
Pr(W 2t−1|[Z 2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1, µ2t−2,+1], [Z 2t,−1,X 2t,−1, µ2t,−1], θ0)
(2.58)
By the Strong Law of Large Numbers,
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Pr(W 2t−1|[Z 2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1, µ2t−2,+1], [Z 2t,−1,X 2t,−1, µ2t,−1], θ)
Pr(W 2t−1|[Z 2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1, µ2t−2,+1], [Z 2t,−1,X 2t,−1, µ2t,−1], θ0)
]
dF (W t||[Z 2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1, µ2t−2,+1], [Z 2t,−1,X 2t,−1, µ2t,−1], θ0)) ≤ 0 (2.59)
On the RHS, it is known as Kullback-Leibler Divergence, which could be proved
to be non-positive by applying Jensen’s Inequality, and it equals zero iff
Pr(W 2t−1|[Z 2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1, µ2t−2,+1], [Z 2t,−1,X 2t,−1, µ2t,−1], θ) =
Pr(W 2t−1|[Z 2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1, µ2t−2,+1], [Z 2t,−1,X 2t,−1, µ2t,−1], θ0) (2.60)
Given we have achieved identification, this equality holds iff θ = θ0 . Thus, θ0 is the
maximizer of the log-likelihood function when T →∞, which means it equals θ when
T →∞. This completes the proof.
2.7.11 Detailed Monte Carlo Results
In this section, I present the Monte Carlo simulation results for the basic model
in the next two tables, where workers’ types X∗ are observable to the econometri-
cian. The starting values are set to be uninformative. We would like to evaluate the
performance of our estimation strategy, as this strategy will be used in the empirical
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part. The results are less accurate as expected but in general performing well.
Table 2.5: Performance of the Likelihood-Based Estimation - Simple Case (bad
starting point)
starting value true value bias std.dev
β 1 2 -0.03143 0.061076
γ -1 -2 0.040247 0.062758
sigmaE 0.75 0.5 -0.0107 0.02987
sigmaV 1.2 0.8 -0.00018 0.00767
PARAB -1.08 -1.2 -0.00011 0.00227
PP 0.09 0.1 0.001156 0.0108
PP 0.72 0.8 -0.00069 0.013004
PP 0.18 0.2 -0.0005 0.017138
PP 0.45 0.9 -0.00263 0.014349
PY 0.05 0.1 0.000594 0.005418
PY 0.45 0.9 0.002019 0.007875
PZ0 0.15 0.3 -0.00032 0.007608
POMEGA 0.25 0.5 0.000225 0.017319
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Table 2.6: Performance of the Likelihood-Based Estimation - Simple Case (very bad
starting point)
starting value true value bias std.dev
β 2 2 0.011772 0.091076
γ -2 -2 -0.0128 0.096681
sigmaE 0.5 0.5 0.000208 0.039282
sigmaV 0.8 0.8 0.000212 0.011857
PARAB -4 -1.2 -0.00052 0.003055
PP 0.1 0.1 -0.00017 0.01525
PP 0.8 0.8 4.2E-05 0.017969
PP 0.2 0.2 -0.00153 0.024809
PP 0.9 0.9 0.002219 0.018691
PY 0.1 0.1 0.000266 0.007567
PY 0.9 0.9 -0.00054 0.010963
PZ0 0.3 0.3 0.000971 0.010876
POMEGA 0.5 0.5 0.000929 0.024391
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2.7.12 Detailed Derivation of General Case Log-Likelihood Function






















Pr(Z2t−1|Z∗2t−1,X ∗2t−1, µ2t−1) · Pr(Y 2t−1|X 2t−2,+1,Z∗2t−1,X ∗2t−1, µ2t−1)·
Pr(µ2t−1|Z∗2t−1,X ∗2t−1,P 2t−1) ·
∑
ω2t−1
Pr(P 2t−1|Z∗2t−1, ω2t−1) · Pr(ω2t−1) · Pr(Z∗2t−1)·
Pr(X 2t−1,X
∗
2t−1|[Z2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1, µ2t−2,+1], [Z2t,−1,X 2t,−1, µ2t,−1]).













2t−1,+1|Z2t,−1,X 2t,−1, µ2t,−1) (2.61)
Remember the primitives we would like to estimate are Pr(Xτ |X∗τ , Xτ−1), Pr(X∗τ , X∗τ−1),
and Pr(Xτ−1|X∗τ−1). (The initial condition occurs when a worker first appears in the mar-
ket. For simplicity I will denote the market as τ−1 as they stay at most for two consecutive
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µ(j),2t−1|Z j,2t,Xµ(j),2t, µ2t,−1). (2.64)
For equation (2.62), we let τ = 2t− 1, so
Pr(Xµ(j),τ ,X
∗


















f(Z j,τ−1|X ∗µ(j),τ−1, µτ−1,+1) ·
∏
i∈µ(j)
f(Xi,τ |X∗i,τ , Xi,τ−1)·











and the RHS corresponds to our primitives. Specifically, with respect to the first probability,
f(Z j,τ−1|X ∗µ(j),τ−1, µτ−1,+1) =
∑
Z∗j
f(Z j,τ−1|Z∗j ,X ∗µ(j),τ−1, µτ−1,+1)Pr(Z
∗
j ).
The RHS of equation (2.63) directly corresponds to our primitives. For equation (2.64),
similarly we let τ = 2t, so
Pr(Xµ(j),τ−1,X
∗
µ(j),τ−1|Z j,τ ,Xµ(j),τ , µτ ) =
Pr(Xµ(j),τ−1,X
∗
µ(j),τ−1,Z j,τ ,Xµ(j),τ |µτ )














f(Z j,τ |X ∗µ(j),τ , µτ ) ·
∏
i∈µ(j)
f(Xi,τ |X∗i,τ , Xi,τ−1)·
Pr(X∗i,τ |X∗i,τ−1) · f(Xi,τ−1|X∗i,τ−1) · Pr(X∗i,τ−1)
and













and the RHS corresponds to our primitives. Specifically, with respect to the first component,
f(Z j,τ |X ∗µ(j),τ , µτ ) =
∑
Z∗j
f(Z j,τ |Z∗j ,X ∗µ(j),τ , µτ )Pr(Z
∗
j ).
Each element on the RHS is a primitive we would like to estimate.
100
Chapter 3
Matching Games with Unobserved
Heterogeneity: A Structural
Analysis of Online Labor Markets
3.1 Introduction
In recent decades, the emergence of an entirely novel online labor market has
made it possible for previously geographically segmented workers and firms to match
with each other at much lower cost. Workers are now hired by the task, therefore
enjoying much more flexibility than staying in a long-term labor contract. Firms,
on the other hand, enjoy the “crowdsourcing” benefits that enable them to attract
multiple job candidates, each providing a unique proposal, and therefore increase
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the chance of finding a better solution. To date, most of the online labor markets
operate in a decentralized fashion: Instead of having a centralized “clearinghouse”
system to assign jobs to workers, firms and workers compete with their peers to
win over the scarce resource on the opposite side. Probably the most significant
difference of such online markets from traditional ones is that workers and jobs are
much more idiosyncratic in both their characteristics and their needs (Horton, 2010).
As a result, a well-defined price system is usually difficult to establish or maintain
in such markets; instead, market participants interact strategically to form monetary
transfers contingent with individual transactions. Meanwhile, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the labor forces of such online markets work primarily part-time and
more importantly, they care other features of a job beyond just cash earned. If this
is true, then the incentive problem in such markets becomes a substantial topic for
market creators. The multi-dimensionality of online workers’ utility profiles, however,
has rarely been captured in the literature, which might lead to misspecified model
predictions. The current literature tends to assume away further the game-theoretical
interaction between firms and workers, which would be inappropriate especially when
market size is finite, possibly due to data restrictions and the lack of a suitable
structural model.
To fill the gap, in this paper I use a two-sided matching framework to answer
two empirical questions regarding such markets: first, how much does a worker in
online labor markets care about various dimensions of a job? Second, based on
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the structural estimates, could the market designer introduce alternative schemes so
as to improve two-sided participation and aggregated match-specific outcomes? In
particular, I establish a stylized two-stage model to study a contest-based online labor
market, in which firms first set their cash prize under asymmetric information, then
workers choose which jobs to accept, taking into consideration peer workers’ and
firms’ preferences. Following Chapter 2 on the identification of matching games with
two-sided unobserved heterogeneity, I use data on (repeatedly) observed agent- and
match-specific characteristics to nonparametrically estimate both sides’ unobserved
heterogeneity, assuming firms share a vertical preference over workers. The preference
primitives are then identified from the equilibrium characterization. The data I use
is an individual-level record of a primary contest category on the world’s largest
online coding community, providing coders around the world access to the software
design/development and data-science problems published by mainly U.S.-based client
firms. The structural estimates show the significant role of the unobserved firm-
and worker-types in determining the observed sorting patterns in the market, as
well as the ineffectiveness of the current prize scheme. Both findings shed light on
the importance of introducing alternative plans to improve the assortativeness that
benefits the platform and market participants in the long run.
From a market-design perspective, this paper takes the first step towards evaluat-
ing how the total surplus generated in the market could be improved by introducing
alternative schemes. For instance, allowing firms to reward workers based on their
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ability and/or performance would also make them better off, despite the fact that
they incur more cost from engaging in the market. This kind of findings is insightful
to the market designer and could empirically boost the development of such markets,
as conducting alternative schemes requires much less cost and is much more witnessed
compared with traditional offline labor markets.
3.1.1 Related literature:
A growing empirical literature analyzes online marketplaces, a major theme of
which is how to efficiently create trade between many buyers and sellers through an
efficient price system. For instance, Einav et al. (2015) find that the auction-based
pricing scheme is declining as online markets becomes mature and is shifting toward
the posted-price scheme. This trend could be partially explained by the significant
number of market participants, the time sensitivity of active trades, and intense
competition among sellers (auctioneers) in the market. On the other hand, when
service delivered in such markets is not standard, and market size is moderate, such
as the one I am studying in this paper, it is usually difficult for a well established
posted-price scheme to exist. Therefore, it is of great importance to examine how firms
strategically determine the monetary transfers and how market outcomes are driven
by the strategic behavior. In this paper, I analyze the pricing scheme by characterizing
the decentralized wage-setting stage of the model and examine alternative schemes
that could potentially improve the market surplus.
104
CHAPTER 3. MATCHING GAMES WITH UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY:
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF ONLINE LABOR MARKETS
Another strand of literature tries to understand the incentives of participants,
especially those of workers in such markets. Horton (2010) mentions in his survey
paper of online labor markets that, given asymmetric information combined with
strategic behavior and job-wise heterogeneity, potential incentive issues impeding
workers from delivering satisfactory service can happen in such markets. In this
paper, I focus on one particular aspect of workers’ incentive issue by trying to answer
the question: under what circumstances will they stay away from certain kinds of jobs,
due to peer competition and their heterogeneous attitudes toward job characteristics,
which determines their equilibrium choices when faced with capacity constraints.
This paper also relates to both the economic and informational system (IT) studies
about online “crowdsourcing” platforms, a concept firstly introduced by Howe (2006).
See for example the paper by DiPalantino and Vojnovic(2009) and Horton and Chilton
(2010) among others. The former models the crowdsourcing markets as a two-stage
game, in which the second stage very much resembles all-pay auctions; they found
diminishing marginal returns of cash prizes regarding workers’ participation level. The
latter adopts a different rational model of labor supply and estimates the reservation
wage for workers to be willing to join the platform. In this paper, I use a two-sided
matching framework to analyze such platforms and focus on both sides’ strategic
movements leading to the observed market patterns.
Lastly, from a methodological point of view, this paper contributes to the re-
cently growing empirical literature analyzing preferences in two-sided matching mar-
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kets when unobserved heterogeneity prevails on both sides. See for example Choo
and Siow (2006), Chiappori et al. (2006), Fox (2010), Graham (2013), Galichon and
Salanie (2012) and Sinha (2014) when utility is modeled as transferrable and Logan et
al. (2008), Boyd et al. (2013), Menzel (2015), Agarwal(2016) when utility is modeled
as non-transferrable. This is, however, not the focus of this paper, and more detailed
relation to this strand of literature is discussed in Chapter 2.
I start the discussion by presenting the market description and relevant institu-
tional backgrounds in Section 2; I then establish the structural model and characterize
the equilibrium in Section 3. Also, I briefly discuss how I achieve point identification
using this strategy in Section 4.8. Next, in Section 4, I discuss the estimation strategy
that nonparametrically recovers the unobserved heterogeneity and parametrically re-
covers the utility primitives. Following that, Section 5 presents the empirical findings
and Section 6 presents the result of the counterfactual experiments. Lastly, I conclude
this paper in Section 7.
3.2 Market Description and Data
The market I study in this paper is TopCoder.com, a leading crowdsourcing web-
site. It offers businesses on-demand access to a worldwide community of over 800,000
designers, developers and data science experts.1 The platform offers three main
1Although these participants come from various industries, from now on I uniformly call them
coders, as most of the jobs involve primarily coding.
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“tracks” for firms and workers to fit themselves in software design, development and
data sciences. My data contains the complete participation record for the component
development projects, a major subset under the development track, from September
2003 to November 2011, with 1, 394 active coders and 2, 846 projects in total. Each
project is observed only once, but coders are observed multiple times throughout the
time span. Multiple coders submit to a single project and are awarded according to
their ordinal ranks. Specifically, the second place gets half of what the first place
gets in cash; and after May 2006, the top five to seven participants get bonus point
proportionally as an extra incentive to participate.
The main pipeline could be broadly divided into three stages. At Stage 1, client
firms reach out to the website, and with the help of a project manager, decompose the
project into smaller, independently manageable parts. They assign each component
a set of reward package (including cash payment and accumulative point rewards
which could transfer to cash seasonally) according to the rules of the website.2 At
the second stage, known as Competition and Collaboration Stage, coders select from
a list of published projects and register themselves without any charge. Coders then
work on the project simultaneously and submit by the due date. Communication
with project managers is allowed and encouraged during the whole process. At the
third stage, the Peer Review Stage, a group of coding gurus is hired by the client
firms as the review board. The group first screens out any submissions failing to
2Specifically, regarding the cash payment, the website requires each client to split their cash
rewards proportionally to the first- and second-place coders, on top of a fixed entry payment
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meet the baseline requirement, as well as technically trivial solutions. Team members
then independently score each submission passed the screening, and submissions are
ranked based on the average of their final scores. Finally, at the Results and Rewards
Stage, participants are awarded according to their ordinal ranks, and coders’ public
profiles are updated.
From the data, for every project, I observe the name (which briefly describes the
project’s content and requirement), the amount of the monetary and non-monetary
award such as the “Digital Run Cup Series” introduced in 2006,3 the duration of
the project as measured by the number of days allowed to develop the codes, the
programming language requirement and whether the project is for custom or generic
use. Furthermore, I observe the number of registrations and submissions per project,
the identity of all coders submitting and passing the screening, and the final scores
for their submitted code. For every coder, I observe his nationality, active days on
the website, and a full history including which projects he/she has participated in,
final scores for every submission, monetary and non-monetary rewards collected, and
updated skill rating on the website.4
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of the project characteristics mentioned
3Digital Run (DR) points were introduced in mid-2006 as a complement to award good per-
formers. They allocate proportionally among top five to seven participating coders at the end of
each project. The points accumulate until the end of each quarter and those among the top third
DR-point holders are rewarded with extra money. Although there have been various changes in the
rules for setting the amount of the points, it is, on average, positively related with the winners’ cash
rewards.
4The site provides each registered programmer with a rating score for each track that he/she
ever participates in. This rating score is calculated with the well-known Elo rating algorithm widely
used to indicate the relative abilities of participants in competitor-versus-competitor games.
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above. On average, each project is active for about one week.5 The levels of the
monetary reward provided by different projects vary considerably, reflecting the ob-
served heterogeneity across projects. The dominant programming languages in the
data are .NET and Java. It is further decomposed into two categories: generic and
custom projects, with approximately 40% being generic. This is to capture whether
the code written for the project will be used only once or will be potentially used
for multiple purposes. Scores to measure the quality of the submissions are scaled
from 0 to 100, averaging about 89, reflecting a satisfactory ex post performance of
coders. Table 3.2 presents the coders’ descriptive statistics. Repeated participation
is common: The average number of previous submissions per coder at the time of
registration, denoted Experience, is 13. This website is strongly international: over
half of registered coders are from China, and only 9.37% are U.S. coders. Moreover,
rating scores are relatively diverse: scaled from 0 to 2,500, I observe an average of
1,169 and a standard deviation of almost 400. Lastly, according to the website, con-
tests occur on a roughly weekly basis. I, therefore, divide the whole dataset into 400
weekly markets. As shown in Table 3.3, I observe about seven contests active in a
week, with about 22 coders participating. Repeated participation within a market is
rare, though. In fact, about 88% of coders only attend once in a weekly market.6
By further exploring the data patterns, I have reason to believe there exists a
5After a closer look, I find that at the early and middle stages of my data time span, almost all
contests are published on each Thursday, but this pattern becomes noisier in later stage.
6Initially, the website even restricted new coders to one project per week. This rule was
abandoned in February 2008: http://apps.topcoder.com/forums/?module=Thread&threadID=
602646&start=0&mc=115.
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nontrivial degree of unobserved heterogeneity on both sides of this market, beyond
observed characteristics. On the coder side, although we can observe the up-to-date
rating scores for each person, it is still unclear how well these scores proxy innate
skills. For instance, in Table 3.4, I observe that even after controlling for coders’
rating score and experience, Chinese coders are preferred over U.S. coders, reflected
by their ordinal placement within each contest. Rather than believing firms inherently
prefer Chinese coders over U.S. coders, I think it may be true that coders’ skill levels
are not perfectly captured by rating scores and might be correlated with coders’
nationalities.
On the firm side, I find much more extraordinary evidence: As shown in Figure
3.4, we see a clear increasing trend in participants’ average rating scores as firms
increase the prize money, but there is a decreasing trend in the average final scores as
prize money goes up. A reasonable explanation would be the existence of project-wise
heterogeneity beyond the observables, which coders may value differently. To take a
closer look, I regress final scores coders get from participating in projects on observed
project-wise and coder-wise characteristics, and the results are shown in Table 3.5.
First, the negative correlation between the cash payment and coders’ performance
does not vanish after I control for observed characteristics. Second, in the last two
column, I consider the potential endogeneity issue concerning projects’ winning cash
payment and coders’ rating scores – the former can be correlated with unobserved
project heterogeneity and the latter might be associated with the unobserved coder
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heterogeneity. To tackle this issue, I use the average winning cash payment within
the weekly market and the last-period rating score for the same coder to instrument
the two endogenous variables. It can be seen that the coefficient before winning cash
payment becomes positive in the last column, where I further incorporate market
fixed effect to deal with market-wise unobserved heterogeneity. This serves as stronger
evidence showing that after teasing out the potential project-wise and market-wise
heterogeneity, higher cash payment indeed motivates better performance measured
by the final scores.
The matching allocation is driven by mutual choices of firms and coders. This
platform’s crowdsourcing feature enables us to observe firms’ cardinal preference over
coders who submit to the project. The more interesting part, however, is how firms
rank all potential participants in the market, which is unknown to the researchers.
Nonetheless, from a simple regression analysis, I find that firms’ revealed preference
over actual submissions indicates a strong vertical pattern. In Table 3.4, I regress
the within-contest ranking against coders’ rating-score rankings along with other
covariates. The coefficient of rating score rank is as high as 0.9 with an R-squared to
be as high as 0.81, and barely changes when we add more covariates. Furthermore,
as this rating score is uniformly computed and ranked, one has reason to believe
that all firms hold a vertical preference over coders, according to their (potentially
imperfectly observed) skill levels.
On the other hand, inference on coders’ preference over firms is less straightfor-
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ward because firms can rank multiple workers who submit, but workers can only
choose one job at a time. More specifically, for any single coder in a market, we
only observe his discrete choice of participation. Nonetheless, it is difficult to use
the standard discrete-choice regression model to study coders’ preference over the
entire project-wise characteristics set, as all the choices (projects) are heterogeneous
across different markets. In Table 3.6, I regress coders’ rating scores against contests’
observable characteristics and see how coders sort themselves into different kinds of
projects regarding their observable characteristics. In particular, I divide coders into
two subgroups: “top coders” who rank first or second in a contest, and “average
coders” who ranked third or worse in a contest. Their regression results are shown
in columns 2 and 3, respectively. A high heterogeneity in the sorting pattern is de-
tected here: Top coders have a strong disutility over longer contests, whereas average
coders slightly prefer more extended contests, as shown in row 2. The preference
for winning cash prizes is also different, as average coders apparently sort away from
highly-paid jobs, probably due to their concern with the job complexity. To sum, it is
inappropriate to hypothesize coders’ preferences to be purely vertical; instead, coders’
clearly sort themselves into projects heterogeneously in the data. More interestingly,
if for instance short projects with high payment are more likely to be highly complex
jobs, we can even detect coders’ different preference over the unobserved types(i.e.
complexity levels) across jobs.
Lastly, I look at how cash payment is determined in the market, as in labor
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markets, monetary transfers play a crucial role in determining the final matching
allocation. In the empirical literature analyzing matching markets, two completely
different ways of modeling the monetary transfers diverge in their methodologies
to identify primitives. In reality, however, monetary transfers are very likely to be
endogenous, but not arbitrarily negotiable between firms and coders. For instance,
in this market, firms first determine the contract terms, publish the information, and
then coders participate to win the contract. Setting and negotiating contracts/wages,
therefore, is excluded from the matching process; however, firms non-cooperatively set
the wage, taking into consideration how the matching game will play afterward. Table
3.7 suggests strong evidence for prize endogeneity: By regressing the winning prize
on the degree of competition along with other firm-level covariates, I find a strong
causal effect of the highest winning prize of peer contests in the market on cash prizes.
When controlling for market-wise fixed effect as shown in the second column, firms
are negatively affected by the head-to-head competition. This is very interesting,
as firms explicitly take into consideration both the market-specific willingness-to-pay
and the competition within a market when setting their cash payment to incentivize
coders to participate later.
To summarize, from a series of reduced-form analyses, I have found that: (1)
there might exists a non-trivial degree of coder-wise, project-wise and market-wise
unobserved heterogeneity in this online market; (2) firms are likely to admit a vertical
preference over coders’ skill levels, but coders might have heterogeneous preference
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over the same job; and (3) firms strategically set the cash payment for their projects,
reflecting their willingness-to-pay for the talents in the competitive market. Next, I
will present a structural model and use a novel method to estimate this game.
3.3 A Structural Model for the Online La-
bor Matching Markets
I present a stylized structural model that captures how the market works. As the
researcher, from market t, I observe three sets of information: the project-wise ob-
servable characteristics including the cash prizes set by all Jt firms, P t; the coder-wise
observable characteristics including their current rating score, X t; and the matching
allocation µt that tells us who matches with whom along with a one-dimensional
match-specific outcome, Z t. On the other hand, the project’s complexity, Z
∗
t and
coders’ abilities, X ∗t , and the market condition ωt, are unobservable heterogeneity, all
of which are assumed to be drawn from finite spaces.
I abstract away several aspects of this market. First, to avoid the complexity
of coordinating intra-firm pricing strategies, and to focus on the inter-firm pricing
competition, I ignore the fact that a firm’s business project is divided into multiple
components. Instead, I simply assume each firm (or equivalent entity) carries a single
project. This is acceptable as in the data; there is no record tracking the identities of
firms behind each project; it might, therefore, be inaccurate to decide which projects
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belong to the same firm. Second, I assume away strategic entry and exit decisions from
both sides. I, therefore, do not consider coders’ strategic participation and potential
learning-by-doing in this model. This is a major simplification, but is consistent with
the empirical findings that there is no explicit pattern regarding entries and exits
over time, as shown in Figure (3.3). This simplification enables me to focus on the
strategic pricing behavior of firms and discrete choices of coders in the market, which I
believe are most important to recover for policy implications. Lastly, when coders are
making their discrete-choice decisions, I assume they enjoy full information including
their peers’ utility profiles and idiosyncratic shocks. While it is rare to observe fully
informed workers in a real-life labor market, it is much easier and almost costless to
achieve full-information scenario for the worker side in online markets. Here I focus
on the information asymmetry from the firm side towards the coder side. Next, I
establish the timeline for the two-stage market game.
At Stage 1, a finite number Jt of firms are randomly drawn to be present in the
market. Firms have common prior about the distribution of peer projects’ complex-
ity and potential coders’ utility profiles but cannot observe other firms’ types nor the
actual identity of participating coders. Also, all firms observe the market condition,
ωt, that commonly affects their profits.
7 By the end of this stage, firms simultane-
ously decide the cash prizes they will pay for the first and second place among all
submissions. At Stage 2, a finite number It of coders are randomly drawn to enter
7An example that determines ωt is a positive shock to recruiting coders from traditional markets.
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the market. Perfectly observing the characteristics and utility profiles of every active
project and every peer coder, they simultaneously submit their codes to the project
they choose. Without loss of generality, assume all firms provide a slot quota such
that Jt × Qt = It. Firms then hire a third-party reviewer board to evaluate all sub-
mitted codes. The market game completes with firms publishing the scores for every
submission, coders getting cash rewards accordingly.
Next, I define the preference structure of firms and coders. There is an abuse of
notation in the subsequent discussion: It (resp.Jt) denotes both the number of coders
(resp. projects) in market t, and the set of coders (resp. projects) in market t.
3.3.1 Preferences Structure of Firms and Coders
As presented in the reduced-form analysis, from Table 3.4, I detect a strong vertical
pattern of firms’ preferences over coders. This implies that coders’ professional skills
might be the primary component affecting firms’ preferences. Nonetheless, I need
to consider the fact that the willingness to pay for professional skills might vary
across firms, especially when they are faced with competitions among other firms
of asymmetric types. Therefore, I model Firm j’s ex post payoff from collecting
submissions of the set of coders µt(j) in market t is modeled as:
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where R is the revenue function that has a known form to the researcher. c is
a one-dimensional revenue coefficient that is positive and reflects how profitable the
submitted codes are. W j is a vector of observable firm/project-wise characteristics;
here in my data, it is the duration and technology of the project. Lastly,
Pij =

Pj, if i is the first place
1
2
Pj, if i is the second place
0, otherwise.
Note that this is one of the simplest parametric specifications of the payoff function
for the ease of illustration, and I can also add nonlinear terms in empirical analyses.
In particular, the revenue part mainly depends on three elements: (i) the project-wise
complexity Z∗j ; (ii) the sum of Zij, which denotes the quality of coder i’s submission
to project j, and (iii) the demand-side shifter that affects the overall willingness to
pay in the market, and is denoted by ωt.






j ,W j,V i, bj), (3.2)
where g2-function is increasing in coder i’s ability, X
∗
i , and decreasing in the com-
plexity of a project, Z∗j . The final score is also determined by project-wise observed
characteristics, W j: the duration and the technology, as well as the coder’s experi-
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j ) and is
realized only after the code is submitted. 8
To sum, this specification of firms’ preference captures (i) the vertical prefer-
ence over coders’ skill ability; (ii) the synergy effect between a project’s complexity
and participating coders’ skill levels, and (iii) the trade-off between attracting better
coders and saving costs.
Next, I model the preference structure of coders towards projects. Following the
discrete choice literature, I assume the indirect utility of coder i choosing project j
in market t is determined by the following equations:




j ,V i) + βW j + νijt (3.3)
where β0 captures coders’ vertical preference over cash prizes, and β0 ≥ 0. The
function ũit is coders’ heterogeneous preference over the complexity of a project, and
reflects their benefit from projects with various complexity which may depend on
their own skills and experiences. Next, as before, W j denotes projects’ duration and
technology requirement, which coders also care about; lastly, νijt is the idiosyncratic
taste shock that is independent of other variables. In this paper, I assume ũit takes
8This is to exclude the case where firms know ex ante the value of bj when they decide the cash
prizes at Stage 1.
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i + γ2V i + ηit) · Z∗j (3.4)
where ηit is a random coefficient following a normal distribution and is independent
of X∗i . Lastly, coders are allowed to choose the outside option. The systematic part
of the indirect utility from choosing any outside option is assumed to be zero.
Now I define the matching allocation µ generated in the second stage of the game:
if coder i chooses project j, then µ(i) = j and i ∈ µ(j). If coder i remains unmatched,
then µ(i) = ∅; if no one chooses project j, then µ(j) = ∅. This enables me to further
define the rational-expectation equilibrium for this extensive-form game.
Definition 4 The rational-expectation equilibrium (δ∗t , µ
∗
t ) is such that: At Stage 2,
for any observed (P t,Z
∗
t ), the matching allocation µ
∗
t : I ∪ J → I ∪ J ∪ ∅ is pairwise
stable; At Stage 1, given the rational expectation about the stable matching function
and the knowledge of distribution of (X ∗t ,Z
∗
t ), firms play the mixed-strategy pricing
function δ∗t : Z→ Σ which is Bayesian Nash Equilibrium strategy.
The equilibrium concept defined in the second-stage market is the pairwise stabil-
ity. An observed µ is said to be pairwise stable if it satisfies:
1. (Individual Rationality) ui,µ(i),t ≥ ui,∅,t,∀i ∈ It and |µt(j)| ≤ Qt, πpostj,µt(j),t ≥
πpostj,µt(j)\i,t, ∀j ∈ Jt, i ∈ µt(j).
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2. (Nonblocking Pairs) For any coder i and project j such that j 6= µt(i), the follow-
ing situations cannot happen simultaneously: ui,j,t > ui,µ(i),t; and π
post
j,µt(j)∪i,t >





,∃i′ ∈ µt(j) if |µt(j)| = Qt.
The first condition implies that the matching allocation I observe is at least as
desirable for all firms and coders as staying unmatched. The second condition implies
that, for any coder i in the market, his/her current choice µt(i) is the most desirable
project in his/her choice set. This choice set consists of any projects that is willing
to swap their current matched coders with coder i, or to fulfill a vacant space with
coder i.
At Stage 1, conditional on the prior knowledge of the joint distribution of potential
coders’ abilities and peer firms’ project complexity, along with the distribution of
coders’ idiosyncratic taste shock and the idiosyncratic shock to the code quality, the
mixed-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is defined as a mapping δ∗t : Z → Σ,
where Σ := {δ|
∑m
l=1 δ
l = 1}, such that for each firm j, given other firms’ equilibrium




























∗, δ∗−j,t(·), ω)] · δlj,t,∀δ ∈ Σ. (3.5)
where πint denotes the interim payoff for firms j that chooses cash prize Pj and
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∗, δ∗−j,t(·), ω) =∑
µt
Pr(µt|Z ∗−j,t,X ∗t , Z∗j , pl, δt(Z ∗−j,t))πpost(Z∗j , ωt,X ∗t , µt, pl) (3.6)
3.3.2 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, I use the result from Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 to establish the
existence result of such equilibrium. Specifically, the following lemma hold and proof
can be found in the appendix of Chapter 2.
Proposition 4 There exists a rational-expectation equilibrium (µ∗t , δ
∗
t ) for the game
defined in the previous section. Moreover, when assuming the symmetric equilibrium
mixed-strategy δ∗ is uniquely played in the data, the following two results hold:
1. The match µt is pairwise stable if and only if ui,µ(i) ≥ maxm∈Mi[µt] ui,m,∀i ∈ It,
where Mi[µt] is defined as follows:
Mi[µt] := {j1|j 6= µ(l),∀X∗l > X∗i , π
post
j,i,t ≥ 0} ∪ {jk|∃lm,m = 1, 2, · · · , k − 1,









} ∪ ∅ (3.7)
2. In markets where all firms fill up their vacancy, the probability of observing a
firm setting the cash prize pm = maxP monotonically increases with the market-
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level unobservable ω and the profit coefficient c.
This proposition shows that, at the second stage, as long as we know the skill levels
of all coders in market t, the pairwise stable outcome degenerates to a discrete choice
problem on the coder side, in which coders make their discrete choices sequentially,
even though this is originally a two-sided market. Moving back to the first stage, in
equilibrium, the better the market demand condition is (e.g. when it is more costly
to recruit coders from alternative platforms), the more probable for me to observe
firms posting maximum cash reward to compete for the best coders in the market.
This applies also to the profit coefficient that is remained to be identified – the more
profitable it is to attract better coders to do the job, the more probable it is for firms
to offer the maximum cash reward.
Detailed proof of this proposition can be found in the second section of Chapter 2.
In the next section, I will move on to the discussion of how to estimate this game. A
stylized identification discussion follows afterward, with minor changes made about
the original identification strategy in the third section of Chapter 2.
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3.4 Empirical Specification and Estima-
tion Procedure
Suppose, as the econometrician, I observe T weekly markets with It coders and Jt
projects in market t. Without loss of generality, assume each of the Jt projects offers
Qt slots such that Jt × Qt = It. Once a project is randomly drawn in market t, it
leaves the population and will not be selected in future markets. On the other hand,
coders enjoy a positive (and exogenous) probability of re-entering the market.
Every coder carries a latent ability level, X∗t , that is discrete and evolves over time
according to some underlying law, Pr(X∗t |X∗t′) if the coder appears in markets t and
t′ consecutively. Each project carries a difficulty level Z∗, also discrete. Addition-
ally, each weekly market t carries unobserved heterogeneity, ωt, which affects firms’
willingness to pay. All Qt slots within a project j share the same characteristics,
W j and the unobserved type Z
∗
j , but grant different cash prizes [Pj,
1
2
Pj, 0, · · · , 0],
respectively.9
To summarize, for each market t, I observe a It× 1 vector of coder characteristics
including their rating scores, X t, and their experiences and nationalities, V t; a Jt× 1
vector of contest characteristics, Wt and cash prizes, Pt; and a matching allocation




j ) = i. The
goal of identification, on the other hand, consists of three categories: (1) The joint
9In the data there exists an extra percentage bonus for coders who have been reliable in their
history; this is abstracted away here but will be taken into account in estimation.
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distribution of coders’ and projects’ unobserved heterogeneity, (X ∗t ,Z
∗
t ); (2) coders’
utility primitives in ui,j,t; and (3) firms’ ex post profit primitives in π
post
j,i,t , i.e. the
one-dimensional profit coefficient c.
In the following discussion, I suppress the market subscript t for ease of notation.
Also, I use bold letters to denote market-wise vectors of characteristics, whereas reg-
ular letters denote individual-level characteristics. The letter f is used to indicate the
probability mass/density function of any distribution, with a little abuse of notation,
and M is used to denote the matrix representation for any discrete distribution.
3.4.1 The Coder Rating System
To keep track of coders’ ability ranking in the population, the website provides
an up-to-date rating record for every coder. The rating score is calculated using the
Elo Algorithm as in chess games and is updated every time a coder participates in a
contest.10
Under this algorithm, I assume the rating score is calculated (and updated) ac-
cording to the following function. Specifically, I assume that a coder’s skill level when
entering the market follows a Bernoulli distribution with parameter pX ∈ [0, 1]. In
addition, I assume the rating scores and evolution of underlying abilities of coders
10The particular algorithm for calculating (and updating) a coder’s rating score can be found at
https://community.topcoder.com/tc?module=Static&d1=help&d2=ratings
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are determined by two rules:
Xτ−1 = X
∗
τ−1 + u1 (3.8)
when a coder first enters the market τ − 1, and
Xτ = λ ·X∗τ + (1− λ) ·Xτ−1 + u2. (3.9)
when he was present in some previous markets and re-enters the market τ . Rating
scores remain unchanged until the next time a coder re-enters the market. The error





Lastly, a coder’s latent ability evolves according to the following rule:
Pr(X∗τ = xH |X∗τ−1,V i) = [δx1(V i), δx2(V i)]′, (3.10)
where V is observable characteristics and X∗τ−1 is the coder’s most recent latent
ability. The goal of estimation, therefore, is to find (σ1, σ2, λ, δx1(V i), δx2(V i).
This specification above indicates that a coder’s rating in market t is determined
by his rating in the most recent market, X̃it, his innate ability in market t, X
∗
it, and
a match-specific shock u independent of X∗i , independent among different coders and
independent across different weekly markets. In reality, this random shock reflects
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additional information used to calculate and update the rating scores, such as the
rating volatility of other peer coders in the same contest. Furthermore, the following
conditions hold for any pair of coders i and m such that µ(i) 6= µ(m) in market t:
Xkt ⊥ Xit|X ∗t ,X t−1, µt.
Next, I specify how the reviewer board evaluates all submitted codes and generate
the final score that reflects firms’ preferences and determines the rank order within
each project.
3.4.2 The Contest Evaluation System
According to the rule specified on the website, the evaluation scores provided by
the reviewer board determines the ordinal rank of participating coders. Moreover,
both the website and users agree that the score is positively related to each coder’s
latent ability and the complexity of a project. Specifically, the more difficult a con-
test is, the more probable that submitted codes cannot meet the universal grading
criterion. Thus, the submitted code is more likely to receive a lower grade. I make
the following parametric specification about how the final score is related to observed
and unobserved characteristics.
Let Zti,j represent the final score coder i gets from participating in project j,
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j ,W j,V i, bj)




j + ξ3.NETj + ξ4Durationj + ξ5Experiencei + bj (3.11)
where,
1. the idiosyncratic part bj reflects anything not captured in the characteristic
space, such as the review board’s potential bias in grading, and is independent
of (X∗i , Z
∗
j ,W j,V i). In particular, it is assumed to follow a zero-mean normal
distribution with variance σ2b .
2. g2 is continuous and monotonically increasing with respect to its first argument
( ξ1 ≥ 0) and is monotonically decreasing in its second argument (ξ2 ≤ 0).
3. Conditional on observed matches µt,
(a) For any two contests j and l in the market, bj ⊥ bl.
(b) For any coder i that is matched with j, bj ⊥ (X∗i , ui,µt).
(c) For any project j in market t, bj ⊥ (Z∗j , ω).
(d) For any two markets t and t′, bt ⊥ bt′ .
Part (i) above implies that the variation in such scores is driven by the unobserved
heterogeneity on both sides. Part (ii) suggests that idiosyncratic taste shocks are
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unrelated with the market willingness to pay, ω. This is reasonable, as the reviewer
board evaluates codes independent of firms’ decision-makers and determines scores
solely based on functionality and documentation. The parameters to be estimated
are therefore (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4, ξ5, σb).
3.4.3 The Equilibrium Cash Prize
As described in the modeling section, the equilibrium decision of the optimal cash
prize is set by firms before the matching process as an equilibrium outcome. This
is also supported by reduced-form evidence: The level of the winner’s cash prize
is significantly affected by the level of winner’s cash prize in peer projects in the
same market. Therefore, I would like to incorporate the prize-setting stage into the
estimation procedure.
I conduct a two-step estimation: In the first step, I estimate δ̂ := Pr(Pjt|Z∗jt, ωt).
In the second step, I match the simulated cash prize distribution with the estimated
distribution from Step 1, and use the minimum-distance estimator to estimate the
firm’s profit parameter c.
In the data, I observe cash prizes taking integer values and are calculated in US
dollars. To make the estimation simpler, in the first step, I discretize the observed
cash prize into three intervals: above the median ($500), equal to the median and
below median. Furthermore, the probability of the cash prize lying in each interval
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is assumed to follow a logit model:11
Pr(Pjt = p
k|Z∗j , ωt) =
exp[ψH + ψ
Z∗
0 · Z∗j + ψω0 · ωt + ψ1.NET + ψ2Duration + ψ3J ]∑
k=M,H exp[ψk + ψ
Z∗
0 · Z∗j + ψω0 · ωt + ψ1.NET + ψ2Duration + ψ3J ] + 1
, k = M,H
(3.12)




0 , ψ1, ψ2, ψ3). All the char-
acteristics in the above equation are observable except for (i) the contest-wise un-
observed heterogeneity, i.e. the project complexity level, and (ii) the market-wise
unobserved heterogeneity, ωt. For the former, I assume it is drawn from a binary
space, {zL, zH}, and how it relates to observables also follows a logit model:
Pr(Z∗j = zH) =
exp[ι0(1 + ι1.NET + ι2Duration)]
exp[ι0(1 + ι1.NET + ι2Duration)] + 1
(3.13)
and the parameters to be estimated are (ι0, ι1, ι2). The market-level unobservable ω
is also drawn from a binary space {wL, wH}, with probability of being wH depends
on the number of projects in the market according to a probit model:
Pr(ωt = wH) = Pr(χ0 + χ1J + vt ≥ 0) (3.14)
where vt follows a standard normal distribution. The parameters to be estimated
11In the actual estimation, I only include the .NET dummy but not the Java dummy, as they
compose 98% of the observations, and in order to avoid multicollinearity, I treat all projects that
are not .NET as belonging to the Java family.
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are (χ0, χ1).
3.4.4 Project Generality
As mentioned in the data description section, one feature about software develop-
ment contests is that, besides the distinction of programming languages (such as Java
and C++), applications are also categorized into two classes: custom and generic.
The submitted code for generic applications will be delivered to the client firm and
simultaneously included in the TopCoder Catalog for potential future use. In con-
trast, custom code is entirely tailor-made for the client firm’s business project: It is
not allowed to be used by others.
Anecdotal evidence has suggested that there exists complexity distinction between
custom and generic projects. For instance, in a custom project, client firms often ex-
pect coders to configure multiple sets of properties to meet their specific functionality
requirement. Figure 3.1 shows that custom projects are on average rewarded higher
than generic projects, but the number of participation is lower, demonstrated by
Figure 3.2. This serves as indirect evidence for the relationship between project gen-
erality and its underlying complexity (types). More intuitively, the types of jobs in
this market involve certain degree of innovation, and it is reasonable to believe that
the customized jobs involve higher degree of innovation than generic jobs, which also
inherently adds complexity to the job.
Specifically, let Yj denotes the binary indicator, equal to one if the contest is
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generic and zero if it is custom. Then, I make the following specification:
Pr(Yjt = 1|Z∗j ) =
exp[φ0 + φ1 · Z∗j + φ2.NET + φ3Duration]
exp[φ0 + φ1 · Z∗j + φ2.NET + φ3Duration] + 1
(3.15)
and the parameters to be estimated therefore are (φ0, φ1, φ2, φ3). Furthermore, assume
log(Pr(Z∗j = z|Y = 1)) − log(Pr(Z∗j = z|Y = 0)) is decreasing in z and is i.i.d.
among all contests with the same Z∗j . In addition, given Z
∗, the distribution of Y is
independent of both firms’ profit shocks and reviewers’ taste shocks . Furthermore,
Yj is excluded from coders’ utility functions.
Intuitively, as we compare an easy project with a difficult one, it is relatively more
probable to observe the complicated project when Y = 0 rather than when Y = 1.
This assumption mainly restricts the possible correlation between the generality of a
project and how reviewers would bias their evaluation conditional on the complexity.
This is reasonable, as final scores mainly evaluate the functionality and documentation
of codes. Nevertheless, I exclude the situation where reviewers are systematically more
favorable to custom (or generic) code.
More implicitly, I restrict coders from having a systematic preference for custom
(or generic) contests, beyond the difficulty levels they carry. From the forum discus-
sion, custom and generic contests do not differ much in popularity. If a generic code is
sold to other clients, the winning coder will gain a “Royalty Dividend” – i.e., a small
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portion of the profit; for custom code, however, there will be no potential dividends
in the future. Nonetheless, royalty payments are tiny compared with winning prizes.
Recently, the website even decided to shut down the Royalty Dividend program due
to lack of popularity and motivation. This is a strong exogeneity assumption, as I
assume coders do not take the potential Royalty Dividend into account when they
make decisions, but we have anecdotal evidence supporting it. In a word, the binary
variable of custom vs. generic contests only reflects a variation in difficulty levels, but
does not affect how reviewers or coders value a contest, beyond its latent complexity,
Z∗.
3.4.5 Coders’ Indirect Utility Primitives
Next, I parametrize coders’ indirect utilities as:
ui,jk = β1Pjk + β2Durationj + β3.NETj + β4X
∗
i + (γ0 + γ1X
∗
i
+ γ2Experiencei) · Z∗j + νij, (3.16)
where νij is the coder/contest pairwise idiosyncratic taste shock, following an i.i.d.
standard Type-I Extreme Value distribution. Specifically, the coefficient β4 is the
fixed-effect for a given ability level X∗i ; γ0 is the fixed effect given a complexity level
of a project; γ1 measures each coder’s preference over the interaction of her ability
and the contest’s difficulty level, and γ2 captures the interaction between a coder’s
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experience and the project complexity; ηi is an unobserved taste determinant that is
independent of the other covariates. The parameters to be estimated are (β1, β2, β3,
β4, γ0, γ1, γ2).
3.4.6 Firm’s Profit Function
As presented in the modeling part, the ex post profit for each firm to attract a set
of coders is specified as:









There are two elements that are unknown to the econometrician. First, the
market-wise unobserved heterogeneity ωt has an unknown distribution; second, the
one-dimensional profit coefficient c is not known either. To estimate these two, I first
exploit the joint distribution of monetary prizes of at least three firms in a market,
as they can be viewed as the three measurements to the underlying market demand
shifter ωt and are conditionally independent with each other. After estimating the
marginal distribution of the market-wise unobserved heterogeneity, ωt, I can then
estimate the one-dimensional profit coefficient, c, for all firms using the following
equation:
c = (δ∗)−1(Pr(P |Z∗, ω), Z∗, P r(ω), P r(Z∗), P r(X∗)).
where Pr(P |Z∗, ω) is already estimated, and δ∗ is the symmetric equilibrium
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strategy of each firm, and is assumed to be invertible on c. In the actual estimation,
however, due to the complexity of computing δ∗, I did not estimate the profit coeffi-
cient, but in the Monte Carlo Simulation section of Chapter 2, I show the performance
of my estimation for c.
After presenting the parametric specification of the primitives in the game, I
present my likelihood-based estimation procedure in the following section.
3.4.7 A Likelihood-Based Estimation Procedure
To summarize, the primitives I would like to estimate consist of three sets: (1)
(β,γ), which are parameters in coders’ indirect utility function; (2) (ξ, σb), which
are parameters that determines the match-specific outcome, or the final score for
each coder, in equation (3.11); and (3) (φ,ψ, ι, ξ), the parameters that determines
the distribution of project complexity, Y , equilibrium cash prize P , the marginal
distribution of project- and market-wise unobserved heterogeneity, (Z ∗, ω), and (4)
(σ1, σ2, λ, δx1, δx2), the parameters that determines the marginal distribution Pr(X
∗)
. Summarizing all these parameters and distributions into θ, the likelihood function
is defined as
L(θ) =






Pr([µ1,P 1,Y 1,Z1,X 1,W 1,V 1]|X∗1) · Pr([µ2,P 2,Y 2,Z2,X 2,W 2,V 2]|X ∗2, [µ1,P 1,Y 1,Z1,X 1,W 1,V 1]) · · ·
Pr([µT ,P T ,Y T ,ZT ,XT ,W T ,V T ]|X∗T , [µ<T ,P<T ,Y <T ,Z<T ,X<T ,W<T ,V <T ]) · Pr(X ∗1,X ∗2, · · · ,X ∗T )
(3.18)
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where the subscript < T denotes all the observed variables prior to market T . We
further know that
Pr([µt,P t,Y t,Z t,X t,W t,V t]|X∗t , [µ<t,P<t,Y <t,Z<t,X<t,W<t,V <t]) =∑
Z∗t
Pr(Z t|Z∗t ,X ∗t ,W t,V t, µt) · Pr(X t|X∗t , X̃ t,V t)
· Pr(µt|Z∗t ,X ∗t ,P t,W t,V t)) · Pr(Y t,P t,Z∗t ,W t,V t). (3.19)
where X̃ t refers to the vector of the most recent rating scores of each coder in market
t. And in the first market,
Pr([µ1,P 1,Y 1,Z1,X 1,W 1,V 1]|X ∗1) =∑
Z∗1
Pr(Z1|Z∗1,X ∗1,W 1,V 1, µ1) · Pr(X 1|X∗1,V 1) · Pr(µ1|Z∗1,X ∗1,P 1,W 1,V 1) · Pr(Y 1,P 1,Z∗1,W 1,V 1).
(3.20)
In equation (3.19), if we rank coders in market t such that X∗1 ≥ X∗2 ≥ · · · ≥ X∗I ,12
Pr(µt|Z ∗t ,X ∗t ,P t,W t,V t)) = H1 ·H2 · · · ·HI
and,
Hi := Pr(µ(i) = j




exp(β1Pjk + β2Durationj + β3.NETj + β4X
∗
i + (γ0 + γ1X
∗
i + γ2Experiencei) · Z∗j )∑
m exp(β1Pm + β2Durationm + β3.NETm + β4X
∗
i + (γ0 + γ1X
∗
i + γ2Experiencei) · Z∗m)
dFη(ηi)
In words, Hi is the probability of coder i choosing contest µ(i) given the choices by
12For simplicity, assume when two coders carry the same ability level, all firms strictly prefer the
one with a smaller subscript.
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other better coders in the market. Lastly, the probability of observing the scores for
submitted codes are:
Pr(Z t|Z ∗t ,X ∗t ,W t,V t, µt) =
Jt∏
j=1






fbj(z − ξ1X∗i − ξ2Z∗j − ξ3.NETj − ξ4Durationj − ξ5Experiencei), (3.21)
Similarly, for the probability of Pr(X t|X ∗t , X̃ t,V t), we have:
Pr(X t|X ∗t , X̃ t,V t) =
I∏
i=1
[fu1(Xi −X∗i ) · 1(coder i first appear in market t)+
fu2(Xi − λX∗i − (1− λ)X̃i) · 1(coder i not first appear in market t)]
(3.22)
The last component Pr(Y t,P t,Z
∗
t ,W t,V t) can be similarly decomposed using the
primitives I am estimating. So far, I have constructed the likelihood function, and
everything on the RHS corresponds to the primitives to be estimated. Standard MLE
approach is not practically implementable without further modification, however. To
see this, recall that coders have a positive probability of re-entering a market. In fact,
this panel structure helps me to achieve identification that will be discussed in the
next section; coders are therefore viewed as “global players” of this repeated game,
leading to the correlation of likelihood across different markets. Taking logarithm is
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not implementable, as likelihood across markets is not separable. Even if we maximize
likelihood function directly, a dimensionality issue will arise here, as we need to sum
over all possible values of Pr(X ∗1,X
∗




times of evaluation if we assume coders’ ability levels are drawn from a finite space
of order M . For instance, in the real data, we have more than 1,300 coders and 400
weekly markets. On average, there are 22 coders per market, which implies that,
to compute the full likelihood, we need to evaluate the joint probability distribution
Pr(X ∗1,X
∗
2, · · · ,X ∗T ) approximately 222×400 times, even if each coder’s skill level takes
only two possible values.
3.4.7.1 A Computationally-Feasible Modified Likelihood-Based
Estimator
I therefore adopt the modified estimator suggested in section 3.5.2 of Chapter 2.
First, I need to make the following assumption:
Assumption 10 Suppose the probability of coder i being selected in market t is
eit =

e0, if coder i never participated before,
e1, if coder i participated in market t− 1,
0, if coder i appeared both in market t and t− 1.
where 0 < e2 < e1 < 1.
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Intuitively, I assume that coder enters the market and stay for at most two consecutive
weeks. Afterward, they leave the market forever. The entry, stay, and exit decisions
are nonstrategic, though. Furthermore, I assume the populations of both coders and
contests consist of countlessly many candidates. Thus, there always exist a positive
number of coders and contests across all weekly markets. Hence, in each market t,
the set of coders, It, could be divided into three categories, {It,−1, It,0, It,+1}, where
It,−1 denotes the coders that also appeared in market t − 1 and stayed in market t,
It,0 denotes coders that appeared only in market t and leave forever after t, and It,+1
denotes coders that first appear in market t and stay for one more period. This is
illustrated in Figure (3.6). This assumption may seem to be restrictive at first sight,
but empirically it is acceptable to focus on coders’ consecutive participation behavior
only, and treat reentry behavior separately for the same coder. Figure (3.7) shows the
frequency coders’ consecutive participation behavior. Specifically, more than 92% of
consecutive attendance is less than or equal to 2 periods, and less than 8% consecutive
participation is more than twice. This adds credit to our assumption: We treat any
coder who re-enters the market after about of consecutive participation as a separate
identity.
Now, I construct a new likelihood function that integrates out partial information
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from what we observe:13
L̃(θ) =
∑




[P 2,Y 2],...,[P T ,Y T ]
L(θ)












2t−1|[Z2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1, µ2t−2,+1,W 2t−2,+1,V 2t−2,+1],
[Z2t,−1,X 2t,−1, µ2t,−1,W 2t,−1,V 2t,−1]). (3.23)
whereAt := [µt,P t,Y t,Z t,X t,W t,V t]. In the last equation, the subscript {2t,−1}
denotes the distribution of variables in market 2t, of coders staying from market 2t−1
till in market 2t; similarly, the subscript {2t− 2,+1} denotes the distribution of vari-
ables in market 2t − 2, of coders staying from market 2t − 2 till market 2t − 1.
Essentially, I have integrated out some information with regard to even numbers
of markets, and mainly focus on the odd numbers of markets. This enables me to
compute market-level likelihood separately without encountering the dimensionality
problem. We condition on the information of observables such as Z and X from even
markets, as they are relevant to coders’ underlying types X∗. The last equality follows
from the fact that in market 2t−1 and 2t+1, there is no coder overlapping anymore;
thus, the joint distributions of observables are independent of each other, conditional
on neighbor market observables. Moreover, coders stay for at most two periods, thus
the only relevant information from even markets is about the codes from right before
13Without loss of generality, assume T is an even number. In addition, there is an abuse of
notation – some variables inW are continuously distributed, but I use the summation sign to denote
the summation of all possible values for discrete variables and the integration over the support of
continuous variables.
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2t−1|[Z2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1, µ2t−2,+1,W 2t−2,+1,V 2t−2,+1],









Pr(Z2t−1|Z∗2t−1,X ∗2t−1,W 2t−1,V 2t−1, µ2t−1)·
Pr(µ2t−1|Z∗2t−1,X ∗2t−1,P 2t−1,W 2t−1,V 2t−1))·
Pr(Y 2t−1|Z∗2t−1,W 2t−1) · Pr(P 2t−1|Z∗2t−1,W 2t−1) · Pr(Z∗2t−1,W 2t−1)·
Pr(X 2t−1,X
∗
2t−1,V 2t−1|[Z2t−2,+1,X 2t−2,+1, µ2t−2,+1,W 2t−2,+1,V 2t−2,+1], [Z2t,−1,X 2t,−1, µ2t,−1,W 2t,−1,V 2t,−1]).
(3.24)
The RHS of equation (3.24) corresponds to the primitives we are interested in
estimating. The detailed derivation is provided in the appendix.
The next lemma establishes the consistency result for the estimator.
Lemma 9 Assume (i) the product space for estimation primitives are compact; 14 (ii)
Pr(µt,Z t,P t,Y t,W t,V t|X ∗t ) is continuous in all parameters and probability distribu-
tions; (iii) the set of primitives such that Pr(µt,Z t,P t,Y t,W t,V t|X ∗t ) > 0 does not
depend on the value of primitives; (iv) there exists a function K(µt,Z t,P t,Y t,W t,V t|X ∗t )
such that
1. logPr(µt,Z t,P t,Y t,W t,V t|X∗t , θ)−logPr(µt,Z t,P t,Y t,W t,V t|X∗t , θ0) ≤ K(µt,Z t,P t,Y t,W t,V t|X ∗t )
and
2. EK(µt,Z t,P t,Y t,W t,V t|X ∗t ) <∞;
14The space include the parametric spaces for (1) (β, γ,σ), which are parameters in coders’ utility
function; (2) (ξ,κ), which are parameters in the score function in equation (3.11), and lastly, the
probability space for the distributions Pr(Y |Z∗), Pr(P |Z∗, ω), Pr(Z∗) and Pr(ω).
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then the likelihood estimator that maximizes the function in equation (3.19) converges
in probability to the true values of the primitives.
A detailed proof can be found in the appendix of Chapter 2. In the next section,
I briefly discuss how the observed data patterns from many finite-sized markets lead
to the identification of the underlying utility and profit parameters through first
identifying the unobserved coder and project heterogeneity. The detailed derivations
are presented in Chapter 2, and I will focus on how the stylized facts in the market I
am studying leads to identification argument.
3.4.8 Identification Discussion
Full identification discussion consists of three steps. First, within each market,
conditional on observing stable matches µ, I identify the joint distribution of (X ∗t ,Z
∗
t )
from jointly observing coder-specific, firm-specific and match-specific characteristics.
The identification strategy is based on the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition tech-
nique developed in Hu (2008). Then, the market-level choice probability can be re-
vealed, which leads to the identification of coders’ indirect utility parameters following
the well-known discrete-choice literature. Lastly, market-wise demand condition can
be identified by observing multiple projects within each market. The identification
of firms’ profit coefficient is identified from the monotonicity result in Proposition 1.
The intuition behind the first step is that, from data, for any individual coder
i, we have three conditionally independent pieces of information related with their
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ability level (current rating Xt and current and previous final scores (Zt, Z̃t)). On
the contest side, we are unable to observe information for the same project across
different markets as each contest appears in only one market. Instead, we must rely
on the information observed from the matching outcomes in one market to invoke
identification. First, let us focus on the final scores, as they not only reflect coders’
innate abilities, X∗, but also the complexity of contests, Z∗. We must be cautious
here, though, as the observed scores are driven by the matching allocation, through
which contests occurring in the same market are implicitly correlated. Another bit
of useful information concerns the equilibrium cash prizes decided by firms: They
are the major movements firms make during the extensive-form game and are an
equilibrium outcome. Again, the distribution of cash prizes is correlated through the
market-level unobservable, ω, and further correlated through the matching allocation,
µ.15 Consequently, we cannot separately identify its distribution without looking at
other contests in the same market. Instead, the conditional independence could only
be built upon observed matching allocations.
The next lemma formally establishes the conditional independence assumption
among observed characteristics. To be more accurate, I return to the explicit market
subscript t.
Lemma 10 The following condition holds for the market-level observables, when con-
15To see this, note that the probability of observing an individual match µ depends on the joint
distribution of (X∗,Z∗,P ). Thus, the distribution of P is variant with different values of µ.
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ditioning on (W t,V t)
(X t|Y t) ⊥ (P t, Z̃ t) ⊥ Z t|(Z ∗t ,X ∗t , X̃ t, µt),
where Y t denotes the Jt × 1 vector of binary variables, each indicating whether a
contest is custom or generic; X t represents the It × 1 vector of coders’ contemporary
ratings; P t represents the Jt× 1 vector of cash prize for all contests; Z̃ t indicates the
It × 1 vector of all coders’ final scores up to their most recent participation; Z t is the
It×1 vector of final scores for all coders; (Z ∗t ,X ∗t ) is the It×Jt matrix of all contests’
and coders’ types; and X̃ t is the It × 1 vector of all coders’ ratings up to their most
recent participation. Lastly, µt is the observed match in market t.
Therefore, fixing the market size (I, J,Q), other observed characteristics (W t,V t)
(suppressed here), the matching allocation and coders’ previous performance, (µ,X̃ ),
I can write down the following equations:




f(P , Z̃ |Z ∗,X ∗, X̃ , µ) · f(Z |Z ∗,X ∗, X̃ , µ) · f(X,Z ∗,X ∗|Y ,X̃ , µ) (3.25)
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as well as,




f(P , Z̃ |Z ∗,X ∗, X̃ , µ) · f(Z |Z ∗,X ∗, X̃ , µ) · f(Z ∗,X ∗|Y ,X̃ , µ) (3.26)
Furthermore, when (X∗, Z∗) follows a discrete distribution, we could partition (or
discretize, if observables are continuous) observable characteristics to have the same
dimension as the cardinality of the support for (X∗, Z∗), such that equations (3.25)
and (3.26) could be written in a matrix form and would provide the nice property of
invertibility. Detailed assumptions can be found in Appendix 3.9.3.
Specifically, fixing a certain value of (Y = y, X̃ , µt, I, J,Q), I compute the proba-
bility of observing X d = x as well as various values of (P d, Z̃ d,Z d)
MXd=x,P d,Z̃d,Zd|Y =y,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q
= MZd|Z∗,X∗,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q ·DZ∗,X∗,Xd=x|Y =y,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q ·M
T
P d,Z̃d|Z∗,X∗,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q (3.27)
where on the LHS, the element on the i-th row and j-th column corresponds to the
probability:
Pr(X d = x, (P d, Z̃ d) = (p,z)j,Z
d = z i|Y = y, X̃ = x, µ, I, J,Q)
where (p,z)j(resp. z i) is the j-th(resp. i-th) distinct value for the vector (P
d, Z̃ d)(resp.
144
CHAPTER 3. MATCHING GAMES WITH UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY:
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF ONLINE LABOR MARKETS
Z d). The first and third matrix on the RHS is similarly defined. The middle matrix D
on the RHS is diagonal whose elements are the probability of observing (Z ∗ = z,X ∗ =
x′,X d = x) for various values of (z,x′) conditional on (Y = y, X̃ = x, µ, I, J,Q). All
matrices are of dimension (mJ · lI)× (mJ · lI). In addition,
MP d,Z̃d,Zd|Y =1−y,X̃=x,µt,I,J,Q = MZd|Z∗,X∗,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q ·DZ∗,X∗|Y =1−y,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q·
MT
P d,Z̃d,Z∗,X∗|X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q (3.28)
By inverting equation (3.28) and right-multiplying equation (3.27), I get
MXd=x,P d,Z̃d,Zd|Y =y,X̃=x,µ,I,J,Q ·M
−1
P d,Z̃d,Zd|Y =1−y,X̃=x,µt,I,J,Q





Here, the matrices on the LHS are directly computable from data, and the RHS
embeds the distribution of unobservables that we are interested in. I use the eigenvalue–
eigenvector decomposition method developed in Hu (2008) for nonparametric identi-
fication. The next proposition is a significant result to identify the joint distribution
of (Z ∗,X ∗) given the market size and observed match, µ.
Proposition 5 The joint distribution of (P ,Z ∗,X ∗|µ, I, J,Q), the conditional distri-
butions of (Z j|Z∗j ,X ∗µ(j)) and (Xµ(j)|X ∗µ(j), X̃µ(j)) are all nonparametrically identified
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from observing the joint distribution of (Y ,X,P , Z̃ ,Z , X̃ ) conditional on a certain
(µ, I, J,Q). Moreover, the underlying law of motion Pr(X∗it|X̃∗it) and initial condition
Pr(Xi1|X∗i1) are nonparametrically identified.
In the second step, the market-level choice probability is equivalent to the prob-
ability of observing the matching allocation µt, and is determined solely by coders’
preferences once we know their skill levels. In order to simplify our notation, the
(I, J,Q,W t,V t) is suppressed from now on. As coders’ preferences are affected by
(X ∗,Z ∗,P ), the market-level choice probability can be written as Pr(µ|X ∗,Z ∗,P ).
After identifying the conditional distribution of unobserved types of coder–slot pairs,
we could apply the Bayes Theorem:





where, f(P,Z∗,X∗|µ) is identified from the previous step and Pr(µ) is directly ob-
servable from data.
Given the knowledge of Pr(µ|X ∗,Z ∗,P ), we are able to recover coders’ utility
primitives based on
Pr(µ|X ∗,Z∗,P ) = Pr(u1,µ(1) ≥ max
j∪∅
u1,j) · Pr(u2,µ(2) ≥ max
j 6=µ(1),∅
u2,j) · · · · Pr(uI,µ(I) ≥ max
j 6=µ(i),∀i<I,∅
uI,j)
if we order coders such that X∗1 > X
∗
2 > · · · > X∗I .
Note that for each coder i, the conditional probability Pr(ui,µ(i) ≥ maxj∪∅ u1,j) is
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very similar to the individual choice probability in single-agent discrete-choice models.
The major difference lies in the way I characterize a coder’s choice set. Now that the
choice set is identified, I can directly use the argument in the discrete-choice literature
to identify coders’ utility parameters.
From Step 1, we have identified the joint distribution of (P ,Z ∗,X ∗). We know
that, for each contest j, the symmetric equilibrium cash prize depends on (Z∗j , ωt),
which implies
Pj ⊥ Pj′ ⊥ Pj′′ |Z∗j , Z∗j′ , Z∗j′′ , ω (3.30)
for any project j, j′, j′′ in market t. Therefore, we could recover the distribution of
market unobserved heterogeneity, ωt, from jointly observing at least three contests
in the market. This is in line with the measurement-error model, as all prizes can
be viewed as noisy measures for ωt. Following Hu (2008), we make the following
assumption to identify the conditional distribution, f(Pj|Z∗j , ω).
Assumption 11 1. ω is drawn from a finite support {w1, w2, · · · , wn} with n ≤
m.
2. There exists a mapping ρ : {p1, p2, · · · , pm} → {1, 2, · · · , n} such that the fol-
lowing matrix is of full rank n× n.
Mρ(P1),ρ(P3)|Z∗1 ,Z∗3 := [Pr(ρ(P1) = p, ρ(P3) = p
′|Z∗1 , Z∗3)]p,p′∈{1,2,··· ,n}
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The next theorem tells us that we could identify the distribution of a single con-
test’s cash prize, P , conditional on its complexity, Z∗, and the market unobservable
ω. This condition distribution could be viewed as firms’ pricing strategies.
Proposition 6 Given Assumption 11, we can nonparametrically identify Pr(Pj|Z∗j , ω)
and the marginal distribution of ω.
As discussed in the theory section, the equilibrium cash prize distribution maxi-
mizes the interim payoff of each firm at Stage 1. Specifically, let δ∗ := Pr(P |Z∗, ω),




















−j(·), ω) is the firm’s interim payoff function defined previously.
In equilibrium, δ∗ is a function of (c, Z∗, ω, β, γ, σ, Pr(Z∗), P r(X∗)), where only the
profit coefficient c is not known. As we already made the assumption with regard to
the equilibrium selection rule, we only need to make sure the δ∗ function is invertible
for c. From part 2 of Proposition 4, the equilibrium distribution of cash prize δ∗
is stochastically increasing with respect to c. Thus, the profit coefficient, c, can be
identified from
c = (δ∗)−1(Pr(P |Z∗, ω), Z∗, ω, β, γ, σ, Pr(Z∗), P r(X∗)).
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Thus, I have nonparametrically identified the distribution of unobserved hetero-
geneity on both sides of the market, and more importantly, identified the preference
primitives for firms and coders. Detailed derivation and proofs can be found in Sec-
tion 3 of Chapter 2. In the subsequent section, I will discuss the estimation results
and show how the model fits the data.
3.5 Estimation Results and Discussion
In this section, I present the estimation result using the modified likelihood-based
estimator I suggested in the previous section. To construct the (log-)likelihood func-
tion, I select markets that have no more than 20 coders; This is because when the
number of coders increases, the computational burden will increase exponentially. I
firstly use odd numbers of markets to generate the point estimate; then I re-estimate
using numbers of markets. I include 204 markets in total (over half of the whole
sample). Also, I do not observe actual coders choosing the outside option in each
market. Here I permute the “outside option” observations by two means: (1) I treat
coders who deliver a coder of score lower than 75 to be choosing the outside option.
This is acceptable as submissions with a score worse than 75 is treated as trivial
and nonfunctional, and can be partially categorized as coder choosing to contribute
nothing in the market; (2) I treat coders appearing more than once in the market
to choose the outside option in the previous market. This is also reasonable, as an
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active coder in the current market is more likely to browse the website for a period
of time, but decide not to participate until he sees exciting projects. Nonetheless, if
given more data, especially data about the actual outside option observations, the
estimation should be more accurate. After adding these observations, my sample size
increases by around 10%. Other detailed specifications can be found in Appendix
3.9.4.
The results are summarized in Table 3.8. Here, I discuss in detail how the esti-
mation result informs us about the market’s underlying patterns and how they are
compared with reduced-form evidence.
3.5.1 Coders’ Utility Primitives
First, let us look at coders’ utility primitives shown in Panel A of Table 3.8. The
cash prize plays an active role in motivating coders to participate, but the magnitude
of that role is small, as the cash prizes have been scaled down by 1000. On the other
hand, duration has a negative impact, showing coders’ preference over shorter projects
over longer ones. If we compare the reduced-form regression of how coders sort them-
selves into different projects, this estimates is in line with the sorting pattern: more
skilled coders sort into projects with a shorter duration. Regarding programming
language, coders slightly prefer .NET projects than Java projects, which is consistent
with the fact that the former is less familiar to most coders.
Coders exhibit a positive individual-level fixed effect, reflecting the fact that more
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skilled coders tend to show more interest to this platform compared with alternative
work opportunities outside the platform. In my model, I also allow coders to perceive
the complexity of a job differently by adding the interaction terms between project
complexity and coder-wise characteristics. On average, the complexity becomes less
desirable to coders with higher skills, although the complexity fixed effect per se has
a positive coefficient in the model. Experience positively affects the probability of
choosing complex projects, which indicates that, coders who have more experience
tend to sort themselves into more complex jobs.
Compared with results in Table 3.6, this panel at least partially echoes what I
have found in the reduced-form sorting pattern. For instance, it is clear that coders
with higher rating score sort themselves into Java projects compared with .NET and
other projects; from the structural estimation, .NET is less favorable to coders. As
mentioned earlier, this pattern also applies to coders’ perception over the duration
of a job. Lastly, the fact that coders (insignificantly) sort into less paid jobs can
be rationalized by the fact that although they love money, they are hesitant to be
engaged in more complex jobs, especially when a coder is more skilled, as suggested
by the structural estimates.
3.5.1.1 Determinants of the Final Scores
Another interesting pattern is how the average final scores are determined by
various factors beyond the participating coder’s skill level. This is summarized in
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Panel B of Table 3.8. Firstly, it is clear that final score is positively affected by coder
ability and negatively affected by project complexity; .NET projects score slightly
less than Java projects; coders participating in projects with shorter duration tend
to score higher, which is reasonable, as longer projects tend to be easier to complete.
More experienced coders tend to get a lower score. Compared with Table 3.5, most
results are consistent regarding observable characteristics.
3.5.1.2 Distribution of Cash Prize, Project Generality and
the Underlying Complexity
More importantly, let us explore how data informs us about the underlying degree
of heterogeneity on the firm side. We see a clear pattern of a project’s cash prize being
increasingly affected by its underlying complexity, as reflected in the third row of Panel
C in Table 3.8. Similarly, higher market-level unobservables are associated with higher
average cash prizes. This is all in line with the theoretical prediction. In addition, cash
prizes compensate more for .NET projects and/or projects with a shorter duration,
as suggested by the coefficient for .NET dummy and Duration covariate. Lastly, as
the number of firms in each market increases, the equilibrium cash prize tend to be
higher; this might be explained by the fact of competition. This result is also partially
consistent with the reduced-form finding in Table 3.7 except for how cash prizes are
related to duration and the number of contests per market. Nevertheless, regression
analysis in Table 3.7 does not consider the unobserved heterogeneity of a project,
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thus can result in biased estimates.
The binary variable Y indicates whether the project is for generic or custom use.
More complex jobs are less likely to be generic, as reflected by the negative coefficient
for the complexity. .NET projects are slightly more likely to be generic. The longer
a project is, the more probable it is a generic project.
Regarding the underlying distribution of project complexity, .NET projects are
slightly more likely to be complex. The shorter a project is, the more probable it is a
complex job. Combining all the estimation regarding the duration, I have found that
shorter projects are more challenging for coders to complete, which may be because
they require more coding efficiency and bug-freeness.
Moving to Panel F of the table, we can see that the market-level demand shifter
is negatively affected by the number of firms in the market. This is reasonable, as the
more firms there are in the market, the less profitable it is to buy submitted codes
via this platform because of the limited capacity supply of coders.
3.5.1.3 Distribution of Coders’ Latent Ability
Lastly, Let me discuss how the structural model tells about the pattern of coders’
latent ability and its evolution over time. First, when a coder is of high ability last
period, it is more probable for him to remain skilled during the current period than
does a coder with low ability, as shown by the first two rows of Panel G. Next, it is
demonstrated by the estimate of λ that a coder’s rating score depends heavily on his
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last-period rating. The disturbance to a coder’s rating score becomes smaller, as over
time, the rating tend to become more stable. This is also consistent with what the
website shows us. Regarding the latent marginal probability of being highly skilled,
Chinese coders tend to be more skilled than coders of other nationalities. This might
arise from the selection as Chinese coders might sort themselves into this platform
more often than others. Most of the estimates are reasonable and consistent with
what I find in reduced-form analyses.
3.5.2 Model Fit
In this section, I describe the in-sample fit of the estimated moments. Specifically,
in the simulated data, I firstly include the same set of coders for all T = 204 weekly
markets. By using the point estimates from the previous section, I generate the ob-
served projects (resp. coders) within each market, including their latent complexity
levels (resp. ability levels), conditional on observed characteristics such as program-
ming language and duration (resp. nationality and experience). Then, I simulate
coders’ discrete choices and the final scores they would get from participating in the
matched project. Lastly, I pool all observations together and re-divide them into
four bins according to the experience percentile of each coder. Table 3.9 depicts the
predicted and observed first and second moments between data and model against
different experience percentiles, with standard deviation from 200 simulated samples
provided in the parentheses. Regarding the first moments, it shows that the model
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well predicts the trend of both rating scores and final scores a coder would get when
he accumulates more experience from participation. The estimates for how much cash
prize a coder would get is less accurate than the previous two estimates, probably
because of the way I discretize the cash prizes. For all first moment estimates, the
last column is always less accurate, though, possibly because the experience is capped
above by 20 during the estimation. Thus the more experienced coder sub-sample is
noisier.
Regarding the second moment estimates, qualitatively my model well predicts the
correlation between the (1) final score and cash prize, and (2) rating score and the
cash prize. Quantitatively the latter is better predicted than the former. For both
estimates, the lower 10% and upper 30% experience subsamples are worse predicted,
probably because these samples have noisier observations. To sum, the overall fit is
good, indicating that the structural model well approximates the observed data.
3.6 Counterfactual Experiments
Although I am unable to provide closed-form solution for the whole model due to
the complexity of computation when the number of agents gets large, it is possible
to explore the market patterns via simulation analysis. In particular, I am interested
in how to improve the total surplus in such a market. I conduct three counterfactual
experiments using the point estimates from the data and an illustrative model where
155
CHAPTER 3. MATCHING GAMES WITH UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY:
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF ONLINE LABOR MARKETS
there are two firms in each market, offering three slots each, and four coders are
randomly drawn from population to make their participation choices. The whole
time window is 12 weeks which is approximately three months after the counterfactual
policies go into effect. Besides computing the welfare of all coders and firms in each
market, I also define the degree of “assortativeness” as
Assort =
Pr(µ(i) = j|X∗i = xh, Z∗j = zh) + Pr(µ(i) = j|X∗i = xl, Z∗j = zl)
Pr(µ(i) = j|X∗i = xh, Z∗j = zl) + Pr(µ(i) = j|X∗i = xl, Z∗j = zh)
and define the participation rate within each market as the percentage of coders not
choosing the outside option. In the first experiment, I am interested in how coders’
attitude towards complexity would affect firms’ welfare.
3.6.1 Coders’ Attitudes Towards Complexity
How different coders perceive the complexity of various projects is influenced by
the scheme that the website designs. For instance, by introducing extra reputation
rewards for complex projects in addition to the cash prize, coders might view those
projects as more attractive than before, potentially due to the fact that their reputa-
tion will be built up that benefits their future income even in other platforms. This
dimension of preference is captured through the γ1-term in coders’ indirect utility
functions: to see this, note that currently γ1 is estimated to be negative, which shows
that more talented coders are more interested in easy jobs rather than complex ones.
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In this counterfactual experiment, I would like to see what would happen if their
attitude toward complexity, γ1 be shifted to positive (first scenario) and even more
negative (second scenario). In particular, the first scenario represents one type of
policy change such as delivering extra point rewards for highly skilled coders to enroll
in challenging jobs, whereas the second scenario can be implemented by giving them
extra points for contributing to easy jobs. Formally, recall the specification about
coders’ utility functions:




j ,V i) + βW j + νij




i + γ2V i + ηit) · Z∗j + νij (3.31)
In particular, the γ1-term in high-skilled coders’ utility function denotes their
overall attitudes towards complexity. In this experiment, we shift the values of γ1 from
upward to twice its absolute value, and downward to 2 times of its current value, to see
its impact on coders’ and firms’ total surplus and other market outcomes. The results
are shown in Table 3.10. It first indicates that in both scenarios, the coders’ welfare is
improved, whereas firms’ welfare is hurt by the first scenario, largely affecting the total
welfare. This is interesting, as what we typically think is that once the assortativeness
is increased, as shown in the fourth row of the first column, firms will be as better
off as coders do. Instead, they are harmed by the decrease in participation. The
reason is that, when high skilled coders are more motivated to take part in difficult
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jobs, low-skilled ones may potentially be “squeezed out” as their desired jobs are
taken, whether it is an easy or a difficult one; this fact on average harms the firm
side as a result. From this experiment, we can see there is a subtle trade-off between
assortativeness and participation, as what I find in the market is that low-skilled
coders are more passionate about complex jobs, and the market will be better off
if we further allow them to do so. Therefore, an incentive scheme that encouraging
high-skilled coders to be more active in easy jobs might help improve this market. In
the long run, however, it remains uncertain which way to go especially if the market
creator would like to attract more skilled labor onto this platform.
3.6.2 Allowing Firms to Price-Discriminate
The current market operates in a way that firms are not able to price discriminate
coders with different skill levels. This may result in the overly high payment by firms
and misalignment of the match between coders and their most suitable jobs. Now I
would like to introduce an alternative regime, in which firms have the choice to design
discriminative contracts based on coders’ skill levels. Specifically, firms could choose
to add a 50% percentage bonus if the coder participated is of high skill level, on top
of their basic cash prize levels. The splitting rules remain the same: the second-
place always gets half of the prize for the first-place. The results are shown in Table
3.11. First of all, this new regime improves the participation rate, as demonstrated
by the last row in the table. Interestingly, both firms and coders benefit from this
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new scheme: (especially high-skilled) coders are now awarded more money due to
price discrimination; meanwhile, firms with complex jobs can attract better coders
to participate. As a result, the total surplus in such a market improves. Lastly, the
degree of assortativeness is moderately hurt by price discrimination, which is less
of a problem, as the price discrimination leads to coders who previously choose the
outside option now stay inside, possibly in less complex jobs. To sum, when firms have
more freedom of choosing how to award coders in terms of price discrimination, they
gain higher utility, which also benefits coders as a whole. This inspires the market
designers to redesign the market so as to improve the total surplus in an efficient
manner.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper adopts a two-stage structural model to study an online contest-based
labor market, where wage contracts are set by the employer before they match with
skilled labor. In the analysis, I establish a computationally practical estimation pro-
cedure allowing unobserved heterogeneity to prevail on both sides. Estimates of
structural parameters using individual level data from a leading contest-based cod-
ing community suggest the importance of accounting for workers’ multidimensional
preferences over short-term jobs on such platforms. To answer the policy question
of how to better design such markets, two counterfactual experiments are conducted,
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which shed light on the importance of incentivizing workers’ preference over different
task complexities and firms’ price discrimination power, which has been less studied
in the existing literature.
This paper takes the first step to establishing a structural model to estimate
such finite-sized markets with unobserved heterogeneity. One important direction for
future research would be to account for workers’ strategic behavior after matching
with the tasks. This requires a combination of the current model and the well-
developed auction/contest literature. By doing so, one could better understand how
workers’ ex post performance is incentivized by different market schemes. It would
be equally interesting if one can compare the economic efficiency and potential skill
spillovers across different matching platforms, but this requires a new set of data
about alternative matching markets.
3.8 Tables and Figures
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: Contest-specific Characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Number of Submissions 2846 3.860506 (3.919741) 1 61
Average Final Score 2845 87.20051 (9.24136) 0 99.94
Winning Cash Payment 2778 578.6886 (318.2293) 0 3000
Duration 2835 6.202469 (2.905825) 0 105
Screening Rate 2832 .9330778 (.1411169) .25 1
Total DR Points 2828 351.6358 (286.9357) 0 2500
Dummy=1 if Custom 2846 .5523542 (.4973389) 0 1
Programming language Percentage (%) N
Java Custom 36.51 1039
Java 26.91 766
.NET Custom 16.62 473
.NET 17.15 488
Others 2.81 80
Note: Each coder gets three independent final scores from the reviewer board, and the average determines
coders’ ordinal rankings. Cash prize is the amount of money awarded to the first-place participant.
Duration is defined as the number of days from the posting date till the submission due date. DR point
reward scheme is observed only after May 12, 2006.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics: Coder-specific Characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Rating Score 1,169.49 392.126 1 2,488 9,849
Experience 13.169 20.029 0 194 10,052
Tenure 624.815 523.109 0 3,201 10,052
Final Score 87.328 10.366 0 100 10,061
Final Cash Reward 212.641 303.650 0 3,000 10,052
Final DR Reward 122.236 189.141 0 2,500 8,109
# of participation/week 1.156 0.474 1 14 8,718
Nationalities Percentage (%) N
China 53.82 747




Note: The tenure of a coder is defined as the number of days from the date he registered on the
website to the date he takes part in the current contest.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics: Market-specific characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
# of contests/week 7.115 4.743 1 24 400
# of active coders/week 21.795 14.885 1 84 400
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Table 3.4: Firms’ Vertical Preference: Placement Regression on Rating Score
Placement Placement Placement Placement Placement
Rank of Rating Score 0.900*** 0.891*** 0.839*** 0.821*** 0.782***
(50.81) (46.12) (147.03) (37.10) (26.18)
Experience -0.00172 -0.00384** -0.000443 -0.00170
(-1.66) (-3.17) (-0.39) (-1.30)
Winning Cash Payment -0.000290*** -0.000489*** 0.0000491 0.0000412
(-5.11) (-4.02) (0.34) (0.10)
Duration -0.0110 -0.0176 -0.0390** -0.0474
(-1.14) (-0.87) (-2.60) (-1.68)
Coder Nationality: China 0.0173 -0.0440 0.0377 -0.00247
(0.37) (-0.90) (0.77) (-0.06)
Coder Nationality: US 0.219* 0.298** 0.250* 0.306**
(2.47) (2.66) (2.44) (3.18)
Constant 0.416*** 0.460*** 0.897*** 0.404** 0.663***
(6.64) (3.99) (3.68) (2.95) (4.27)
Project Generality FE N Y Y Y Y
Technology FE N Y Y Y Y
Market FE N N Y N Y
IV Regression N N N Y Y
Obs 10075 9778 9778 8430 8430
R-sq 0.810 0.811 0.728 0.776
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. P-value in parentheses.
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Table 3.5: Final Score Regression
FinalScore FinalScore FinalScore FinalScore FinalScore
Winning Cash Payment -0.00414*** -0.00291*** -0.00221*** -0.00229*** 0.0200*
(-9.94) (-9.27) (-6.13) (-3.78) (2.52)
Rating Score 0.0177*** 0.0182*** 0.0116*** 0.0121***
(75.48) (91.80) (52.55) (37.92)
Experience -0.0263*** -0.0471*** 0.00794* -0.0146**
(-6.86) (-11.46) (2.07) (-3.00)
Duration -0.398*** -0.148* -0.374*** -1.111**
(-9.49) (-2.45) (-6.83) (-2.86)
.NET Custom -1.400* -0.378 -1.288* 0.691
(-2.50) (-0.60) (-2.19) (0.68)
.NET Generic -3.507*** -0.457 -2.584*** 5.966***
(-6.36) (-0.72) (-4.40) (5.09)
Java Custom -1.054* -0.258 -0.901 3.793***
(-1.99) (-0.43) (-1.60) (5.62)
Java Generic -3.443*** -1.180 -2.578*** 5.489***
(-6.39) (-1.89) (-4.43) (4.72)
Coder Nationality: China 0.947*** 0.460** 1.432*** 1.141***
(5.87) (3.13) (8.52) (5.51)
Coder Nationality: US -3.348*** -2.033*** -2.301*** -0.894
(-8.36) (-6.14) (-5.03) (-1.64)
Constant 89.61*** 73.00*** 69.29*** 79.24*** 65.73***
(387.76) (115.78) (93.36) (113.69) (23.13)
Market FE N N Y N Y
IV Regression N N N Y Y
Obs 9776 9555 9555 8253 8253
R-sq 0.011 0.530 0.546 0.476
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. P-value in parentheses.
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Table 3.6: Coder’s Heterogeneous Preferences: Sorting Patterns
Whole Sample Top Coders Average Coders
Robust OLS 2SLS Robust OLS 2SLS Robust OLS 2SLS
Cash Payment -0.0258 -0.0300 -0.0747*** 0.00192 -0.237*** -0.182***
(-1.55) (-1.09) (-3.84) (0.06) (-9.81) (-3.70)
Duration -2.984 -2.803 -15.71*** -18.51*** 4.468 2.009
(-1.41) (-1.21) (-6.27) (-6.64) (1.46) (0.56)
.NET Custom 149.9*** 149.7*** 200.0*** 201.1*** 146.3** 147.7**
(4.29) (4.29) (5.06) (5.07) (3.07) (3.13)
.NET Generic 68.71* 67.82* 199.1*** 215.2*** 118.4** 123.7**
(2.01) (1.97) (5.08) (5.41) (2.60) (2.74)
Java Custom 107.4** 106.6** 229.6*** 242.3*** 110.9* 115.3**
(3.17) (3.13) (5.92) (6.18) (2.47) (2.59)
Java Generic 62.66 61.55 230.7*** 250.4*** 124.2** 132.2**
(1.85) (1.79) (5.91) (6.32) (2.77) (2.95)
Constant 1115.5*** 1117.4*** 1262.5*** 1223.3*** 977.1*** 960.3***
(31.45) (30.41) (30.77) (28.55) (21.02) (20.10)
Obs 9571 9571 4652 4652 4919 4919
R-sq 0.007 0.007 0.024 0.021 0.019 0.018
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. P-value in parentheses.
165
CHAPTER 3. MATCHING GAMES WITH UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY:
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF ONLINE LABOR MARKETS
Table 3.7: Regression Analysis: Endogenous Pricing of Contests
Cash Payment Cash Payment
Duration 36.03*** 23.80***
(6.99) (8.30)
.NET Custom -26.50 -2.212
(-0.73) (-0.08)
.NET Generic -229.6*** -192.7***
(-6.30) (-6.46)
Java Custom -155.8*** -138.8***
(-4.64) (-5.14)
Java Generic -278.2*** -220.0***
(-8.05) (-7.56)
Number of Coders/Market 0.950*
(1.96)
Number of Contests/Market -4.222*
(-2.43)




Market FE N Y
Obs 2751 2751
R-sq 0.288 0.394
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. P-value in parentheses.
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Table 3.8: Structural Estimation Result
Estimate Std. Dev.
Panel A: Coder’s Utility Parameters
β1 Cash prize 0.0104 2.52e-9
β2 Duration -0.0849 1.28e-4
β3 .NET -0.1500 1.21e-5
β4 Ability 1.4309 1.62e-5
γ0 Complexity 1.6223 1.54e-5
γ1 Ability × Complexity -2.3248 6.15e-5
γ2 Experience × Complexity 0.1436 4.93e-4
Panel B: Final Score Parameters
ξ0 Intercept -0.3700 0.0059
ξ1 Ability 1.0004 1.49e-9
ξ2 Complexity -0.0089 2.08e-5
ξ3 .NET -0.0296 0.0016
ξ4 Duration -0.0215 0.0355
ξ5 Experience -0.0241 0.0726
σb Std.Dev. of b 0.4622 0.0018
Panel C: Cash Payment Parameters
ψM Mid-level cash FE -0.2676 3.45e-6
ψH High-level cash FE -0.2534 5.10e-5
ψZ
∗
0 complexity FE 0.2511 3.34e-6
ψω0 demand shifter FE 2.0027 8.93e-5
ψ1 .NET 0.4985 1.74e-5
ψ2 Duration -0.0940 5.38e-4
ψ3 No. of projects 0.2080 4.57e-4
Panel D: Project Generality Indicator Parameters
φ0 Intercept -1.3349 3.77e-5
φ1 complexity FE -0.0995 2.35e-5
φ2 .NET 0.0202 5.88e-6
φ3 Duration 0.1846 1.04e-4
Panel E: Project Complexity Parameters
ι0 intercept -0.0754 2.00e-5
ι1 .NET 0.0165 4.47e-6
ι2 Duration -0.6023 1.20e-4
Panel F: Market Demand Shifter Parameters
χ0 intercept 0.5054 3.40e-5
χ1 no. of projects -0.5901 1.74e-4
Panel G: Coder’s Latent Ability Parameters
Pr(X∗t = xH |X∗t−1 = xL) Law of motion 0.4094 4.40e-6
Pr(X∗t = xH |X∗t−1 = xH) Law of motion 0.7262 1.95e-5
λ coefficient in equation 3.9 0.1252 2.66e-6
σ1 Std.dev. in equation 3.8 0.8538 1.82e-4
σ2 Std.dev. in equation 3.9 0.4570 1.38e-4
Pr(X∗t−1 = xH |Not Chinese) Marginal prob. of high ability if not Chinese 0.7033 1.54e-5
Pr(X∗t−1 = xH |Chinese) Marginal prob. of high ability if Chinese 0.8049 2.16e-5
T Number of markets 204
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001. Standard errors are calculated from 22 Bootstrapped samples due to
the length of time taken to do the estimation. In Panel A, cash prize is scaled down by 1000, adjusted for their
reliability bonus in Panel A, and further discretized in Panel C into three intervals: pL for prizes smaller than the
median, pM for equal to median and pH for larger than median in Panel C. Score is scaled down by 100. Duration
is capped from above by 14. Experience is capped up by 20. Rating scores are scaled down by 1000.
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Table 3.10: Counterfactual Experiment 1: Coders’ At-
titudes Towards Complexity
New values of γ1 -2γ1 2γ1
Coder surplus change (%) 10.5182 57.5541
(18.4574) (18.6697)
Firm surplus change (%) -37.8889 3.2451
(41.1096) (10.4817)
Total surplus change (%) -35.1617 5.3782
(37.0937) (10.0079)
Assortativeness change (%) 696.9877 -16.3580
(1477.3) (10.9636)
Participation rate change (%) -54.2458 37.0392
(22.3489) (2.0887)
Note: Standard errors are calculated from 100 simulated sam-
ples. The scaling and discretization are the same as in the
estimation part.
Table 3.11: Counterfactual Experiment 2: Allowing Firms to Price Discrimi-
nate
Adding Bonus for 95% Confidence Interval
High-type Coders
Coder surplus change (%) 0.0215 [-0.0264, 0.0566]
(0.0339)
Firm surplus change (%) 0.1610 [-0.3304,0.2874]
(1.8740)
Total surplus change (%) 0.1723 [-0.2919, 0.2509]
(1.7628)
Assortativeness change (%) -0.3397 [0, 0]
(11.4086)
Participation rate change (%) 0.0206 [0, 0]
(0.2749)
Note: Standard errors are calculated from 100 simulated samples. The scaling and dis-
cretization are the same as in the estimation part.
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Figure 3.1: Cash Reward and the Generality of the Project
Figure 3.2: Number of Submissions and the Generality of the Project
Figure 3.3: The Number of Projects and Coders over Time
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Figure 3.4: The Distribution of Avg. Rating Scores and Avg. Final Scores within
a Project
Figure 3.5: The Distribution of Avg. Rating Scores and Avg. Final Scores within
a Project
Figure 3.6: Coders’ Consecutive Participation Illustration
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Figure 3.7: Coders’ Consecutive Participation Distribution
Figure 3.8: Model Fit: Coder’s Rating Score Rank Prediction Bias
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3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 An Alternative Two-step Estimation Proce-
dure
As an alternative approach to the structural estimation procedure discussed in
Section 3.5, I conduct a two-step estimation, wherein the first step, by using the final
score and rating score of each coder, I estimate their ability levels from a fixed-effect
regression; in the second step, I adopt the benchmark case estimation procedure in
Chapter 2 to recover primitives of the model. Compared with the general approach,
this approach restricts the data generating the process of coders’ rating scores from
their observable and unobservable characteristics. Specifically, I assume rating scores
are generated from a linear fixed-effect model discussed below. By making this addi-
tional restriction, I can incorporate more information in the second step, as I do not
encounter the dimensionality problem after recovering coders’ latent ability levels in
the first step.
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3.9.1.1 Step 1: Fixed-Effect Regression to Recover Ability






jt + ξ3Wijt + bjt, (3.32)
where X∗it denotes the coders’ ability in market t, Z
∗
jt denotes the contest’s unobserved
heterogeneity – i.e., its complexity; Wijt are the observed characteristics of coder i
and/or contest j, and lastly, bjt is the contest-level idiosyncratic taste shock that
follows mean-zero normal distribution with unknown variance. In this equation, both
X∗it and Z
∗
jt are unobserved by the econometrician. However, the coders’ ability level
X∗it is imperfectly measured by their rating scores:
Xit = X
∗
it + ζi + uit, (3.33)
where ζi is the fixed effect for frequently participating coders, and is independent of
the idiosyncratic shock, u. 16 To simplify the estimation procedure, I first separately
estimate coders’ abilities using a fixed-effects regression model:
Ztij = ξ1X
∗
it + ξ3Wijt + Z̃
∗
jt, (3.34)
16For ζi, I tried three sets of specifications: Fixed effect for coders who participated more than 14
times, more than 20 times, and more than 30 times.
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where Z̃∗jt is the contest-level fixed effect that summarizes both the unobserved hetero-
geneity Z∗jt and the contest-level idiosyncratic shock bjt. Thus, by plugging equation
(3.43) back to equation (4.14), we have
Ztij = ξ1Xit + ξ3,1Wit + ξ3,2Wjt + Z̃
∗
jt + ζ̃i + ũit, (3.35)
whereWijt is decomposed into [Wit,Wjt], and ζ̃i = −ξ1·ζi and ũit = −ξ1·uit. Assuming
the independence between ũ and other observables and fixed effects, we are able to
consistently estimate the coefficient [ξ1, ξ3,1] and back out the ability level X
∗
it given
observable characteristics. This enables us to construct the residual that relates to
the unobserved heterogeneity of contests, Z∗jt.
Ztij − ξ̂1X̂∗it − ξ̂3,1Wit ≈ ξ2Z∗jt + ξ3,2Wjt + bjt (3.36)
and the parameters (ξ2, ξ3,2, σb) are to be estimated in the second stage.
Table 3.12 shows the fixed-effects regression of the average final score. A clear
positive causality between the coders’ ratings, proxying their skill, and the average
final score is reinforced here. This is in line with my theoretical assumption, in which
the average final score will monotonically increase with one’s skill level. Furthermore,
I have tried three specifications of coder-wise fixed effects, which account for the fixed
effect of coders who have participated more than (1) 14 times, (2) 20 times and (3)
30 times. The table shows that the point estimates among the three specifications
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are very similar. In the main estimation part, therefore, I use the estimated result
that accounts for fixed effects of coders who have completed more than 30 projects.
3.9.1.2 Step 2: Structural Estimation of Primitives
In this step, I parametrize coders’ indirect utility function, equilibrium cash prize
distribution and other model primitives as follows. Firstly, I discretize the observed
cash prize into two intervals: above or equal to median and below median. Then, the
probability of the cash prize lying in each interval follows a logit model:17
Pr(Pjt = p
H |Z∗j , ωt) =
exp[ψH + ψ
Z∗
0 · Z∗j + ψω0 · ωt + ψ1.NET + ψ2Duration + ψ3J ]
exp[ψH + ψZ
∗
0 · Z∗j + ψω0 · ωt + ψ1.NET + ψ2Duration + ψ3J ] + 1
, (3.37)




0 , ψ1, ψ2, ψ3). The proba-
bility of a project being generic or custom also follows a logit model:
Pr(Yjt = 1|Z∗j ) =
exp[φ0 + φ1 · Z∗j + φ2.NET + φ3Duration]
exp[φ0 + φ1 · Z∗j + φ2.NET + φ3Duration] + 1
(3.38)
17In the subsequent discussion, I only include the .NET dummy but not the Java dummy, as they
compose 98% of the observations, and in order to avoid multicollinearity, I treat all projects that
are not .NET as belonging to the Java family.
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and the parameters to be estimated therefore are (φ0, φ1, φ2, φ3). On the other side
of the market, for coder’s indirect utility function, we specify
ui,jk = β1Pjk + β2Duration + β3.NET + β4X
∗
i + (γ0 + γ1X
∗
i
+ γ2Experience) · Z∗j + νij, (3.39)
and the parameters to be estimated are (β1, β2, β3, β4, γ0, γ1, γ2). Lastly, I assume
the unobserved heterogeneities of contests are drawn from a binary space, {zL, zH},
and how it relates to observables also follows a logit model:
Pr(Z∗j = zH) =
exp[λ0(1 + λ1.NET + λ2Duration)]
exp[λ0(1 + λ1.NET + λ2Duration)] + 1
(3.40)
and the parameters to be estimated are (λ0, λ1, λ2). The market-level unobservable
ω is also drawn from a binary space {wL, wH}, with probability of being wH depends
on the number of projects in the market according to a probit model:
Pr(ωt = wH) = Pr(χ0 + χ1J + vt ≥ 0) (3.41)
where vt follows a standard normal distribution. The parameters to be estimated
are (χ0, χ1).
As in the data, I do not observe coders choosing outside option, I impute coders
who have appeared in the previous two markets but do not appear in the current
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market as choosing the outside option. This enlarges my sample size by about 45%.
More important, it enables me to give more accurate estimates for the cash prize
coefficient.
3.9.2 Result using the Alternative Estimation Pro-
cedure
In the empirical specification, I conduct a two-step estimation, wherein the first
step, by using the final score and rating score of each coder, I estimate their ability
levels from a fixed-effect regression; in the second step, I adopt the benchmark case
estimation procedure in Chapter 2 to recover primitives of the model.
3.9.2.1 Step 1: Fixed-Effect Regression to Recover Ability






jt + ξ3Wijt + bjt, (3.42)
where X∗it denotes the coders’ ability in market t, Z
∗
jt denotes the contest’s unobserved
heterogeneity – i.e., its complexity; Wijt are the observed characteristics of coder i
and/or contest j, and lastly, bjt is the contest-level idiosyncratic taste shock that
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follows mean-zero normal distribution with unknown variance. In this equation, both
X∗it and Z
∗
jt are unobserved by the econometrician. However, the coders’ ability level
X∗it is imperfectly measured by their rating scores:
Xit = X
∗
it + ζi + uit, (3.43)
where ζi is the fixed effect for frequently participating coders, and is independent of
the idiosyncratic shock, u. 18 To simplify the estimation procedure, I first separately
estimate coders’ abilities using a fixed-effects regression model:
Ztij = ξ1X
∗
it + ξ3Wijt + Z̃
∗
jt, (3.44)
where Z̃∗jt is the contest-level fixed effect that summarizes both the unobserved hetero-
geneity Z∗jt and the contest-level idiosyncratic shock bjt. Thus, by plugging equation
(3.43) back to equation (4.14), we have
Ztij = ξ1Xit + ξ3,1Wit + ξ3,2Wjt + Z̃
∗
jt + ζ̃i + ũit, (3.45)
whereWijt is decomposed into [Wit,Wjt], and ζ̃i = −ξ1·ζi and ũit = −ξ1·uit. Assuming
the independence between ũ and other observables and fixed effects, we are able to
consistently estimate the coefficient [ξ1, ξ3,1] and back out the ability level X
∗
it given
18For ζi, I tried three sets of specifications: Fixed effect for coders who participated more than 14
times, more than 20 times, and more than 30 times.
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observable characteristics. This enables us to construct the residual that relates to
the unobserved heterogeneity of contests, Z∗jt.
Ztij − ξ̂1X̂∗it − ξ̂3,1Wit ≈ ξ2Z∗jt + ξ3,2Wjt + bjt (3.46)
and the parameters (ξ2, ξ3,2, σb) are to be estimated in the second stage.
Table 3.12 shows the fixed-effects regression of the average final score. A clear
positive causality between the coders’ ratings, proxying their skill, and the average
final score is reinforced here. This is in line with my theoretical assumption, in which
the average final score will monotonically increase with one’s skill level. Furthermore,
I have tried three specifications of coder-wise fixed effects, which account for the fixed
effect of coders who have participated more than (1) 14 times, (2) 20 times and (3)
30 times. The table shows that the point estimates among the three specifications
are very similar. In the main estimation part, therefore, I use the estimated result
that accounts for fixed effects of coders who have completed more than 30 projects.
3.9.3 Detailed Assumptions and Derivations in Iden-
tification Discussion
Recall the two equations I establish in the first step of identification:
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Table 3.12: Fixed Effect Regression on Final Score
(1) (2) (3)
Final Score Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
RatingScore 0.0196∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗
(0.000350) (0.000330) (0.000310)
Experience -0.0679∗∗∗ -0.0585∗∗∗ -0.0437∗∗∗
(0.00686) (0.00656) (0.00627)
Intercept 64.07∗∗∗ 64.77∗∗∗ 65.42∗∗∗
(0.358) (0.339) (0.324)
≥ 14 experience Coder FE Y
≥ 20 experience Coder FE Y
≥ 30 experience Coder FE Y
Contest FE Y Y Y
N 9,823 9,823 9,823
R2 0.622 0.606 0.595
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.




f(P , Z̃ |Z ∗,X ∗, X̃ , µ) · f(Z |Z ∗,X ∗, X̃ , µ) · f(X,Z ∗,X ∗|Y ,X̃ , µ) (3.47)
as well as,




f(P , Z̃ |Z ∗,X ∗, X̃ , µ) · f(Z |Z ∗,X ∗, X̃ , µ) · f(Z ∗,X ∗|Y ,X̃ , µ) (3.48)
Then, by making the following assumptions, a formal identification result is es-
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Table 3.13: Empirical Result – Alternative Approach
Parameter Description point estimate std.dev.
Panel A: Coders’ utility parameters:




β3 .NET projects -0.3109
∗∗∗ 0.0479
β4 Ability -0.8383** 0.3930
γ0 Complexity 1.1980
∗∗∗ 0.4502
γ1 Ability× Complexity 0.5238 0.5745
γ2 Experience × Complexity -0.2481∗∗∗ 0.0099
Panel B: Average final score parameters:
ξ2 Complexity -0.0205
∗∗∗ 0.0044
ξ3 .NET projects 0.0019 0.0038
ξ4 Duration 0.0580
∗∗∗ 0.0031
σb Std.Dev. of b 0.0648
∗∗∗ 0.0019
Panel C: Cash prize parameters:




0 Complexity FE 1.8209
∗∗∗ 0.1920
ψω0 Demand shifter FE 0.6492 1.3534
ψ1 .NET projects -0.1552 0.1677
ψ2 Duration -0.6726 0.6580
ψ3 # of Projects -0.3048
∗∗∗ 0.0500
Panel D: Generic project indicator parameters:
φ0 Intercept -0.6115 1.4515
φ1 Complexity FE -0.2437 0.2631
φ2 .NET projects 0.6007
∗∗∗ 0.1128
φ3 Duration 0.4463 0.5730
Panel E: Project-level unobservable parameters:
λ0 Intercept -0.3506 0.4735
λ1 .NET projects -0.1111 0.1418
λ2 Duration -0.4448
∗∗∗ 0.1994
Panel F: Distribution of market-level unobservable:
χ0 Intercept 0.7835
∗∗∗ 0.2997
χ1 # of projects -0.1936
∗∗ 0.0726
T No. of Markets 344
Note: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors are calculated from 100 Bootstrapped samples.
In Panel A, cash prize is scaled down by 1000, adjusted for their reliability bonus in Panel A, and further
discretized in Panel C into two intervals: pL for prizes smaller than the median, and pH for higher than
or equal to median in Panel C. Duration is scaled down by taking log(1+Duration). Experience is scaled
down by taking log(1+Experience).The final scores are scaled down by 100.
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tablished in Proposition 2.
Assumption 12 1. Each contest’s, j, complexity is drawn from the finite space
{z1, z2, · · · , zm}.
2. Each coder’s, i, ability is drawn from the finite space {x1, x2, · · · , xl}.
3. The final score, Zij, is drawn from a bounded atomless support [0, 100].
4. The cash prize is drawn from the finite space {p1, p2, · · · , pM} with M ≥ m.
5. The rating score, Xit, is drawn from an arbitrarily large but discrete support
{x̃1, x̃2, · · · , x̃L}.
As all latent types are discrete, we would like to write equations (3.25) and (3.26)
in matrix forms. The following assumption is crucial.
Assumption 13 For any observed (µ,X̃ = x, I, J,Q),
1. There exists a mapping φX : {x̃1, x̃2, · · · , x̃L} → {x1, x2, · · · , xl} such that for
any contest j: ∀x,x′ ∈ {x̃1, x̃2, · · · , x̃L}|µ(j)|,x 6= x′, and for any observed X̃µ(j),
Pr(X dµ(j) = x|X ∗µ(j) = x,X̃µ(j)) > Pr(X dµ(j) = x|X ∗µ(j) = x′, X̃µ(j)),
where, for any coder i, Xdi = φX(Xi).
2. There exists a mapping φP : {p1, p2, · · · , pM} → {1, 2, · · · ,m}.
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3. There exists a mapping φz1 : [0, 100] → {1, 2, · · · , l ·m} for each final score of
the winning coders Zj,1.
4. There exists a mapping φz2 : [0, 100] → {1, 2, · · · , l} for each final score of the
non-winning coders Zj,−1 and a vector of values y, such that the following matrix
is of full rank mJ · lI :
MP d,Z̃d,Zd|Y =y,X̃=x,µt,I,J,Q. (3.49)
where for each nonwinning coder i, Zd = φz2(Zi) and Z̃
d = φz2(Z̃i); for each
winning coder i, Zd = φz1(Zi) and Z̃
d = φz1(Z̃i); and for each contest j, P
d =
φp(Pj).
3.9.4 Detailed Specifications in Structural Estima-
tion
In the structural estimation, I assume coders’ latent ability levels are drawn from
a binary space {0, 2}. The project-wise latent complexity level is drawn from {−1, 1}.
The market-wise demand condition is similarly drawn from {−1, 1}. The cash prizes
are discretized into three values: {0, 500, 3000}. Final scores are divided by 100, thus
ranging from 0 to 1. Rating scores are divided by 1000, thus ranging from 0 to 2.5.
Experiences are capped above by 20. When calculating the log-likelihood function, I
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selected markets with less than or equal to 20 coders, and in total there are 204 such







In recent years, a growing amount of markets begins to adopt contests and/or auc-
tions to allocate scarce economic goods and services to multiple players. Examples can
be found in rent-seeking activities by politicians such as lobbying a desirable political
prize, research and development races on different new drugs among pharmaceutical
companies and procuring temporary jobs to part-time talents via the Internet. There
exists an abundant amount of economic questions to be answered while seeing this
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trend in real life. From a market-design point of view, researchers are interested in
how different regimes of allocating the economic good to participants can achieve a
better market welfare. Also, it remains uncertain whether it would be better off to
introduce more competition on the other side of the market, i.e. auctioneers/contest
holders, to boost the performance of bidders/contestants. To answer questions like
these, one should firstly understand what the current market patterns tell us about
players’ preferences over the economic good to be allocated via an auction or a con-
test. This is not an easy task, as unobserved characteristics may mostly affect players’
behavior in equilibrium. In this paper, I develop a two-stage structural model where
players initially choose among several contests held simultaneously, and then partici-
pate, getting paid according to the rank order of their submitted bids/efforts. In the
model, it is also allowed that non-winners get part of the economic good according
to a commonly-observed splitting rule. The major theme of this paper is to suggest
a nonparametric identification and estimation strategy to recover both player-wise
and contest-wise unobserved heterogeneity, from observing (1) all players’ first-stage
equilibrium choices over different contests, and (2) the second-stage equilibrium effort
they exert to win.
In particular, my model assumes that for each economic good to be auctioned
1, there is one extra layer of heterogeneity beyond observable characteristics such
1I will use terms in auctions and contests literature interchangeably, though primarily I am
studying a multi-prize contest problem. For instance, I call what the contestants contribute in a
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as the monetary prize. This heterogeneity could originate from the complexity of
meeting some minimum requirement for the job, and/or a virtual reward benefiting
contestants’ future activities, such as a good reputation in the market. This is usually
difficult to observe or measure from data but is also as important in determining mar-
ket players’ behavior. To see this, contestants’ will bid according to their preference
over the unobserved part of a job; on the other hand, contest holders will determine
how much prize they would like to propose given all the relevant features of their jobs.
The econometric model is further complicated by the fact that contestants may also
carry unobserved characteristics determining the market outcomes. Examples can be
their valuation over the prize awarded by a contest, or their latent abilities to complete
certain jobs. Using a simple additively separable parametric setting, I can exploit the
variations in contestants’ observable choice probabilities over multiple contests when
facing different numbers of peer contestants to uncover the underlying joint distribu-
tion of their unobserved heterogeneity by solving the two-stage model described in
the previous paragraph. Furthermore, contestants’ unobserved types can be nonpara-
metrically recovered from the distribution of equilibrium bids. Identification through
the one-to-one mapping between equilibrium bids and unobserved bidders’ valuation
has been established by Guerre, Perrigne and Voung (2000), and the major departure
here is that I am solving an all-pay “auction” with multiple prizes awarded according
to the rank order. By combining the two steps, I can nonparametrically identify the
contest as “bids”.
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full model, which can be well estimated when having enough contestant variations
across markets in the data.
4.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it borrows theo-
retical results from all-pay auctions and multi-prize contests with private information
of bidder- (contestant-) types. When a contest is static in the sense that no mul-
tiple rounds exist, it is isomorphic to private-valued all-pay auctions with multiple
prizes. (Moldovanu and Sela, 2006) The existence and characterization results of all-
pay auctions date back to Milgrom and Weber (1982) but only one prize is granted
in a standard all-pay auction. On the other hand, in the strand of contest design
literature, Moldovanu and Sela (2001) proves the existence of a (unique) symmetric
equilibrium bidding strategy when multiple prizes are granted within a contest. Here,
I extend Moldovanu and Sela’s model to study multiple parallel contests held at the
same time faced by multiple contestants. Kvasov (2006) characterizes mixed-strategy
equilibria in a two-player complete-information simultaneous contests with budget
constraint and identical valuation, whereas in this paper I study the simultaneous
contests among multiple bidders with private information and heterogeneous valua-
tion over auctioned items. Compared with the optimal contest design literature such
as Modovanu and Sela (2001), I do not consider contest designer’s optimization prob-
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lem; instead, I assume contest prizes and splitting rules are exogenously given, but
allow the contest prize to be correlated with contest types in an arbitrary way.
The competition among bidders over multiple objects also naturally relates to the
growing study of multi-unit and combinatorial auctions. Multi-unit Auction litera-
ture examines the case where the auctioneer holds multiple homogeneous and divisible
goods, allowing bidders to submit a price-quantity pair of bids. In this paper, how-
ever, the items to be auctioned are assumed to be heterogeneous in various aspects,
and therefore is more closely related to the (single-round) combinatorial auctions over
heterogeneous goods studied in Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2006) and Kim, Olivares
and Weintraub (2014). One feature is that only one auctioneer exists in their mod-
els, trying to solve a complex “Winner Determination Problem” (Rothkopf et.al.,
1998 and Sandholm, 1999) that chooses the best bidder-item allocation to maximize
the total revenue from all auctions. In this paper, I study the case that multiple
auctioneers are present in the market, each holding a single-item multi-prize contest
and implicitly competing to win over the best bidders. Therefore the winner deter-
mination problem is much more straightforward than in the standard combinatorial
auctions. To my best knowledge, the most closely related auction literature to this
paper is Gentry, Komarova, and Schiraldi (2016), in which they study the simultane-
ous first-price single-item sealed-bid auctions, allowing bidders to hold non-additive
preference over combinations of auctioned items. Bidders submit a vector of bids to
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all items being auctioned in the market at the same time. In this paper, I split the
game into two stages: at the first stage, bidders need to make an entry decision of
being involved in at most one auction in the market; afterward, they engage in a
multi-prize single-unit contest as described previously. To restrict bidders to involve
no more than one auction/contest a time seems to be less general than in Gentry,
Komarova, and Schiraldi (2016), but can instead provide very useful information on
bidders’ choice probability which leads to the full identification of auction/contest-
wise and bidder-wise unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, my model provides a
clean-cut way to explicitly model capacity constraint which is sometimes present in
real life applications.
Lastly, the theoretical framework is closely related to the two-stage model estab-
lished in DiPalantino and Vojnovic (2009), except for the multi-prize aspect of the
contests, extending their all-pay auction framework in the second stage. This two-
stage model provides a way to depict the capacity constraint faced with every bidder
and most importantly serves to identify the underlying heterogeneity across auc-
tions/contests in empirical studies, which provides a novel insight into the structural
literature that mainly discusses bidder-wise unobserved heterogeneity. The extension
to multiple prizes within a contest has its empirical virtue of better fitting into real-life
markets such as sports tournaments, crowd-souring coding platform, and lobbying in
political activities.
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To summarize, complementing existing literature, this paper studies simultaneous
contests that (1) extends standard single-item auctions to provide multiple prizes; (2)
endogenizes the entry decision of bidders toward multiple parallel contests before the
competition, and (3) nonparametrically identifies both contest-wise and contestant-
wise unobserved heterogeneity.
In the subsequent section, I set up a two-stage model, defining the preference struc-
ture of the players on both sides. The equilibrium characterization is then established
in Section 4. Afterward, I discuss in Section 5 the nonparametric identification results
when players’ unobserved types are continuous and bounded, and I allow auction-wise
unobserved types to be either discrete or continuous. I then suggest an estimation
procedure in Section 6. Monte Carlo simulation is then provided in Section 7. Lastly,
I conclude in Section 8.
4.3 Model Setup
From this section, I denote one side of the market as “contests” and the other side
as “bidders,” with a bit abuse of terminology. An outline of the model is as follows.
Consider a two-stage game where there are N bidders and M contests randomly se-
lected to be present in market t. At Stage 1, each of the bidders chooses one contest
to enter, after perfectly observing his valuation towards every contest award, but not
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the valuation of others. Choosing the outside option generates a payoff normalized to
zero. At Stage 2, every bidder exerts a certain level of effort in the contest he chooses
without knowing the first-stage choices of other bidders, and the payoff depends on
(1) which contest he steps into, (2) his valuation towards that contest, and (3) the
rank order of his effort level within the contest. The rule of splitting the prize ac-
cording to the rank order is common knowledge.
For each contest, the prize consists of two parts: the actual monetary reward, R,
and a virtual reward (or cost if negative), ε, that is correlated with money and could
be interpreted as the reputation for performing Ill in the contest, and/or the difficulty
of meeting the minimum requirement of the contest. In particular, the payoff of a
bidder with valuation v exerting effort level b is v(R + ε)− b if he ranks the highest,
φj,2v(R + ε) − b if he is the second-place, φj,3v(R + ε) − b if third-place and so on.
Without loss of generality, I assume φj,k = 0, ∀k ≥ 3, and φ := φj,2 ∈ [0, 1) does not
differ across contests. I further assume that the total reward is larger than zero all
the time, i.e. R + ε > 0,∀R, ε, as a contest would never attract any participation if
the total reward is negative. Here the all-pay feature is clear – no matter which rank
a bidder ends up with, his effort is already exerted and cannot be contingent on his
rank order or be reverted.
The valuation of each bidder is independently drawn from a commonly known
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distribution, F (·), on a bounded interval, [0, V̄ ]. Both the monetary prize R and the
virtual prize ε can be drawn from either a discrete or a continuous space. Suppose
in market t, there are in total Jt different values for R + ε, and for each value, there
are Mj contests in the market. In other words,
∑Jt
j=1 Mj = M . This total value
of prizes denoted as the “class” of contests and all other information regarding the
contests and bidders is commonly known to every market participants at the initial
stage. From now on, I suppress the market subscript t for the ease of illustration.
4.4 Equilibrium Notion
A mixed-strategy for bidder i with valuation v consists of two parts: [π(v),β(v)],
where π(v) is a (J − 1) × 1 vector that tells us the probability of bidder i choosing
one contest in each class of the contests2 , and within the class, he uniformly ran-
domizes in choosing which contest to join; β(v) is a J × 1 vector of bidding functions
at the second stage for each class of the contests. Here, bidders (resp. contests)
are interchangeable as long as they have the same “type”, i.e. valuation of a bidder
(resp. the 2-dimensional rewards, [R, ε], of a contest). I restrict myself in discussing
symmetric Bayes-Nash Equilibrium only, which specifies that each bidder yields the
highest expected payoff by playing the equilibrium strategy, believing that others are
2And of course, if a bidder plays a pure strategy of entering one contest for sure, π(v) will be all
zeros except for one element.
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following the symmetric Bayes-Nash Equilibrium strategy. The following proposition
establishes the existence result of such an equilibrium:
Proposition 1 There exists a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium to this two-
stage game.
Proof: I first prove there exists a (unique) monotone symmetric pure-strategy
Bayes Nash equilibrium for the second-stage sub-game. At Stage 2, assuming other
bidders all play a monotone symmetric bidding strategy β(·), the expected payoff for
bidder i with value vi to bid b in contest class j is:
EΠj(vi, b) = vi(Rj + εj)(1− pj(1− F̂j(β−1(b)))N−1 (4.1)
+ φjvi(Rj + εj)(N − 1)pj(1− F̂j(β−1(b)))(1− pj(1− F̂j(β−1(b)))N−2 − b,
where pj := Pr(bidder k chooses contest class j) and
F̂j := Pr(β(vk) ≤ b|bidder k chooses contest class j). Further, I denote f̂ as the
derivative of F̂ agains v. Note that pj is the same for all other bidders as bidder i
has no prior knowledge regarding other bidders’ types at the time of bidding; this
equivalently means other bidders’ choice probability at Stage 1 is ex ante equal to
bidder i’s. Deriving the First Order Condition with respect to b gives us the following
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equation:
β′(vi) =vi(Rj + εj)(N − 1)(1− pj(1− F̂j(vi)))N−2pj f̂j(vj) (4.2)
− viφ(Rj + εj)(N − 1)(1− pj(1− F̂j(vi)))N−2pj f̂j(vi)
+ viφ(Rj + εj)(N − 1)(N − 2)(1− pj(1− F̂j(vi)))N−3pj(1− F̂j(vi))pj f̂j(vi)









xφ(Rj + εj)(N − 1)(N − 2)(1− pj(1− F̂j(x)))N−3pj(1− F̂j(x))pj f̂j(x)dx
It is easy to check that the second derivative function β′(v) ≥ 0, thus satisfying the
monotonic assumption of the bidding strategy. Furthermore, the equilibrium payoff
for bidder i is:
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EΠ∗(vi) = viφ(Rj + εj)(1− pj(1− F̂j(vi)))N−1 (4.4)




+ φ(Rj + εj)(N − 1)
∫ vi
0
(1− pj(1− F̂j(x)))N−2pj(1− F̂j(x))dx




Next, conditional on knowing what bidders will behave in the second stage, I
move back to the first stage – This is a simultaneous-move game with finite action
space and independent type space regarding bidders, then according to Milgrom and
Weber(1985), I know that a mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibrium always exists.
As the game is symmetric, I may select one symmetric equilibrium. In fact, when the
bidders’ types are invariant to which contest they participate in, the symmetric equi-
librium is unique according to Proposition 4.1 of DiPanlatino and Vojnovic (2009).
I now characterize the equilibrium entry strategy π(·) for any bidder i at Stage 1.
Following a similar argument as in DiPalantino and Vojnovic (2009), I firstly calculate
the marginal benefit for bidder i to choose one contest in class j:
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= (Rj + εj)(1− pj(1− F̂j(vi)))N−1 + φ(Rj + εj)(N − 1)(1− pj(1− F̂j(vi)))N−2pj(1− F̂j(vi))
By checking the second order derivative of EΠ∗, I know that the marginal benefit
stated above is positive and increasing in vi, i.e. EΠ
∗(·) is a non-decreasing contin-
uous convex function of vi, and Π
′(·) is continuous in vi. Applying Corollary B.1 of
DiPalantino and Vojnovic (2009), I have:
Π′j(0) = Π
′
k(0),∀j, k such that Pj > 0, Pk > 0; (4.6)
Π′j(0) ≥ Π′k(0),∀j, k such that Pj > 0, Pk = 0; (4.7)
where,
Π′j(0) = (Rj + εj)(1− pj)N−1 + φ(Rj + εj)(N − 1)(1− pj)N−2pj
Intuitively, it means that for any contest that has zero entry probability, it must
be the case that the marginal benefit of entering it cannot exceed that of any contest
with a positive entry probability for the lowest-type bidder; and if this is true, it
must be true for all higher-type bidders. Otherwise, in equilibrium, there is always a
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profitable deviation for the lowest-type bidder to choose the contest that all bidders
currently have zero probability to enter.
Using this result, I could derive the equilibrium entry probability for each contest.
I do this progressively. Rank the contest classes such that R1 + ε1 > R2 + ε2 > · · · >
RJ + εJ > 0. First, consider the case that all classes of contests have positive entry
probabilities. I therefore solve for the following system of equations:

(R1 + ε1)(1− p1)N−1 + φ(R1 + ε1)(N − 1)(1− p1)N−2p1 = C
(R2 + ε2)(1− p2)N−1 + φ(R2 + ε2)(N − 1)(1− p2)N−2p2 = C
· · ·
(RJ + εJ)(1− pJ)N−1 + φ(RJ + εJ)(N − 1)(1− pJ)N−2pJ = C
∑J
j=1 pjMj = 1
(4.8)
where only [p1, p2, · · · , pJ , C] are unknowns and there are J+1 polynomial equations.
Note that by fixing other coefficients, the LHS of all the equations but the last one is
decreasing in p on its interval [0, 1]. I consider the case that p1 = p2 = · · · = pJ = 1.
Thus, all LHS of the first J equations are equal to zero, but clearly the last equation
does not hold. I now let pJ decrease from 1 towards 0. Meanwhile, for each value of
pJ , I solve for p1, · · · , pJ−1 so as to equate the LHS of all the first J equations. If N
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is an even number, the real-valued solutions for pj, j < J always exist; if N is odd, I
compute that the Hermite form of the following polynomial:
(1− φ)(Rj + εj)(1− pj)N−1 + (N − 1)φ(Rj + εj)(1− pj)N−2 − C (4.9)
As long as the signature of the Hermite form is positive, I could ensure the
existence of a real solution for pj. As pJ decreases and other p’s decreases ac-
cordingly, their weighted sum
∑J
j=1Mjpj gets closer to 1. If it gets to 1 before
pJ approaches zero, I have found the solution [p1, p2, · · · , pJ ], as other p’s must
not exceed pJ . If when pJ = 0, the weighted sum is still larger than 1, I let
pJ = 0 and decrease pJ−1 from 1 towards 0. Following similar argument, I find
a solution or move to the next pj. Now consider the case where all pj, j ≥ 2 are
set to be zero. Then it must be the case that p1 >
1
M1
, where p1 is such that
(R1 + ε1)(1− p1)N−1 + φ1(R1 + ε1)(N − 1)(1− p1)N−2p1 = R2 + ε2. Given the mono-
tonicity of the LHS as a function of p1, I further know that
Π′1(0) := (R1 + ε1)(1−
1
M1






> R2 + ε2
In this case, the equilibrium would be that all bidders randomize in class 1 of the
contests, with an entry probability being 1
M1
. To sum, I could always find a solution
to this problem.
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Next, I solve for the individual entry probability, π(v), given a bidder’s type.
First, I claim that the following lemma holds:
Lemma 1: Suppose in equilibrium, class 1, 2, · · · , K contests have positive entry
probabilities, K ≤ J . Then there exists 0 ≤ vK ≤ vK−1 ≤ · · · v2 ≤ v1 ≤ V̄ such that:
1. Π′j(v) = Π
′
1(v)∀j = 1, 2, · · · , l, v ∈ [vl+1, vl)
2. Π′j(v) < Π
′
1(v)∀j = l + 1, · · · , K, v ∈ [vl+1, vl)
Proof: Following a similar argument in DiPalantino and Vojnovic (2009), I define
the [v1, v2 · · · , vK ] as:
pj(1− F̂j(v)) > 0,∀v ∈ [0, vj)
pj(1− F̂j(v)) = 0,∀v ∈ [vj, V̄ ]
I firstly show that 0 ≤ vK ≤ vK−1 ≤ · · · v2 ≤ v1 ≤ V̄ . It is easily shown that
vK ≥ 0 as otherwise, I have pK(1− F̂K(0)) = 0, which corresponds to pK = 0. This,
however, contradicts our assumption that pK > 0. Similarly, to show vK ≤ vK−1, I
consider the case that vK−1 < vK , then there exists v ∈ [vK−1, vK) such that
pK−1(1− F̂K−1(v)) > 0
pK(1− F̂K(v)) = 0
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This, however, cannot be true, as I have Π′K−1(v) = RK−1 + εK−1 ≥ RK + εK >
ΠK(v). This means it cannot happen that a bidder of type v only participates in
contest class K but not class K − 1 as the marginal benefit of moving to the lat-
ter is more than staying with the former. Following the same logic, I could prove
0 ≤ vK ≤ vK−1 ≤ · · · v2 ≤ v1 ≤ V̄ . Also, for v ∈ [vl+1, vl), I know that he will have a
positive probability in joining contest class 1, 2, · · · , l but not class l + 1, · · · , K.
To show Π′j(v) = Π
′
1(v)∀j = 1, 2, · · · , l, v ∈ [vl+1, vl), I consider a case that ∃j ≤ l
such that Π′j(v) > Π
′
1(v) for some v ∈ [vl+1, vl). This cannot happen as I already
have EΠ∗j(v) = EΠ
∗
1(v),∀j ≤ l, and once Π′j exceeds Π′1, it would be profitable for
the bidder of type v to choose contest class j instead of class 1. This contradicts the
statement that when v ∈ [vl+1, vl), the probability of entering contest class 1 through




To show Π′j(v) < Π
′
l(v)∀j = l + 1, · · · , K, v ∈ [vl+1, vl), I consider that Π′j(v) ≥
Π′1(v) for some v ∈ [vl+1, vl) and j ≥ l + 1. I then choose a positive number ν such
that, Rj+εj−Π′j(vl+1−ν) < Π′j(v)−Π′j(vl+1). This is ensured by the fact that Π′ is a
continuous function, and as v approaches vl+1 from left side, Π
′ approaches Rj+εj ar-
bitrarily. Thus, I have Π′j(v)−Π′j(vl+1−ν) ≥ Π′j(v)−Π′j(vl+1) > Rj+εj−Π′j(vl+1−ν),
which indicates Π′j(v) > Rj + εj which can never be true. This completes the proof.
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To solve for the individual entry probability, π(v), given a bidder’s type, I firstly





Thus, I have: πj(v) = − 1f(v)
∂pj(1−F̂j)
∂v
. Suppose v ∈ [vl+1, vl), then πj(v) =
0,∀j ≥ l + 1. Then it can be shown that, ∀j ≤ l, πj(v) = xj(v)Mj , where xj(v) :=
Prob( choose class j |V ∈ [v, vl+1)). This probability could be solved iteratively. First
solve for x1(v1) which is the probability of choosing class 1 when v ≥ v1. This is triv-
ial as I have x1(v1) =
1
M1
. Next, I solve for x1(v2), x2(v2) via the following system of
equations:

(R1 + ε1)(1− 1M1 (1− F (v1))−
x1(v2)
M1
(F (v1)− F (v2)))N−1
+φ(R1 + ε1)(N − 1)(1− 1M1 (1− F (v1))−
x1(v2)
M1
(F (v1)− F (v2)))N−2( 1M1 (1− F (v1))
+x1(v2)
M1
(F (v1)− F (v2))) = C
(R2 + ε2)(1− x2(v2)M2 (F (v1)− F (v2)))
N−1
+φ(R2 + ε2)(N − 1)(1− x2(v2)M2 (F (v1)− F (v2)))
N−2(x2(v2)
M2
(F (v1)− F (v2))) = C
x1(v2) + x2(v2) = 1
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Complicated as this system of nonlinear equations seems, I can use a similar argu-
ment to track down its solution as what I did in deriving the unconditional entry prob-
abilities, pj. I do this progressively, and could derive xj(v1), xj(v2), · · · , xj(vl), xj(v),
j = 1, 2, · · · , l. After solving xj(v), I could derive the individual entry probabilities.
The most intuitive implication of Lemma 1 is that when I divide bidders into K + 1
ordered groups according to their skill levels, in equilibrium, a bidder of skill level
v ∈ [vk+1, vk) randomizes his entry in the first k classes of contests. Thus, I proved the
existence and characterized the symmetric Bayes-Nash Equilibrium for this two-stage
game.
4.5 Nonparametric Identification
Recall that the goal of identification in this game consists of two parts: (i) The
distribution of the contest complexity, ε; (ii)The distribution of the valuation, vi,
for bidders that have positive entry probabilities to at least one of the contests in
the market. I now discuss the strategies for two cases respectively: when contests’
unobserved types are discrete and when they are continuous.
4.5.1 When Contest Types are Discrete
In this section, I assume that the contest types are drawn from a finite space
with a cardinality of Q. Here, I do not restrict the contest type to be independent
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of its monetary prize, i.e. Pr(ε|R) 6= Pr(ε) for some (R, ε). Furthermore, I allow
contest prizes in the same market to be correlated with each other, i.e. Pr(R|ε) 6=
ΠjPr(Rj|εj). This is to capture the possibility of firms strategically setting their
monetary rewards to compete with their peer firms in the market, and the market-level
unobserved factors affecting contest holders’ pricing behavior. The only restriction on
the contest side is that the contest types are independent of the number of bidders in
the market when conditioning on their monetary prizes. This assumption naturally
holds when the contest designers have no knowledge about how many bidders will
appear in the market when they design their rewarding schemes. The type space on
the bidder side is assumed to be i.i.d. drawn from [0, V̄ ]. More importantly, it is
assumed that fixing the number of contests and their monetary prizes; the researcher
can observe at least Q distinct values of the number of bidders, N , from data. This
is to ensure enough variation in equilibrium choice probabilities in the first stage to
recover the discrete distribution of contests’ unobserved types.
The identification strategy consists of two steps. First, I exploit the variation
in entry probabilities in response to the different amount of bidders in a market to
recover the joint distribution of contest types, ε := [ε1, ε2, · · · , εQ]. Suppose in the
data, there are infinitely many repeated markets where we can observe many markets
with the same monetary prize vector, R = r. I therefore am able to compute the
empirical probability toward each contest in the market. I write down the following
equation:
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Pr(a contest with R = rj is chosen|R,N) =∑
ε
Pr(a contest with R = rj is chosen|R,ε,N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=p̂j
·Pr(ε|R,N) (4.11)
Note that once I knew the values of (r, ε, N), p̂j could be computed by the system
of equations (4.8) and the algorithm provided in the modeling part, as all other
coefficients in the system of equations are observable to the econometrician. More
important, I have the following independence result:
Pr(ε|R,N) = Pr(ε|R) (4.12)
Therefore, fixing the value of R = r, equation (4.11) could be written using every
distinct value of N . Suppose I can observe Qj ≥ Q distinct values of N , I will have
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Pr(R = rj is chosen |r, n1)
Pr(R = rj is chosen |r, n2)
· · ·





Pr(R = rj is chosen |r,e1 , n1), P r(R = rj is chosen |r,e2 , n1), · · · , P r(R = rj is chosen |r,eQJ , n1)
Pr(R = rj is chosen |r,e1 , n2), P r(R = rj is chosen |r,e2 , n2), · · · , P r(R = rj is chosen |r,eQJ , n2)
· · ·











The LHS is an QJ×1 vector that is observed from data. The first matrix on the RHS
could be computed from equilibrium argument. The last vector on the RHS is the
goal of identification. A just-identified case would be when QJ = Q, and assuming the
first two matrics on the RHS are both invertible, I could identify the joint distribution
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Pr(R = rj is chosen |r,e1 , n1), P r(R = rj is chosen |r,e2 , n1), · · · , P r(R = rj is chosen |r,eQJ , n1)
Pr(R = rj is chosen |r,e1 , n2), P r(R = rj is chosen |r,e2 , n2), · · · , P r(R = rj is chosen |r,eQJ , n2)
· · ·





Pr(R = rj is chosen |r, n1)
Pr(R = rj is chosen |r, n2)
· · ·
Pr(R = rj is chosen |r, nQJ )

(4.13)
The over-identified case, on the other hand, would be when QJ > Q. In this
case, I could always come up a way to combine some distinct values of the number of
bidders to reconstruct a similar equation above, but with Q vector on the LHS. The
conditional distribution of ε given R = r can still be identified.
Next, I move to the bidder side. First of all, I use the observed distribution of
bids within each contest to identify the conditional distribution, F̂j(v). To do this,
I follow the seminal paper by Guerre, Perrigne and Voung (2000), GPV henceforth,
and derive an equation linking the observed bids to the unobserved bidder types.
Fixing the total number of bidders N and the vector of monetary rewards R, and
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conditional on observing bidder i choosing contest class j, I have:
v−1i =(1− φ)(Rj + εj)(N − 1)(1− pj(1− Ĝj(b))N−2pj ĝj(b) (4.14)
+ φ(Rj + εj)(N − 1)(N − 2)(1− pj(1− Ĝj(b))N−3pj(1− Ĝj(b))pj ĝj(b)
:= ξj(b, Rj, εj, N, φ, pj)
where, Ĝj(b) is the observed cdf of bids in contest class j, and ĝj is the corre-
sponding pdf function. The choice probability pj is a known function of (R,ε,N). I
can use this equation to recover the conditional cdf, F̂j(v), for any contest class j,
Fj(v|R,ε,N) = Pr(V ≤ v| choose class j; ε,R,N) (4.15)




= Pr(b ≤ ξ−1j (
1
v






,Rj, εj, N, φ, pj(R,ε,N)))
In order to recover the unconditional cdf, F (v), I need the following equation










Note that the first part is identified from the previous argument, and πj(v|R,ε,N)
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could be computed using the algorithm in the modeling part, and I already identified
the distribution of contest types, Pr(ε|R).
4.5.2 When Contest Types are Continuous
When ε is drawn from a continuous space such as the real line, I can still achieve
nonparametric identification under suitable conditions. To see this, suppose in the
data, there are many repeated markets where contests offer J distinct values of mon-
etary rewards, R, and N bidders. I therefore am able to compute the empirical prob-
ability of a contest with monetary rewards R ∈ {r1, r2, · · · , rQR} chosen by bidders.
I then write down the following equation:












g(−(R + ε), N) · f(ε|R)dε
Here, again both R and ε are 1×J vectors. Let t := −R, then the above equation
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can be written as a convolution:
Pr(a contest with R = rj is chosen|R,N) := f ∗ g(t) =
∫
ε
g(t − ε) · f(ε)dε (4.18)
In the above equation, I supress (R,N) for the ease of illustration. Assume both f
and g are continuous and absolutely integrable with absolute integrable Fourier trans-
form 3, then according to the Convolution Theorem, I can write down the following
equation:
F(f ∗ g(ξ)) = F(f(ξ))×F(g(ξ)) (4.19)
where F denotes the Fourier Transform operation. I could then recover the density
function of ε given R:
f(ε|R) =F−1( F(f ∗ g(−R))
F(g(−(R + ε)))
)
=F−1( F(Pr(a contest with R = rj is chosen|R,N))
F(Pr(a contest with R = rj is chosen|R,ε,N))
) (4.20)
In particular, the numerator can be computed from data, and the denominator can
be computed from equilibrium argument in the modeling section. Most importantly,
given a fixed number of biddersN , I need to observe the choice probability at any value
3Alternatively, I assume the Fourier Transform of fε is everywhere non-vanishing.
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ofR to construct the Fourier Transform in the numerator; in other words, variations in
monetary prizes provide the primary identification power of contest-wise unobserved
heterogeneity. In reality, this full-support condition is difficult to satisfy; instead, I can
exploit the variations in the number of bidders like in the discrete case to ensure full
identification. To see this, suppose I construct a new function,H (R,N1, N2, · · · , NK),
such that it equals Pr(a contest with R = rj is chosen|R,Nk) when we actually ob-
serve contests’ types to be R and the number of bidders to be Nk in the data; The
number K is defined as the number of distinct N ’s that covers the full support
of R. Another function G(−(R + ε), N1, N2, · · · , NK) := Pr(a contest with R =
rj is chosen|R,ε,Nk), when Nk and R are jointly observed in the data. can be simi-
larly defined and computed in equilibrium, except that I condition on a certain value
of ε now. We then have the following equation:
H (R,N1, N2, · · · , NK) =
∫
ε
G(−(R + ε), N1, N2, · · · , NK)f(ε|R)dε (4.21)
Then the Convolution Theorem still applies here, except that we substitute the
functions to be Fourier Transformed on the RHS of equation (4.20) with the H and
G functions respectively:
f(ε|R) =F−1( F(H (R,N1, N2, · · · , NK))
F(G(−(R + ε), N1, N2, · · · , NK))
) (4.22)
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These two functions ensure that for any values of contests’ monetary prizes R, so
long as we observe some markets in the data with the number of bidders to be Nk,
we can still achieve identification of contests’ unobserved types. Essentially it still
requires the full support ofR to be observed, but allows the values to be observed with
different numbers of bidders in the market; therefore the conditional independence
condition in equation (4.12) is also assumed. So far, the distribution of contest-
wise unobserved heterogeneity is nonparametrically identified. Identifying bidder-wise
unobserved heterogeneity adopts the same strategy as in the discrete case, except that
I need to take integration over ε according to their joint distribution.
4.6 Nonparametric Estimation
The estimation procedure consists of two parts: uncovering the bidders’ and con-
tests’ unobserved type distribution. I start by estimating the distribution of contest-
wise unobserved heterogeneity by using the variation in the amount of participating
bidders to recover the distribution of contests’ unobserved types. This can be directly
done using equation 4.13 for the discrete case. For the continuous case, following equa-
tion 4.20, I use Monte Carlo method to numerically integrate when estimating the
Fourier transform of observed density functions on the RHS. Specifically,
f̂(ε|R) =F̂−1( F̂(Pr(a contest with R = rj is chosen|R,N))
F̂(Pr(a contest with R = rj is chosen|R,ε,N))
) (4.23)
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where, F̂(Pr(a contest with R = rj is chosen|R,N)) := 1M
∑M
m=1 Pr(a contest with R =
xmj is chosen|xm, N))e2πixmR and xm is (pseudo-) randomly generated from a multi-




m=1 Pr(a contest with R = xmj is chosen|xm, ε, N)e2πixm(R+ε). Lastly, I gener-
ate M (pseudo-) random vectors from multivariate uniform distribution, ym,m =





F̂(Pr(a contest with R=rj is chosen|R,N))
F̂(Pr(a contest with R=rj is chosen|R,ym,N))
e2πiεym .
Here, I also show a special case, where ε is drawn from a continuous function known
up to a finite-dimensional parameter vector θ. In this case, I use a moment-based
estimator that relies on various values of N , the number of bidders in the market, to
estimate θ. In other words,
θ̂ =argminθ(||Pr(a contest with R = rj is chosen|R,N)−
M∑
m=1
Pr(a contest with R = rj is chosen|R,εm,θ , N)||) (4.24)
where εm,θ is a (pseudo-) randomly generated vector with a density function f(·|R,θ).
So long as there are as many different values of N as the dimensionality of θ, the
distribution of ε can be estimated.
After recovering the conditional distribution of contests’ unobserved types, I show
the estimation of the distribution of bidders’ value function. Following GPV, a
well-known two-step estimation strategy is used: in the first step, I estimate the
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distribution of observed bids for each class of contests using kernel methods; after
that, I recover the pseudo-private value for each bidder using the following equa-
tion, then use the kernel method to estimate the conditional distribution of bidders’
value functions within each class of contests. Formally, in the first step, suppose
a set of bidders Ijt choose contests of class j in market t, and I observe their bids
{Bit, i ∈ Ijt, t = 1, 2, · · · , T}, then the empirical distribution function Ĝ and the
























where hjg is a bandwidth that may vary across contest classes and Kjg(·) is a kernel
function on a compact support. One thing to mention here is that, by solving the
functional form of the equilibrium bidding strategy within each auction, I know that
the underlying density of equilibrium bids is infinite at its loIr bound. Furthermore,
it is also Ill known that on its boundaries, the kernel density estimator is biased.
Therefore, kernel methods could be quite inaccurate near the loIr bound. I hence
trim the pseudo-private value using the following criteria. In particular, bidder i’s
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ε{(1− φ)(Rj + εj)(N − 1)(1− p̂j(R,N)(1− Ĝj(b))N−2p̂j(R,N)ĝj(b)
+φ(Rj + εj)(N − 1)(N − 2)(1− p̂j(R,N)(1− Ĝj(b))N−3p̂j(R,N)·
(1− Ĝj(b))p̂j(R,N)ĝj(b)}−1 · Pr(ε|R) , if Bmin + ρjghjg/2 ≤ Bit ≤ Bmax− ρjghjg/2
+∞ , otherwise
when contest-wise types, ε’s, are discrete and ρjg denotes the length of support of the
kernel function used for contest class j. In the equation above, the estimated function
p̂j(R,N) :=
∑Q





{(1− φ)(Rj + εj)(N − 1)(1− p̂j(R,N)(1− Ĝj(b))N−2pj(R,N)ĝj(b)
+φ(Rj + εj)(N − 1)(N − 2)(1− p̂j(R,N)(1− Ĝj(b))N−3p̂j(R,N)·
(1− Ĝj(b))p̂j(R,N)ĝj(b)}−1 · dF (ε|R) , if Bmin + ρjghjg/2 ≤ Bit ≤ Bmax− ρjghjg/2
+∞ , otherwise
and the estimated function p̂j(R,N) :=
∫
ε
pj(R,ε,N)dF̂ (ε|R). In practice, this
integration can be done numerically if not having a closed-form solution. In the
following section, I show how this estimation procedure performs using Monte Carlo
simulated data.
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4.7 Monte Carlo Evidence
4.7.1 When Contest Types are Discrete
In this Monte Carlo simulation analysis, I generate 100 markets with i.i.d. dis-
tributed 2, 3, 4 or 5 bidders and i.i.d. distributed two contests in each market. As
discussed in the identification argument, this is to create variation in number of con-
tests within each class for the first-stage estimation. Bidders’ types are drawn from
a truncated standard lognormal distribution on [0.1, 4]. Further, I let the monetary
reward take only two distinct values, {5, 3}. For simplicity, I further assume that
there is only one project having monetary reward equal to 5 and one project having
monetary reward equal to 3 in each market. The contest complexity is drawn from
a binary support of {−0.1, 0.1}, and the conditional probability of ε given monetary
reward R is given by:
Pr(ε = 0.1|R) =

0.9, if R = 5
0.1, if R = 3
(4.27)
This also suggests that the ε’s across different contests are independent of each
other. This assumption is only for computational simplicity. I use triangular Kernel
function, and the bandwidth is set same as in GPV. Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1 are the
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results from two steps of the estimation with 100 repetitions. The starting values are
set to be zeros. It can be seen that, for the estimation of contest-wise complexity
distribution, the overall bias is small, despite the relatively high variation as shown
by the standard deviations. For the estimation of bidders’ valuation function, it can
be shown that on the interval of [0.8, 3.3], the estimation is relatively good. On the
lower and higher bounds, however, it is less accurate due to the inaccurate kernel
estimation of bid density near boundaries.
4.7.2 When Contest Types are Continuous
Now I present the performance when the contest unobserved types are continuous.
I only show results estimating parametric distribution for contest-wise complexity lev-
els, and nonparametric distribution for bidders’ valuation, as fully nonparametrically
estimating the whole model may be computationally burdensome and require a lot
more variations in the simulated data. I generate 100 i.i.d. markets with 2, 3, 4,
5 or 6 bidders in each market. Bidders’ valuation is again drawn from a truncated
standard lognormal distribution on [0.1, 4]. Further, I let the monetary reward take
only two distinct values, {5, 3}. For simplicity, I further assume that there is only
one project having a monetary reward equal to 5 and one project having a monetary
reward equal to 3 in each market. The contest complexity is drawn from a normal
distribution, which parameters are given below. The conditional mean is:
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1, if R = 5
−1, if R = 3
(4.28)
and the conditional variance is:
σε|R =

1, if R = 5
2, if R = 3
(4.29)
I estimated the parameters using two specifications. First I fix the variances of ε’s
and only estimated the conditional means, µε|R=5 and µε|R=3. The results are shown
in the first panel of Table 4.2. Then I estimated all four parameters of ε, including
σε|R=5 and σε|R=3. The starting values are set to be 0.9 times the true values in
the first specification and the true values in the second specification. To estimate
the parameters for contest complexity levels, I adopt the Monte Carlo numerical
integration method and generate 200 random samples to approximate the integrated
value. It can be seen that there is more noises and inaccuracy regarding estimating the
contest-wise complexity levels, compared with the discrete case, as I see higher biases
and larger variation in Table 4.2. This inaccuracy increases when I try to estimate
more parameters in the model. One conjecture is that, when trying to estimate the
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distribution of contest-wise complexity nonparametrically, I must need a much richer
variation in the number of bidders appeared in each market.
To sum, it can be seen that compared with the continuous case, it is more accurate
to estimate the contest-wise unobserved heterogeneity in the discrete space. This is
mainly due to the data availability and the bias arisen from numerical integration.
4.8 Conclusion
This paper develops a new method to identify and estimate primitives in simul-
taneous contests with multiple prizes. In theoretical modeling part, I establish a
two-stage game where contestants first choose one among multiple contests, then in
the second stage, they compete within each contest by submitting their bids or con-
tributing their efforts to win over the pre-determined prize based on the rank order.
Non-winners may get part of the prize due to a pre-determined rule. I show that
by jointly observing their first-stage choice probability and the second-stage bidding
strategy, I can nonparametrically identify the joint distribution of unobserved het-
erogeneity on both sides of the market. I then present a corresponding estimation
strategy and show the performance of Monte Carlo experiments.
While this novel strategy can be potentially applied to many real-life scenarios
from political lobbying to online labor markets, I see at least three directions for fu-
ture work to suit more complicated markets better. First, it is widely observed that
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bidders/contestants incur nonrefundable cost when bidding in the second stage of the
game. Hence, how to incorporate this bidding cost as another layer of contest-wise
and/or bidder-wise unobserved heterogeneity is important to study. The main com-
plication here is the lack of a closed-form solution to characterize players’ equilibrium
strategies in the presence of the bidding cost, except that I know there will be a min-
imum level of bidders’ skills to enter a particular contest class. Another direction is
to introduce supermodularity or submodularity between bidders’ skills and contests’
types. For instance, some bidders may encounter synergy effect by participating in
certain classes of contests. It would be fascinating to see how market outcomes are
affected by this synergy effect, and most importantly, how the market designer could
stimulate a better participation pattern using alternative policy intervention. Lastly,
as contest holders stand for the other side of the market, it would be substantial to
explicitly study their equilibrium behavior by incorporating a pricing stage before the
contestants’ movements. This is also related to the other two chapters of this thesis
but requires more work regarding proving the existence of a reasonable equilibrium
notion.
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Figure 4.1: Kernel Density Fitting of Bidder’s Value Function – Discrete Case
Table 4.1: Estimation of the Distribution of Contest-wise Unobserved Heterogeneity
– Discrete Case
starting value true value bias std.dev
Pr(ε = 1|R = 1.1) 0.9 0 -0.0303 0.3072
Pr(ε = 1|R = 1) 0.1 0 -0.0150 0.3144
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Figure 4.2: Kernel Density Fitting of Bidder’s Value Function – Continuous Case
(first specification)
Figure 4.3: Kernel Density Fitting of Bidder’s Value Function – Continuous Case
(second specification)
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Table 4.2: Estimation of the Distribution of Contest-wise Unobserved Heterogeneity
– Continuous Case
starting value true value bias std.dev
First set of parameters
µε|R=5 1 0.9 -0.1537 0.2135
µε|R=3 -1 -0.9 0.1532 0.2063
Second set of parameters
µε|R=5 1 1 -0.1925 0.4180
µε|R=3 -1 -1 0.2365 0.4351
σε|R=5 1 1 0.2534 0.7427
σε|R=3 2 2 -0.2337 0.6918
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